PACIFIC STATES/BRITISH COLUMBIA OIL SPILL TASK FORCE

2003 ANNUAL REPORT
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The states of Alaska, Washington, Oregon, California, and Hawaii have joined with the Province of British Columbia in order to combine resources and coordinate efforts to protect their shared waters and 56,660 miles of sensitive coastlines from the devastating impacts of oil spills.
This Annual Report of the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force is submitted to the Premier of British Columbia and the Governors of California, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, and Alaska, as well as to the citizens whom they represent. It provides information on the activities and accomplishments of the Task Force and its member agencies from July 2002 through June 2003.

The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force was established by a Memorandum of Cooperation signed in 1989, following two West Coast oil spill incidents. The first involved the barge Nestucca, which spilled oil impacting the coasts of Washington and British Columbia in December of 1988. The second incident was the catastrophic spill by the T/V Exxon Valdez in Alaska’s Prince William Sound in March of 1989. These events highlighted common concerns shared by West Coast states and the Province of British Columbia related to spill risks from coastal vessel traffic, the need for cooperation across shared borders, and a shared commitment among West Coast citizens of both the US and Canada to protect their unique marine resources.

The Oil Spill Task Force produced a report in October of 1990 that included 46 joint recommendations for spill prevention and response, as well as recommendations specific to each member's jurisdiction. Most of these recommendations have since been incorporated into state or provincial statutes, rules, or programs. They are also reflected in the US Federal Oil Pollution Act passed in 1990 (OPA ‘90), as well as the Canadian Shipping Act Amendments adopted in 1993.

As state/provincial and federal policies and programs are implemented, the continuing focus of the Task Force is on fostering regulatory compatibility, sharing information and resources, and coordinating regional projects to improve oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response in the shared Pacific waters of the US and Canada. These efforts have been guided by our five-year Strategic Plans (1994-1999, 1999-2004) and are based on our Mission, Goals, and Objectives as stated on the following page.

When the State of Hawaii authorized its Department of Health, Environmental Health Division, to join the Task Force in 2001, the governing Memorandum of Cooperation was updated and signed by Hawaii Governor Benjamin Cayetano, Alaska Governor Tony Knowles, Washington Governor Gary Locke, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber, California Governor Gray Davis, and Gordon Campbell, Premier of British Columbia. The organization's name was changed to the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, and the 1999-2004 Strategic Plan was also modified and reauthorized by the Task Force Members at their 2001 Annual Meeting.

This Annual Report does not reflect oil spill prevention and response activities on the part of any federal agencies or industry organizations except as may have occurred in response to or in cooperation with the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force or a member jurisdiction.
OUR MISSION:
The mission of the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force is to strengthen member agency efforts to prevent, prepare for, and respond to oil spills in US and Canadian Pacific coastal waters by exchanging information, sharing resources, promoting a consistent approach to regulatory standards, collaborating with key stakeholders to address shared concerns, reviewing current legislative authorizations and making recommendations for necessary changes, and advocating for our common interest on national and international issues.

OUR GOALS:
To prevent oil spills in US and Canadian Pacific coastal waters, both large spills that occur rarely but cause catastrophic impacts, and small spills that occur daily and have an equally devastating cumulative effect.

To coordinate communication, policy development, response capabilities, prevention and preparedness initiatives, and education in order to maximize efficiency of effort; to learn from one another and share ideas and “products.”

To clarify the roles and responsibilities of state and provincial agencies and federal agencies in order to reduce regulatory gaps, overlaps, and conflicts.

To advocate in national and international arenas on selected issues of common concern, earning respect through credibility, clarity of purpose, and collaboration.

To work cooperatively with federal agencies, vessel operators, the oil industry, response contractors, interest groups, and all concerned citizens to create opportunities for political and technological breakthroughs by serving as a catalyst for progressive change.

To educate the public on the impacts of oil spills and issues relating to spill prevention, response, and remediation.

To serve as a model of cooperation and coordination for the rest of North America.

OUR OBJECTIVES
Spill Prevention: Define and implement either regulatory or public/private partnership programs which effectively prevent oil spills and water pollution from vessels, facilities, recreational boating activities, and pipelines.


Communications: Improve communications within the Task Force and with the general public as well as with key stakeholders, and maintain a high level of public and stakeholder involvement in Task Force activities.
**Key Task Force Personnel**

**Task Force Members**

Commissioner, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

**Tom Fitzsimmons** (1996-2003)
Director, Washington Department of Ecology

**Lawrence Lau** (2003)
Hawaii Deputy Director for Environmental Health

**Gordon Macatee** (2003)
Deputy Minister, British Columbia Ministry of Water, Air, and Land Protection

**Carl Moore** (2003)
Interim Administrator, Office of Spill Prevention and Response, California Department of Fish and Game

Deputy Administrator, Oregon Department of Environmental Quality

**Coordinating Committee Members:**

**Larry Dietrick** (1999-2003)
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

**Curtis Martin** (2001-2003)
Office of Hazard Evaluation and Emergency Response

Washington Department of Ecology

**Scott Schaefer** (2000-2003)
Office of Spill Prevention and Response, California Department of Fish and Game

British Columbia Ministry of Water, Air, and Land Protection

**Mike Zollitsch** (1997-2003)
Oregon Department of Environmental Quality

**Executive Coordinator:**

**Jean Cameron** (1993-2003)
Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force
Dear Reader,

I certainly never guessed when I accepted the challenge as the Task Force’s first Executive Coordinator in March of 1993 that I’d still be at it ten years later! I am proud of all that the Oil Spill Task Force has accomplished over the last decade, including expanding its membership to include the State of Hawaii, the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project’s Findings and Recommendations, the revision of the Oil Spill Field Operations Guide, development of a Data Dictionary focused on causal information, Mutual Aid Agreements, implementation of a regional database, development of Integrated Vessel Response Plan guidelines, a thorough analysis of pilotage standards on the West Coast with recommendations for improvements, publication of recommended protocols for care of oiled wildlife, and much more.

Not least among our accomplishments has been the fact that the Task Force provides a forum for dialogue on key oil spill policy issues, not only among our member agencies, but with stakeholders from both US and Canadian federal agencies, industries, and advocacy organizations. We are planning our 2003 Annual Meeting and Roundtable to initiate a regional discussion on how to handle a worst-case event like the Prestige oil spill and manage decisions regarding “Places of Refuge.”

We realized a long-standing goal of generating regional spill data this year. Although one year’s worth of data does not a trend make, it provides interesting information on the need to focus on facility and vehicle spills as we develop a new five-year strategic plan for 2004-2009. It also points out that our work is far from done: more than 376,358 gallons of oil products were spilled in our region in 2002. As Tom Fitzsimmons, Washington State’s Task Force Member, noted “…maintaining vigilance in the face of resource shortfalls and new security priorities, while looking for more collaborative paradigms, will be the challenge over the next few years.”

We have benefited from two collaborative training events this past year: an investigator training course sponsored by OSPR and a seminar on detecting illegal bypasses on oil/water separator systems sponsored by Ecology. Another outcome of recent collaborations is the fact that, with passage of Alaska’s legislation in 2001 and adoption of their
implementing regulations in 2002, all West Coast jurisdictions now require oil spill contingency plans from non-tank vessels operating in our waters. We also note that all TAPS tankers will be double-hulled by 2008, and only three of these will not have “super-redundant” steering and propulsion systems.

Other milestones worth noting include appointment of four new Task Force Members over the past year: Ernesta Ballard, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation Commissioner; Lawrence Lau, Deputy Director for Environmental Health at the Hawaii Department of Health; Gordon Macatee, Deputy Minister for the British Columbia Ministry of Water, Land, and Air Protection; and Carl Moore, Interim Administrator, for the Office of Spill Prevention and Response in the California Department of Fish and Game. I welcome them to this successful collaborative effort, and look forward to working with all of you over the year ahead!

Sincerely,

Jean R. Cameron
Executive Coordinator
2002-2003 IN REVIEW:

OIL SPILL TASK FORCE ACTIVITIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SPILL PREVENTION PROJECTS:

THE SPILL INCIDENT AND CAUSAL DATABASE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Under the chairmanship of Jack Barfield of the Washington Department of Ecology, our Database Project Workgroup made great strides towards compiling regional spill data that will help target our oil spill prevention activities. Workgroup membership includes Camille Stevens from Alaska's Department of Environmental Conservation, Stafford Reid for the BC Ministry of Water, Land, and Air Protection, Mary Lou Perry for Oregon's Department of Environmental Quality, Rick Holly and Spencer Ung for California's Office of Spill Prevention and Response, and Curtis Martin and Marcia Graf for Hawaii's Office of Hazards Evaluation and Emergency Response. Over a series of conference calls the Workgroup agreed to consistent data categories and levels of detail which they could supply for 2002 oil spill data, pursuant to the Data Dictionary adopted by Task Force members in 1997. Jack Barfield provided member agencies with a standardized submittal format and compiled the 2002 data.

That data is displayed as a center insert to this Annual Report. The total spill volume for the Pacific States/BC Oil Spill Task Force region in 2002 was 376,358 gallons, which includes all spills of greater than 42 gallons to either water or land. Considering spills by source, we note that "Facilities" and "Vehicles" were the two largest contributors, with Facilities having a much larger share, approximately four times that of Vehicles. This generally held true in the breakdown by states, except in California and Hawaii. The California figures may be explained by the fact that energy shortages during the year resulted in significantly increased deliveries of fuel by truck to power generating facilities during 2002. Although preliminary, this initial data indicates that more prevention efforts ought to be focused on facilities. The Task Force will consider this during development of its 2004-2009 Strategic Plan and will further track source trends as we acquire data for multiple years.

Regarding Spills by Product, we note that "Diesel" was the largest contributor, at a 31% share regionally. Taken together with the above breakout by "Source," the conclusion is that diesel spills from vehicles and facilities are a major concern where prevention efforts should be focused. As we look at the causal information, the data shows 41% of spill volume to be due to "Equipment Failure," with "Human Error" at 29% and Organizational/Management Failure at 0.2%. This conclusion is at
variance with causal analysis experts who conclude that Human Error and Organizational/Management Failure, taken together, generally account for about 80% of all accidents. In the 2002 data, only Oregon, California, and Hawaii showed a significant contribution from Human Error and Organizational/Management Failure. It is the opinion of the Database Project Workgroup that many spills attributed to “Equipment Failure” would turn out to be attributed to Human Error or Organizational/Management Failure if they were investigated more thoroughly. However, several of our member states did not have the ability to carry out or record more thorough investigations for their 2002 data. The conclusion of the Database Workgroup is that the focus of spill prevention efforts should continue to be on Human Error and Organizational or Management Failure.

The Database Project Workgroup will target its 2003 efforts on refinements of spill data collection, including efforts to further define “other” and “unknown” categories, facility and vehicle types, and the causal information entered into each agency’s data. Towards that goal, the Task Force and California’s Office of Spill Prevention and Response co-sponsored an investigator training event in Sacramento, CA in February 2003. Thanks to the organizing efforts of Rick Holly and Bud Leland of OSRP, twenty-three persons attended from the Washington Department of Ecology, Hawaii’s HEER, OSPR, California State Lands’ Marine Facilities Division, and District 11 of the US Coast Guard. The DNV trainers applied terms from the Task Force’s Data Dictionary in their case studies, and all attendees gave both the trainers and the course content high marks.

We did not include data from British Columbia for 2002, since our member agency in BC is not the provincial agency that collects such data. However, Stafford Reid is designing an incident reporting system that will provide this information in the future.

THE WEST COAST OFFSHORE VESSEL TRAFFIC RISK MANAGEMENT PROJECT

Our focus this year has been on outreach as well as implementation of the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup’s final consensus findings and recommendations. These recommendations were covered in detail in the Task Force’s 2002 Annual Report, and were presented to the public and Task Force Members at their 2002 Annual Meeting. We also briefed VADM Terry Cross, the new Commander of the US Coast Guard Pacific Area, on the project and recommendations specific to the Coast Guard. His staff has worked with the Task Force and NOAA’s Coast Pilot Branch to develop and approve wording for notes on navigation charts and entries into Coast Pilot editions 7, 8, and 9. These
entries reflect the Workgroup’s recommendations for voluntary minimum
distances offshore for coastwise traffic. Transport Canada has also worked
with the Canadian Coast Guard and the Task Force to place equivalent
language on charts and sailing directions for the waters of Western
Canada.

Rick Holly of OSPR, the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk
Management Project Co-Chair, has worked with USCG Pacific Area and
Task Force staff to give presentations on the Project Workgroup’s final
consensus findings and recommendations to the Port Hueneme Harbor
Safety Committee in Southern California, the Spills Advisory Group of the
American Petroleum Institute, the Ship Operators Cooperative Program,
and the International Oil Spill Conference. A copy of the Workgroup’s final
project report is available at the Task Force’s website, and copies have also
been provided upon request during the year.

**DEVELOPMENT OF VOLUNTARY MANAGEMENT AND OPERATING
STANDARDS FOR TANKER OPERATORS**

In February of 2003, Stan Norman of the Washington Department of
Ecology and US Coast Guard Captain Scott Glover, Chief of Marine Safety,
Pacific Area, met with representatives from the Alaska Tanker Company,
SeaRiver Maritime, Inc., Polar Tankers, Tesoro, WSPA, and the American
Waterways Operators to discuss voluntary industry practices to reduce the
risk of oil spills. Such practices would go beyond current federal and
international standards and as such, would involve additional costs, but
justifications for such investments include improving safety and reducing
liability. The meeting attendees urged the Task Force to include operators
of non-tank vessels in further discussions, noting that all large vessels
face similar operating issues. They agreed to rank a set of “best industry
practices” with regard to which practices would be most effective in
preventing oil spills for both large vessels and tank barges.

Ranked from 1 to 10, with 1 considered the most effective, Best Industry
Practices for Commercial Tugs and Barges were ranked as follows:

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<th>Practice</th>
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<td>Tug crewing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navigation procedures</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tug crew work hours</td>
<td>3.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tug crew training</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tug technology</td>
<td>4.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tug watch procedures</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tug emergency procedures</td>
<td>5.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tug management system</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tug crew record keeping</td>
<td>7.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tug crew drug/alcohol testing</td>
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Ranked from 1 to 10, with 1 considered the most effective, Best Industry Practices for Large Commercial Vessels were ranked as follows:

- Watch practices: 1.25
- Training: 2.25
- Navigation: 2.5
- Pre-arrival tests & inspections: 5.5
- Management System: 6
- Emergency Procedures: 6.5
- Event Reports & Language: 7 each
- Technology: 8
- Engineering: 9.67
- Personnel Evaluations & Drug/alcohol testing: 10 each

The Task Force will focus this project on industry outreach during the 2003-2004 work year, endeavoring to promote dialogue on these practices across a broad range of maritime operators on the West Coast. For more information on the specifics of each practice, please visit the Task Force web site.

THE PACIFIC OIL SPILL PREVENTION EDUCATION TEAM

The Task Force Executive Coordinator participates in the Pacific Oil Spill Prevention Education Team (POSPET), as do representatives from the BC Ministry of Water, Land, and Air Protection, the Washington Department of Ecology, and the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality. Other POSPET members represent King County Hazardous Waste, Oregon State University Extension Sea Grant, Washington Sea Grant, the California Coastal Commission, the Oregon State Marine Board, the Puget Soundkeeper Alliance, and the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission. POSPET provides a forum where these programs can coordinate outreach to recreational boaters and marina operators with a focus on preventing small oil spills that add up to big environmental problems.

POSPET is chaired by Eric Olsson of Washington Sea Grant. Under Eric Olsson's leadership, POSPET sponsored a presentation and discussion in Lacey, Washington on May 13th that covered the Clean Marina programs in Washington, California, and Florida. Presenters focused on the problems and costs associated with pollution from recreational boating and marinas, as well as the range of educational programs available to address these problems.
MONITORING TAPS TANKERS
Laura Stratton of the Washington Department of Ecology provides the Task Force agencies with quarterly information on the status of Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS) tankers that transit the West Coast. These reports cover owner/operator, date of build or scheduled date of build, hull configuration, deadweight tonnage, conversion date if single hull or double bottom, and retirement date. This information is also posted on the Ecology web site, which is listed on page 48 below. The Task Force member agencies also track trends in the US Coast Guard’s Critical Area Inspection Program for TAPs tankers.

In addition, Task Force member agencies share information among themselves regarding casualties and incidents involving both tank and non-tank vessels that are transiting between our member jurisdictions.

SPILL PREVENTION TOPICS OF CONCERN
Each year the coordinating Committee monitors and shares information on selected spill prevention topics. Our topics for 2002-2003 included:

- Cruise ship operations with regard to spills and other water pollution impacts;
- Oil spill prevention research and development;
- Pipeline spill prevention;
- Bunkering and Oil Transfer standards;
- Offshore Lightering;
- Highway and railroad spill trends;
- Spill prevention at facilities;
- California’s development of a “threat matrix” to prioritize oil spill risks from sunken vessels; and
- Port and facility Best Available Protection standards.

SPILL PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PROJECTS:
A REVIEW OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING REQUIREMENTS
In March of 2003 the Task Force posted a draft of recommended contingency planning elements on its website for public comment. This action marked the culmination of an 18-month process which involved the Task Force’s Coordinating Committee in a thorough review and discussion of contingency plan requirements. Most of these requirements had been put in place in the early 1990s, so the Coordinating Committee’s goal was to bring the contingency planning requirements of our member agencies “into the 21st century.” Specific project goals included:
To simplify contingency planning by:
- Developing streamlined plans for vessels;
- Making the entire process less cumbersome on all involved;
- Allowing for electronic references to existing plans and documents as appropriate to meet information requirements; and
- Reducing agency resources spent on plan review so that more can be invested in drills, inspections, OSRO certifications, etc.

To achieve consistency and harmony by:
- Promoting standardization among member agencies and with federal agencies; plus
- Making plans consistent with area contingency plans and the area planning process.

To allow for and encourage Innovation by:
- Using electronic formats for plan submittal;
- Accepting vessel plans in the IVRP format or streamlined vessel plans; and
- Using the ICS/ICP format for facility plans.

To improve preparedness/response by:
- Addressing gaps and changes in response paradigms;
- Providing for continuous improvement;
- Making spill response more efficient; and
- Verifying and/or certifying spill response providers referenced in a contingency plan.

Among the recommended revisions were allowances for electronic submittals and references, putting all renewals on five-year cycles, more emphasis on the roles of Qualified Individuals and Incident Management Teams, development of response scenarios in cooperation with the regulating agencies, and a distinction between planning and performance standards for response.

In addition, the Task Force is recommending that a streamlined plan be used for vessels. This approach would initially apply to non-tank vessels, then tank vessels at the next appropriate planning cycle. The contents of such a plan are described in regulations recently adopted by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation. Contingency plan information not covered in streamlined plans would be included in oil spill response organization (ORSO) applications by OSROs that serve vessels submitting streamlined plans.
Following adjustments based on public comment, the Task Force Coordinating Committee will submit their final recommendations to the Task Force Members at the 2003 Annual Meeting.

**CONTINGENCY PLANNING REQUIREMENTS FOR NON-TANK VESSELS**

One of the Task Force’s goals for this past year was to support initiatives by the US Coast Guard or other states to require oil spill contingency planning and response contracts for large cargo, passenger, and fishing vessels. We intend to do so by providing letters of support, testimony, or expertise as necessary. The US Coast Guard’s draft 2003 Authorization Act provides authority to require contingency plans from non-tank vessels 400 gross tons or larger, so we look forward to working with them on regulations to implement this authority.

**1-800-OILS-911**

The Task Force maintains this toll-free spill reporting number in California, Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia. The number automatically reaches the 24-hour emergency reporting number in each of these four jurisdictions as a function of the location from which the call originates. For example, a call made to 1-800-OILS-911 from anywhere in Washington will automatically reach the Washington emergency reporting number.

Although it is available for anyone to use, information regarding the number is targeted at recreational boaters and fishermen through outreach by POSPET members (see above). Usage analysis for August 2002 through April of 2003 shows that the OILS-911 number was used 106 times during that period. The breakdown shows that 16 of those calls were made in British Columbia, four in Washington, four in Oregon, and 82 in California.

**THE INTEGRATED VESSEL RESPONSE PLAN GUIDELINES**

In 1998 the Task Force completed a cooperative project with the US Coast Guard and industry stakeholders that resulted in approval of a voluntary Integrated Vessel Response Plan (IVRP) format. This format allows correlation of West Coast state planning requirements as well as the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by the Canadian Coast Guard with the US Coast Guard vessel planning requirements.

The Task Force Members signed a formal agreement in 1998 reflecting their willingness to accept vessel response plans submitted in the IVRP format. They also agreed to communicate any new or revised contingency
planning regulations to the Task Force Executive Coordinator for updates to the format guidance matrix. In addition, the Canadian Ministry of Transport determined that the Integrated Vessel Response Plan format will be acceptable to meet their vessel planning standards, since it includes the SOPEP format from Marpol. A formal endorsement from the US Coast Guard is also in place.

The integrated format guidance matrix is available to planholders on the Task Force website, and is kept current with any changes in member agency contingency planning regulations, thus is an ongoing project.

**SPILL PREPAREDNESS/RESPONSE TOPICS OF CONCERN**

As under the Spill Prevention Objective, the Coordinating Committee has monitored and shared information on the following oil spill preparedness/response “topics of concern” throughout the past year:

- Unannounced drill programs;
- Financial responsibility requirements, state and federal;
- Hazardous material spill contingency planning;
- Response technologies, including research and development;
- Salvage capabilities and regulations;
- Response training standards for member agency personnel; and
- Illegal bypasses of oil/water separator systems.

**COMMUNICATIONS PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES:**

**STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION**

Stakeholders can monitor Task Force activities through our web site and our mailings, and can also participate in Task Force sponsored events or project workgroups. The Executive Coordinator maintains a mailing list of interested persons in the US, Canada, and abroad who receive notices of the roundtable discussions and annual meetings, as well as a request for Legacy Awards nominations. We host two public events each year: a roundtable forum and our Annual Meeting; these two events will be combined in July of 2003.

**THE 2002 ANNUAL MEETING**

The theme of the 2002 Annual Meeting was “Doing It Right: Balancing Regulatory and Non-Regulatory Approaches.” Eighty-four persons attended the event, which was hosted by the Washington Department of Ecology at the Tacoma Sheraton Hotel. Task Force Members or their delegates included: Harlan Henderson (California), Michele Brown
Michele Brown, Commissioner of Alaska’s Department of Environmental Conservation, delivered the keynote address. She addressed the Annual Meeting theme by explaining that Alaska Governor Tony Knowles had decided that resource development had to be done right or not at all, and defined “doing it right” by three concepts:

- Sound science - requiring the latest and best scientific information about resources and best technologies;
- Prudent management - ensuring conservation and sustainability through adaptive management, field monitoring, assessment, and verification; and
- Responsible, meaningful public involvement and decision making.

“To me,” Michele stated, “it meant that enforcing the laws would now be the floor for basic compliance, but we were expected to do better than that. We needed to become more comprehensive and multi-disciplinary in our analyses, and more inclusive and outcome driven in our processes. As we implemented the post-Exxon Valdez laws, we experienced an attitude change in government, industry, and the public: we no longer saw a spill prevention and response system as fixed at any single point in time. We had come to view the system as one of continuous improvement, requiring constant attention, re-evaluation, and testing. Yet, the traditional system of regulatory permit and plan approval wasn’t really maximizing the benefits of that attitude change. “

“We began by recognizing that there is a common resource stewardship responsibility on government, on industry, and on the public, and an obligation for all three to be involved and have confidence in how and what decisions were being made. Not one of the three can do it alone while the others just watch or judge,” Michele stated. “We sought a real discussion among resource managers, environmentalists, facility operators, property owners, and political officials, and we sought for that discussion to move away from the old saw of science versus politics. The discussion must start with sound science as the floor for decision making. The discussion then must move to politics, meaning democratic

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1 Jim McCracken was a victim of a double murder-suicide in Kamloops, BC on October 15th. The Members of the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force are tremendously saddened by Jim’s death. His commitment to asking tough questions and finding the right answers will be a loss for the entire Pacific Region as well as for the people of the Province of British Columbia.
decision-making. We experimented with this non-regulatory approach in two areas where we were having difficulty gaining improvements. We’re now full believers."

“The first example is Alaska’s new legislation designed to extend the state’s oil spill safety net to include non-tank vessels - vessels of over 400 gross tons that carry oil as fuel - that were previously unregulated. Our spills database showed that, in the previous five years, the unregulated operators had 10 times more spill incidents and spilled 50 times more oil than the regulated operators. That big hole in our oil spill prevention and response safety net had to be addressed. The Alaska Legislature established a Task Force which drew together a cross-section of industry and some public representatives. Through extensive study and discussion the group developed a set of recommendations to bring efficient, flexible, and cost effective oil spill prevention and response planning to over 1000 non-tank vessels. The Task Force’s recommendations carried a lot of weight with the Legislature as they were a collaborative product with both government and industry approval. The law establishing the general requirement to have a contingency plan then easily passed the next legislative session.”

“The second example I’d like to mention concerned the introduction of state-of-the-art tanker escort vessels in Prince William Sound. The evolution from no escort to the current full assist capability was not smooth. Frankly, the group began work with some hostility. But, as we studied tanker risks in the Sound and analyzed the costs and benefits of various proposed alternatives, the mood changed. By 1999, all parties were convinced of the benefits of enhanced tugs. And, instead of just choosing among existing technology, the group ended up designing an enhanced tug to fit the specific purposes and geography. The order went to the shipyards, the tugs were built, and they are now in service.”

Michele Brown noted that “Other good examples of a non-regulatory approach are this Task Force’s development of the new and improved Field Operations Guide for oil and hazardous substance incident response and the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Study, which has looked at vessel traffic on a regional basis in order to recommend safe distances for transiting near sensitive shoreline and other resources. Through these and other initiatives, the Task Force continues to prove its effectiveness in promoting non-regulatory options on a regional, inter-jurisdictional scale.”

“In summary,” she concluded, “this non-regulatory approach I’ve been describing does not replace a regulatory program. It augments it by spending time on improved outcomes rather than in constantly rewriting
stale or outdated regulations. It takes work and still has some conflict, but the gains are truly measurable. Regulatory agencies are managers and facilitators for community values discussions as well as enforcers of law. It's far better for people to be involved in key agency decision making rather than standing outside the ring and urging the agency to be position gladiators. Compliance with regulations may be minimally adequate but that's not always enough for doing it right. Non-regulatory or cooperative management approaches can lead us to more effective and direct improvements.”

Following activity updates from the Task Force member agencies, Annual Meeting host Tom Fitzsimmons, Director of the Washington Department of Ecology, presented the five 2003 Legacy Awards (see below). Following these Legacy Award presentations, Jean Cameron explained that the Task Force member agencies and their staff are not eligible for the Legacy Awards, so with the approval of the Coordinating Committee, she had decided to create a new award category this year, called the Executive Coordinator’s Outstanding Service Award. She explained that this award need not be given each year, but was intended to honor outstanding service to the Task Force by one of its Members. That being said, she proudly announced that the 2002 Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force Outstanding Service Award was to be presented to Michele Brown, Task Force Member from Alaska, in appreciation of her vision that the ideals of regional cooperation, open communication, and continuing improvement would be the operative values of the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force.

Jean also announced two Certificates of Appreciation marking five or more years of service to the Task Force. The first of these Certificates of Appreciation was presented to Michael Zollitsch, Coordinating Committee Member from the State of Oregon. Jean explained that his integrity and experience had added value to the deliberations of the Task Force Coordinating Committee, and his patience and perseverance as a contract manager has contributed greatly to the efficient operations of the Task Force. The second Certificate of Appreciation was presented to Tom Fitzsimmons, Task Force Member from the State of Washington. Jean noted that Tom has been a consistent voice for regional and local commitments to oil spill prevention while also improving oil spill preparedness and response. Over the last six years Tom enthusiastically supported the Task Force’s efforts to facilitate public/private sector partnerships while making this approach standard procedure in the State of Washington and providing unequivocal leadership on difficult trans-boundary issues.
The afternoon panel discussion continued the theme of Balancing Public and Private Initiatives. The panel was moderated by Jim McCracken, Director of Regional Operations and Environmental Protection for the Province of BC. Panelists included:

- Jack Buono, Operations Vice President for SeaRiver Maritime, Incorporated;
- US Coast Guard Captain Dave Westerholm, Chief of the US Coast Guard Office of Response and Vice Chair of the National Response Team;
- Dr. Mike Ziccardi, Program Coordinator for California’s Oiled Wildlife Care Network; and
- Bruce Wishart, Policy Director for People for Puget Sound.

The panel discussion was followed by a presentation by Rick Holly of OSPR, USCG CDR Steve Danscuk, and USCG LT Patricia Springer on the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup’s final findings and recommendations. Copies of the Project Final Report were also made available for the audience.

The full text of Ms. Brown’s keynote address and more details on the panel discussion as well as a copy of the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup’s final report are all available at the Task Force web site at: http://wlapwww.gov.bc.ca/eeeb/taskforc/tfhome.htm.

The following persons offered advice and comment during the public comment session for the 2002 Annual Meeting:

- Bill Burnett of the Fraser River Pilots in BC explained that pilots consider themselves the first line of defense for marine environmental protection.
- Steve Lewis, President of the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council, offered several observations on the non-regulatory process. Noting that citizen organizations don’t have the same resources to bring to the table as industry and government, he recommended the following guidelines for such a process:
  1. Participants should mutually agree to the problem definition;
  2. Likewise, they should agree on the project goals;
  3. Adequate resources must be committed to see the project through;
  4. This would be helped by a mutually agreed upon time limit;
  5. An outside facilitator should be used;
  6. Regulatory interpretation should be avoided; and
  7. Don’t attempt to resolve all philosophical differences.
• CAPT Chip Booth commented that the US Coast Guard is always exploring ways to be more collaborative, and cited the USCG District 13 Memorandum of Agreement with the State of Washington.
• Rich Berkowitz of the Transportation Institute in Seattle, WA commented that a lot has already been accomplished on marine spills and recommended that Task Force member agencies shift more of their focus to inland spill issues.
• USCG CAPT Dave Westerholm advised the Task Force to consider the National Academy of Sciences study on spill sources with regard to future priorities and to stay engaged with the Coast Guard by commenting on regulatory proposals and offering advice as to what should be done.
• Jonathan Benner stated that he generally agrees with comments made at the meeting, and wants to stay engaged with activities on the West Coast. He will advocate for continued attention to state/federal roles and consistency with international standards.

Following the public comment period, Task Force Members signed an agreement to adopt and endorse the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management (WCOVTRM) Project Workgroup’s Final Report and Recommendations. They also agreed to work with the US and Canadian Coast Guards, the maritime industry, and local governments to ensure implementation of the recommendations. The Members thanked all workgroup members present for their hard work and contributions to the WCOVTRM Project.

Jean Cameron, Task Force Executive Coordinator, then reviewed Task Force activities over the past year as well as the Task Force's work plans for the coming year. She highlighted new projects and changes to the annual workplan approved by the Task Force members at their work session the previous day.

As the host for the 2002 Annual Meeting, Tom Fitzsimmons then thanked Michele for her emphasis on continuous improvement as well as partnerships and collaborations. He noted that British Columbia is initiating new approaches to emergency response programs and that all the member states of the Task Force face “interesting times,” even if much has been accomplished. “Maintaining vigilance in the face of resource shortfalls and new security priorities, while looking for more collaborative paradigms, will be the challenge over the next few years,” Tom stated. Gary Gill then invited the Task Force Members to Hawaii for the 2003 Annual Meeting and the 2002 session was adjourned.
THE 2002 LEGACY AWARDS

Legacy Award categories include industry, non-profit or public agency organizations, individuals, and team efforts. The Task Force gives Legacy Awards in these categories for projects, accomplishments, or leadership that demonstrates innovation, management commitment, and improvements in oil spill prevention, preparedness, or response resulting in enhanced environmental protection. Efforts to promote partnerships and involve the public are also considered. Organizations or individuals nominated for the Legacy Award must be located or primarily operating in the Task Force jurisdictions of Alaska, British Columbia, Washington, Oregon, California (and Hawaii effective August 1, 2001). Organizations or individuals representing a regulated industry must demonstrate a satisfactory history of compliance with state, provincial, and federal oil spill regulations.

Five 2002 Legacy Awards were presented as follows:

Mr. Kim Beasley, General Manager, Clean Islands Council, Hawaii, in recognition of his extraordinary efforts to both prepare for and respond to oil spills. Details follow:

- Recognizing the value of effective early response efforts, Mr. Beasley worked with the resort/hotel industry on Maui to develop a “Hotel Pack” of response equipment and to train hotel staff in its use.
- Their goal was to reduce oil spill impacts on hotel properties and guests, thus reducing the overall costs of a spill event.
- Mr. Beasley’s efforts have significantly increased the oil spill awareness in the Maui hotel industry, given the hotels the basic tools needed to launch an effective initial response, and provided the potentially affected parties with the information they need to better protect themselves and their guests from the consequences of an oil release.
- Mr. Beasley plans to extend the program to the hotel industry on the other Hawaiian Islands.
- Mr. Beasley took initiative beyond his job requirements with the CIC to develop this project. The Task Force views this as an innovative project which both improves spill response and includes a public education element; in addition, the project is transferable to other member jurisdictions.

Mr. Jerry McMahon, Vice President, Pacific Region, American Waterways Operators in recognition of his extraordinary efforts to both prevent and prepare for oil spills. Details follow:

- This award is for Mr. McMahon’s leadership of the Washington State Maritime Commission, later the Washington State Maritime
Cooperative (WSMC). Representing the towing industry, he served as president of WSMC for seven years until his recent resignation.

- As Chair of the Commission, which was established by the Washington Legislature, he established its administrative structure and guided its transition into a private-sector non-profit cooperative.
- Besides setting up an effective administration and meeting response requirements, he has implemented educational programs for the vessel operators covered by WSMC and established a mutual aid agreement with Burrard Clean, the spill response cooperative in BC.
- In addition to his successful leadership of WSMC, Jerry has represented the Pacific Region tug/towing industry on numerous advisory committees for both our member states and the Task Force.
- He also co-chairs the American Waterways Operators/US Coast Guard Quality Steering Committee, Pacific Region.
- In all these roles, Jerry McMahon has contributed to improving oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response, thereby improving environmental protection.

Mr. Stephen Ricks, President, Clean Bay Incorporated, Concord, California, in recognition of extraordinary efforts to both prepare for and respond to oil spills. Details follow:

- As president of Clean Bay Inc., Steve Ricks has spearheaded dramatic improvements in the region’s oil spill response and clean up capabilities.
- Under his leadership, the nonprofit Clean Bay has doubled its resources for both deep- and shallow-water clean up for tankers, non-tank vessels and marine facilities since 1990.
- Mr. Ricks collaborated on efforts to develop the State of California Unified Oil Spill Control Course to train spill responders. Since 1996, this successful public-private partnership has taught more than 200 responders about equipment deployment techniques, safety and organizational command systems.
- Through his work on the San Francisco Bay and Delta Area Committees, Mr. Ricks has played a strong leadership role in developing and field-testing response strategies for environmentally sensitive sites in the San Francisco Bay Area.
- As a member of California’s Oil Spill Technical Advisory Committee, he provides a positive common sense approach to contingency planning, ship-to-ship oil transfers and regulations effecting oil spill response organizations.
- For more than a decade, Mr. Ricks has been a driving force in advancing spill prevention and response capabilities to protect the environment.
SeaRiver Maritime, Incorporated, of Houston, Texas, in recognition of extraordinary efforts to prevent oil spills. Mr. Jack Buono, Vice President for Operations, accepted the award on behalf of SeaRiver Maritime. Details follow:

- Within our area of interest, SeaRiver Maritime operates ocean-going tankers in the TAPS trade, carrying Alaskan crude oil to West Coast refineries. SeaRiver Maritime consistently exceeds the US Coast Guard's Critical Area Inspection program requirements for these tankers, and places great emphasis on the professionalism of its people.
- SeaRiver Maritime has invested $1.7 million in employee training and drills, conducted root cause analysis risk assessments, and uses a rigorous vetting process that focuses on both vessels and terminals.
- SeaRiver Maritime's Safety Management System both satisfies the mandatory International Safety Management Code and also meets or exceeds several other voluntary quality standards including the ISO 9000 standards.
- In both 1999 and 2001 the Washington Department of Ecology certified that SeaRiver had met criteria for its ECOPRO award, which requires voluntarily meeting a level of operation that exceeds state and federal standards and emphasizes reducing accidents caused by human error.
- SeaRiver Maritime's 2001 data indicates that their approach has been successful. In 2001 SeaRiver handled 196.4 million barrels of product with less than 11 gallons lost, and had no operating casualties.
- SeaRiver Maritime has exhibited a commitment to oil spill prevention that translates into environmental protection for the West Coast of both the US and Canada and the Oil Spill Task Force was pleased to honor their commitment and record.

The Turn Point Standard of Care Development Team, which includes the Canadian Coast Guard, Marine Programs; the British Columbia Coast Pilots; and the US Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Services, Puget Sound. This award was made in recognition of The Turn Point Standard of Care Development Team's extraordinary efforts to prevent oil spills. US Coast Guard Commander William Devereaux accepted on behalf of the USCG VTS and Ms. Yvette Myers accepted on behalf of the Canadian Coast Guard, Marine Programs. Details follow:

- The US Coast Guard’s 1999-2000 Port Access Route Study for the Strait of Juan De Fuca recommended that a Special Operating Area be established in the vicinity of Turn Point, where Boundary Pass
meets Haro Strait - in order to prevent collisions and power groundings of deep draft vessels.

- Cooperation between the BC Coast Pilots, the Canadian Coast Guard, and the US Coast Guard resulted in the Turn Point Standard of Care, which became effective in June 2001. The Standard of Care (SOC) established criteria by which vessels would meet at Turn Point as well as maintain a minimum distance offshore.
- A measuring and monitoring system was created to evaluate the effectiveness of the Standard of Care; as of 4/1/02, there has been 99.9% compliance with the minimum distance recommendation.
- In addition, the goodwill generated in developing this standard of care has resulted in improved communication across borders and across professions, as well as cooperative projects to educate small vessel operators and recreational boaters in the area.
- This type of transboundary cooperation and coordination epitomizes the goals of the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force.

**TASK FORCE WEB SITE**

The British Columbia Ministry of Water, Land, and Air Protection maintains a website for the Task Force. The following information is available from the home page:

- An overview of Task Force;
- A map of the Task Force's area of interest;
- A list of Task Force Members and Coordinating Committee, with contact information;
- Copies of the current Strategic Plan, Annual Workplan, and the latest Annual Report;
- Recent correspondence and comments submitted by the Task Force;
- The latest edition of our newsletter, Quarterly Report to Our Stakeholders;
- Cooperative Agreements and Resolutions adopted by the Task Force Members;
- Task Force Project Reports;
- Summary Notes of the most recent Annual and Coordinating Committee Meetings;
- Connections to Internet sites for Task Force Member and Federal Agencies; and
- Upcoming Task Force event information.

Please visit our site on at:
http://wlapwww.gov.bc.ca/eeeb/taskforc/tfhome.htm
OTHER TASK FORCE COMMUNICATIONS AND OUTREACH ACTIVITIES

• Pursuant to our focus on submitting Task Force consensus comments on federal initiatives, the Executive Coordinator tracks rulemaking activities and notifies member agencies of opportunities for comment on relevant proposals. Consensus comments were submitted by the Task Force this year on the US Coast Guard’s proposed Salvage and Marine Firefighting regulations, the US Coast Guard’s Environmental Agenda for the 21st Century, and the US Coast Guard’s proposed rule on 2003 Removal Equipment Requirements and Alternative Technology Revisions. The Task Force also submitted a statement to the US Commission on Ocean Policy. Copies of all these comments are available on our web site.

• The Task Force Coordinating Committee met with representatives of the US Coast Guard Pacific Area during their winter quarterly meeting and representatives from the Canadian Coast Guard, Environment Canada, and Transport Canada during their spring meeting. Discussion topics focused on projects of common interest such as implementation of the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project recommendations as well as topics of common concern such as Places of Refuge.

• The Task Force responds to information requests from students, regulators, journalists, professionals, and concerned citizens worldwide. For example, from August of 2002 through April of 2003, the Task Force responded to information requests from the US, Canada, Egypt, Brazil, and New Zealand.

• Jean Cameron represents the Task Force on the Pacific Region Quality Steering Committee of the American Waterways Operators and the US Coast Guard. This team is focused on improving safety in barge and towing operations on the West Coast. Stan Norman of the Washington Department of Ecology serves as the Task Force’s alternate.

• Jean Cameron also serves as a member of the US Coast Guard’s Navigation Safety Advisory Council (NAVSAC), where she works with representatives of the maritime community to prevent oil spills by promoting navigation safety through applications and revisions to both the inland and international “rules of the road,” advice on implementation of the Coast Guard’s Prevention Through People program, and review of safety issues associated with developments in maritime and navigation technology.

• The Coordinating Committee of the Task Force held its quarterly meetings in Tacoma, Washington, Long Beach, California, Honolulu, Hawaii, and Vancouver, BC over this past work year. These meetings provide opportunities for information exchange as well a
decisions on implementation of projects outlined in our Annual Workplan.

- Jean Cameron, Executive Coordinator, attended both the October 2002 and the February 2003 meetings of the American Petroleum Institute’s Spills Advisory Group and updated them on Task Force activities and projects.

- The Task Force member agencies routinely exchange information on their initiatives and activities. In addition, the Task Force office maintains a directory of member agency staff that includes information on their program areas and ICS specialties, thus facilitating both information exchange between agencies as well as expertise exchange during spill responses. Our Annual Workplans also identifies points of contact within each member agency for each Task Force project or Topic of Concern.

- A quarterly newsletter is published on our website. Titled our “Quarterly Report to Our Stakeholders” it provides interested persons with regular updates on Task Force activities and projects.

- The Task Force has initiated a survey of West Coast and national environmental organizations active on oil spill and marine protection topics.

- Task Force and Coordinating Committee members met at SeaTac, Washington in November 2002 to consider long-term visions for Task Force activities and the level of staffing necessary to achieve those visions. They agreed to maintain a fulltime Executive Coordinator position and also agreed to transfer management of the staff contract from Oregon Department of Environmental Quality to the Washington Department of Ecology effective July 1, 2003.

- The Task Force sponsored a booth at the 2003 International Oil Spill Conference in Vancouver, BC April 6-10, 2003, where both Task Force and member agencies’ literature was available. Booth staffing was shared among the member agencies and everyone had opportunities to interact with conference attendees. In addition, Jean Cameron co-presented a paper on the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project and co-chaired a panel session at the Conference on cross-boundary response.
TASK FORCE MEMBER AGENCY ACTIVITIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

In addition to their dedication of staff and resources to Oil Spill Task Force projects, our member agencies have been involved in a wide range of initiatives in their own jurisdictions, as outlined below:

ALASKA:

The Division of Spill Prevention and Response, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC)

- ADEC received reports of 1,966 oil spills, 79 brine spills, and 387 hazardous substance spills in calendar year 2002. The Department conducted 314 field responses to oil spills, 9 field responses to brine spills, and 40 field responses to hazardous substance spills. The Department estimates that 219,947 gallons of oil, 68,953 gallons of brine and 46,806 gallons of hazardous substances were spilled in 2002.

- Of the 43 oil spills exceeding the Task Force data threshold of 500 gallons to land and one barrel to water, 36 were from facilities, 3 from vessels, and 3 from vehicles. The source for one spill was unknown.

- ADEC responded to three incidents which required a significant response effort, including incident management and oversight, shoreline cleanup assessment, and communications support:
  1. The abandoned fishing vessel Genei Maru No. 7 drifted ashore at Cape Kazakof on Afognak Island in November 2002. In coordination with the US Coast Guard, ADEC provided communications support and helped develop plans to remove 14,570 gallons of fuel, 48 cubic yards of solid waste, 2 drums of oily waste, and 3 drums of hazardous materials from the beached vessel.
  2. In response to the November 3rd earthquake along the Denali Fault, which measured 7.9 on the Richter scale, ADEC provided assistance to affected villages to mitigate quake-related spills. In Mentasta, the hardest-hit village, ADEC assisted in re-plumbing heating oil tanks and providing fuel to heat buildings and homes during the emergency phase. Trans-Alaska Pipeline System assessment and repair efforts were also monitored by ADEC until the successful restart of the pipeline.
3. In response to recurring intermittent spills in Cook Inlet from an abandoned 19-mile sub-sea pipeline in 2001 and 2002, ADEC worked with BP to develop and implement a spill mitigation plan which guided the removal of 113 barrels of crude oil and 1,142 barrels of oily water from the abandoned line. Response resources and dispersant monitoring equipment were mobilized as a contingency if oil was released during the mitigation efforts.

- ADEC continued to work with BP Exploration and Phillips Alaska to implement the Charter Agreement for the Alaska North Slope, which was developed as part of the 1999 BP-ARCO merger and signed by the State of Alaska, BP and Phillips. The Charter's environmental commitments include a pledge by industry to spend over $15 million by 2010 to clean up historic contamination, including old reserve pits, contaminated sites, and abandoned drums, and to improve oil spill response on Alaska's North Slope. The Charter also commits industry to improve the safety of oil transportation through the accelerated acquisition of double-hulled tankers.

- ADEC negotiated two new Community Spill Response Agreements in 2002, increasing the total number of agreements to forty-one (41). These agreements continue to expand the State's pool of responders and provide “first response” capability in some areas for the first time. ADEC also pre-positioned five additional spill response equipment packages which are available at cost to local communities, responsible parties, spill response cooperatives and response action contractors. The addition of these five packages also brings the total number of response equipment packages statewide to forty-one (41).

- The Alaska Incident Management System (AIMS) Guide for Oil and Hazardous Substance Response was revised with an effective date of November 2002. The guides have been widely distributed to the spill response community in Alaska, including the Alaska Regional Response Team, State Emergency Response Commission, Local Emergency Planning Committees, the oil industry, and oil spill response cooperatives. Guides were also provided to attendees at the 2003 International Oil Spill Conference.

- ADEC continued to implement new legislation requiring oil spill contingency plans for non-tank vessels of over 400 gross tons and railroad operations that carry or transport substantial amounts of fuel. There are approximately 1000 non-tank vessels of over 400 gross tons and one railroad operation (the Alaska Railroad) subject to these regulations, which became effective November 27, 2002. Newly regulated
operators had until May 27, 2003 to submit contingency plans to ADEC for review and approval.

- A tabletop Hazardous Materials Response Planning exercise was held at Healy in May 2002, and featured a joint deployment in response to a simulated truck rollover involving a hazardous substance. Participants included ADEC, the Anchorage and Fairbanks Hazmat teams, the 103rd Civil Support Team, EPA, and local responders. Cold-weather decontamination exercises were also held in Anchorage and Fairbanks during the winter. The Statewide Hazmat Response Working Group discussed Level A Hazmat Team deployment elsewhere in the state, with particular focus on Valdez and Juneau, as well as a statewide decontamination strategy for incidents involving a large number of people.

- The Federal/State Unified Plan is undergoing revision and general comments were requested to begin drafting Change 3. Change 1 to the Cook Inlet Subarea Contingency Plan has been drafted and will undergo public review this summer. The change incorporates 74 Geographic Response Strategies which have been developed for the Cook Inlet subarea. GRS development for the Prince William Sound subarea is also nearing completion for 20 sites, and a total of 60 GRS sites for the Southeast Alaska subarea are being finalized. Once completed, the strategies will be incorporated into the appropriate subarea plans.

- Additional information about the program and available documents can be obtained at the ADEC web site at:
  http://www.state.ak.us/dec/dspar/dec_dspr.htm
BRITISH COLUMBIA:

Environmental Emergency Management and Permits, the
British Columbia Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection

The Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection (WLAP) works to protect people, property, and the environment from environmental hazards through its emergency program. This program undertakes emergency planning and coordination and uses trained Response Officers for oil and hazardous material response. The Regional Operations Branch in Victoria undertakes environmental emergency planning.

On average, more than 3500 environmental emergencies are reported to the ministry annually; most are hazardous material spills and releases. Response Officers located in regional offices are available to respond to these spills. There is a Manager, Environmental Emergency Planner and an Emergency Operations Officer in Headquarters (Victoria) for planning and preparedness of large-scale incidents from marine, freshwater, and land based hazards.

There are various interagency coordinating committees established to promote cooperation among oil spill response agencies. Memberships include WLAP, the Environment Canada, Fisheries & Oceans Canada, Burrard Clean Operations, Transport Canada and the Port of Vancouver. The committees meet regularly to exchange information and to discuss training, equipment, and response issues of mutual concern.

BC Water, Land and Air Protection supports and monitors Coast Guard (both US and Canadian), shipping and oil industry initiatives towards marine oil spill prevention, preparedness and response. Issues of concern include:

- Improving rescue tug capability along BC's West Coast;
- Assessing shipping risks on the outer BC coast posed by vessels on the great-circle route, en route to Alaska, or operating in Canada's territorial sea;
- Phasing out of single-hulled oil tankers on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS);
- Promoting a unified command approach in marine oil spill response among lead jurisdictions and the Responsible Party;
- Reducing chronic spills from commercial and recreational vessels, and
- Promoting compliance on waste discharges from passenger and other major vessels.
The Province continues to maintain the Coastal Inventory and Oil Spill Response Information System for coastal protection and planning (http://wlapwww.gov.bc.ca/eeeb/osris/osris.html). This computer-based system utilizes satellite imagery with video and geographically linked/mapped coastal inventory data for determining shoreline sensitivity. Coastal resource and land use data have been gathered for the Strait of Georgia, Vancouver Island and Central Coast. An atlas of the west coast of Vancouver is available on CD-ROM.

The Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection is an “associate member” of Burrard Clean Operations for the purpose of improved response capability and to facilitate closer industry and government cooperation.

In accordance with the Ministry’s 2003/04 - 2005/06 Service Plan (available at http://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/sp2003/wlap/), the ministry is developing frameworks for acceptable remediation of contaminated sites and appropriate responses to high-risk environmental and human health and safety emergencies. To guide its Response Officers on whether to attend a spill in the field, a risk-based decision model has been developed that takes into account public safety, environmental sensitivity, response capability and timing of other responding agencies and the Responsible Party. A major focus of the emergency management program will also be to expand industry and local government responsibility for response to and clean up of spills.

A spill incident database is currently being developed. This data-base will have a strong program evaluation component that includes: capturing data on industrial sectors that cause spills, measuring response performance by all government sectors (local, federal and provincial) and the Responsible party, determining spill cause factors, and tracking response costs.

The Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection, as the lead provincial agency for spills, is currently training and equipping four Incident Management Teams to deliver on its three response plans for major environmental emergencies (BC Marine Oil Spill Response Plan, BC Inland Oil Spill Response Plan, and BC Hazardous Material Response Plan). These plans and supporting operational guidelines can be found on the Emergency Program’s homepage.

The Environmental Emergency Program’s Homepage is http://wlapwww.gov.bc.ca/eeeb/eephome/index.htm
In addition, the following reports and documents are available from the British Columbia Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection, PO Box 9377, Stn Prov Govt, Victoria, BC, V8W 9M6, CANADA

- BC Coastal Marine Facility and Operating Standards Manual (11/91)
- Guidelines for Industry Emergency Response Plans (3/92)
- Coastal Resources Oil Spill Response Atlas: Southwest Coast of Vancouver Island (8/90)
- Coastal Resources Oil Spill Response Atlas: Southern Strait of Georgia (11/93)
- Oiled Marine Shoreline Cleanup Training Course (5/95)
- Basic Marine Oil Spill Safety Training Course (5/95)
- The Double Hull Issue and Oil spill Risk on the Pacific West Coast (7/95) (on internet site)
- Benefit-Cost Analysis of Expediting the Schedule for Double-Hulling Oil Tankers and Barges Operating in and near British Columbia Waters (9/95)
- Benefit-Cost Analysis of Establishing a Dedicated Rescue/Salvage Tug to Serve Canada’s Southern West Coast (9/95)
- Financial Preparedness for a Major Marine Oil Spill in British Columbia (9/95)
- BC Marine Oil Spill Response Plan (on internet site)
- BC Inland Oil Spill Response Plan (on internet site)
- BC Hazardous Material Response Plan (on internet site)
- Operational Guidelines for Site-level Emergency Response (on internet site)
CALIFORNIA:

The California Department of Fish and Game’s Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR)

- The Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), a division of the Department of Fish and Game (DFG), is the lead State agency for off-highway oil spill prevention and response in California. The Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990 (Act) established the OSPR and provides the OSPR Administrator with substantial authority to direct spill response, cleanup, natural resource damage assessment and restoration.

- New Administrator: On Friday, February 28, Harlan Henderson resigned as OSPR Administrator in order to pursue other opportunities. He had been the OSPR Administrator since July 2001. Department of Fish and Game Director Robert Hight named Mr. Carlton Moore interim OSPR Administrator.

Moore is a senior attorney who has been with OSPR since its inception in 1991. He is well-qualified to oversee OSPR, with particular expertise in federal legal issues, admiralty and international law. During his years with OSPR, Moore has been responsible for coordinating legislation affecting ships in California waters, and is familiar with regulations promulgated by the Coast Guard and the International Maritime Organization. He has been responsible for implementation of State regulations affecting tanker safety and routing, including tank vessel escorting. He also prepared the report to the California Legislature for the Coast Guard Vessel Traffic System program in our state.

In addition, Moore has previously served as supervisor of the Regulations unit, interim Deputy Administrator, and Special Legal Counsel to the Administrator. The Department loaned him to the Department of Boating and Waterways, where he was interim Director from 1998 to 2001. Moore earned his B.A. in political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and completed post-doctorate studies in admiralty at the University of Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law. He served 33 years in the US Coast Guard Reserve, attaining the rank of Rear Admiral.

- Legislation - SB 849 (Torlakson, Oil Spill Prevention and Response) - Chapter 514, Statutes of 2002 became law on January 1, 2003. This bill authorizes the Administrator for Oil Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) to increase by 1¢, the amount of the fee for each barrel of crude oil or petroleum product delivered to a marine terminal. This money funds
OSPR’s day-to-day operations and spill prevention and preparedness activities. SB 849 also clarifies that a $2,500 fee may be assessed on non-tank vessels entering State waters, to be collected at the time the vessel applies for a Certificate of Financial Responsibility. The bill requires the Department of Finance to prepare a report to the Governor and the Legislature on the financial basis and programmatic effectiveness of the State’s oil spill prevention, response, and preparedness programs by January 1, 2005.

The Oil Spill Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), after reviewing the report, shall transmit comments to the same by August 1, 2005. The bill also adds a non-tank vessel representative to the TAC, and changed the frequency of the TAC report to the Legislature and Governor about California’s marine oil spill prevention and response programs from annual to biennial. The bill extended until January 1, 2006, the Administrator’s authority to allow certain non-tank vessels to enter the State with less than $300,000,000 in financial responsibility for marine oil spills, as well as clarify that non-tank vessels shall not enter State waters without demonstrating appropriate financial responsibility. SB 849 also changed the date the Administrator must prepare and submit an annual revenue and expenditure plan projecting three years ahead, from January 15 to January 20 each year.

Regulations - Legislation enacted in 2001 (AB 715, Chapter 748, Statutes of 2001) outlined the requirements for an OSRO “Rating” program, and required that contingency plan holders only contract with “Rated” OSROs. Regulations were drafted and were approved by OAL in October 2002 to enact this rating program, which is similar to OSPR’s old Approval Program for OSROs, with the following changes:

- Clarifies and simplifies the application content format, and requires more detailed information on subcontracted equipment and the “systems approach” to response;
- Requires ratings for booming, on-water recovery and storage, and shoreline protection services;
- Clarifies conditions for rating, including participation in unannounced drills and verification inspections, and provides more detail on required “announced” drills (i.e., type and amount of equipment to deploy);
- Specifies and defines rating levels and lists the information to be included on the OSRO Rating Letter issued by OSPR;
- Requires dedicated or OSRO-owned and controlled resources for response of six hours or earlier. (Dedicated or OSRO-owned and controlled resources for shoreline protection services will be phased-in);
• Outlines the rating update and renewal procedures;
• Specifies criteria for denial, modification, suspension or revocation of a rating;
• Delineates the process for an OSRO to appeal a rating; and
• Current OSRO approvals will be grandfathered into the system. 
Ratings are due three years from the current approval date.

Revised Local Government Grant Regulations - The Local Government Grant regulations implement a program to provide grants for local governments to complete, update or revise an oil spill contingency plan in order to provide a coordinated oil spill response and clean-up effort between the local government, OSPR, and federal officials. This OSPR program has existed since 1993. All counties that have jurisdiction over or within marine waters have already created their initial local oil spill contingency plans, and are now only submitting updates. The regulations have been updated to reflect this, as well as other clarifying amendments. Approval from OAL is anticipated in fall 2003. The significant proposed changes will:
• Clarify and provide consistency with the terms/titles used to describe the Unified Command System;
• Update geographic boundaries to make them consistent with the US Coast Guard Designated Areas;
• Refine some of the terms and conditions of the Grant Agreement;
• Amend the format for the local plans, to be consistent with the Area Contingency Plans;
• Clarify the coordination of the local governments’ oil spill response personnel with that of the State’s Incident Command System, which is used within the Unified Command structure; and
• Clarify how the grant money can and cannot be used.

The SS Jacob Luckenbach oil recovery project was completed on September 30, 2002. The US Coast Guard hired Titan Maritime to remove as much oil as possible from the leaking, 49-year-old wreck in Gulf of the Farallones National Marine Sanctuary. Titan began work in San Francisco in late May, but under-water work was delayed by 60mph winds and up to 25-foot seas. What Titan’s president expected to be a month-long project took four months instead. The 175-foot depth necessitated “saturation diving,” in which two divers breathed a helium mixture, and were kept in an artificial habitat that equaled the barometric pressure at the wreck, for 28 days at a time. They were then replaced by fresh divers who did the same. Cold waters near San Francisco made the oil as thick as refrigerated peanut butter, so the divers had to heat it just to make it liquid enough to pump to storage tanks on the support barge above the
Luckenbach. OSPR and Coast Guard personnel were on the barge and aboard observation vessels throughout the operation, watching for oil that could leak and endanger wildlife. Local OSROs were prepared to respond at any time, as were NOAA and State Lands Commission staff.

There was tremendous public interest in the incident, particularly since OSPR's Petroleum Chemistry Laboratory had linked the Luckenbach's oil to ten years of “mystery spills” on California's central coast. Local, national, and international news media kept the Unified Command's public affairs staff busy for nearly a year.

After four months, Titan had pumped over 100,000 gallons of bunker fuel from the Luckenbach. It was impossible to get to all the oil on board, because of the way the freighter has settled into the sea bed, and the cargo on decks above the oil compartments blocks any safe access. Small amounts of oil did leak during last winter's bigger storms, and California's Oiled Wildlife Care Network was ready for the seabirds that got into it. Between November 10 (2002) and January 31 (2003), wildlife search and collection teams took 577 oiled birds - mostly common murres - to the San Francisco Bay Oiled Wildlife Care and Education Center in Cordelia (Solano County). Ninety-one of them were treated, cleaned, rehabilitated, and released.

The Luckenbach incident was a wake-up call that alerted Californians to the fact that there are over 1,600 sunken wrecks off our coast. They include every type of vessel, from a 16th-Century Spanish galleon to small recreational boats, to an aircraft carrier and WWII-era oil tanker (loaded with Santa Maria crude oil). Old, deteriorating vessels that carry petroleum, chemicals, and other toxic materials pose a threat to California's rich marine life and habitats. To address that issue, OSPR's Marine Safety Branch has developed a risk matrix, and identified the ships whose cargo or fuel pose the most serious threats.

- 2002 Spill Statistics - OSPR's Communications Center received reports of 1,312 petroleum spills to water in 2002. The majority of these were in Los Angeles and San Diego Counties. Twenty petroleum spills reported in California during 2002 were above the Task Force reporting thresholds of 500 gallons to land and 42 gallons (one barrel) to water. 35% of these were from pipelines, 30% from vessels, 20% from vehicles, and 5% from facilities. Another 10% are listed as “other” sources, and the source was unknown for another 5%. As in 2001, diesel was the most common oil spilled, representing 60% of these reports. Jet fuel/kerosene and other/unknown oils made up 10% each; bunker C/HFO, gasoline,
hydraulic oil, and waste oil each represented 5% of the spills included here. Equipment failure was listed as the cause of 60% of these spills, with human error following closely at 55%. Another 5% were unknown.

- Unannounced Drills - OSPR continues to evaluate and improve upon oil spill response readiness in California’s five major ports, conducting 24 unannounced drills from April 2002 to April 2003. The objective of these drills was to demonstrate the ability of plan holders to make timely notifications to all the appropriate parties, and to ensure the deployment of resources in accordance with approved plans during the three hours immediately following a simulated spill. Using the lesson learned from last year’s drills, we concentrated on Plan Holder non-tank notification drills in ports other than San Francisco and Los Angeles. We also began drilling Mobile Transfer Units (MTU). We plan to exercise MTU’s and to conduct unannounced notification and equipment deployments on both OSRO and plan holders in the future.

With the October 2002 approval of new regulations issued under provisions of the Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act (section 819), OSPR was given the opportunity to establish and test specific performance standards for Oil Spill Response Organization (OSRO) Ratings. OSRO applications began to arrive in early November. The first drill was held on November 15 in Long Beach. The last drill was held on December 31 in San Diego. From beginning to end the tone of each drill was positive, with OSROs making every effort to exceed requirements and expectations. As of January 1, 2003, there were 11 Rated OSROs in California. This program is a huge step in the right direction for OSPR to ensure that OSROs are prepared to respond to oil spills in California’s marine environment. A major result of the program is that OSROs have demonstrated in concrete fashion what OSPR can expect from them. All in all, OSPR is convinced that performance standards are the wave of the future and the basis for partnerships moving forward.

- Anacapa Island Restoration Project - OSPR is the lead trustee agency on the American Trader (oil spill) Natural Resources Trustee Council (ATTC), which has funded a project to remove non-native black rats (rattus rattus) from Anacapa Island, a chain of three islets in the Santa Barbara Channel. Over the past 60-plus years invasive rats had decimated native seabird populations, in particular the Xantus’s murrelet. The Xantus’s murrelet is a small, rare pelagic seabird that only comes ashore to breed, and only does so on about twelve islands in the Santa Barbara Channel and off the coast of northern Baja California. Scientists believe there are between only 10,000 and 20,000 of these birds in the
world. It is being considered for federal listing as a Threatened Species, and is already a Species of Special Concern in California.

Working with Channel Islands National Park and Island Conservation and Ecology Group (ICEG) - who submitted the project for consideration by the ATTC - OSPR, the US Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration oversaw the aerial distribution of rodenticide pellets on the craggy East Anacapa Island in December 2001 and on West and Middle Anacapa in November 2002.

Since these applications, to date, monitoring teams have found no evidence of any rats’ survival on Anacapa. Scientists monitoring murrelets flying to and from the east islet have detected increases in the number of birds visiting nesting colonies ranging from 58% to more than two times higher than in previous years. Nest researchers have found 14 murrelet nests, including the first nest documented on Cat Rock since 1927. In addition, populations of the endemic Anacapa deer mouse and side-blotched lizard are thriving since the removal of the rats. For more information on this project, visit http://www.nps.gov/chis/naturalresources/airp.html.

For additional information or reports and documents, please visit the OSPR web site at http://www.dfg.ca.gov/Ospr/
HAWAII:

Hazard Evaluation and Emergency Response Office of the Environmental Health Administration in the Hawaii Department of Health (HEER)

- In general, the function of the HEER Office is to plan for and respond to hazardous substance, pollutant, contaminant, or oil releases to the environment. The HEER Office evaluates actual or potential impacts such releases may have on the public, the environment, and natural resources, and mitigates them as needed. The HEER Office is staffed with professionals able to assess chemical risks, evaluate the extent of chemical contamination, formulate response plans, oversee remediation, and conduct response activities. In addition, the HEER Office coordinates statewide planning activities to prepare for and respond to chemical and oil spills in the environment.

- During FY 2002, the HEER Office received 490 notifications concerning the release of a hazardous chemicals or oil spills. Out of the 490 notifications reported, 40 required extensive State On-Scene-Coordinator (SOSC) coordination and involvement. Notable among the spill responses were the Honolulu Harbor Area-Wide Contamination, Hilo Bayfront Soccer Fields, Reported Anthrax Incidents, and Kekaha Sugar Mill as described below:

- **The Honolulu Harbor Area-wide Contamination** The Honolulu Harbor Area-Wide Contamination site was the highest profile response site for FY 2002. Activities have continued to focus on preventing releases of the area-wide petroleum contamination from entering Honolulu Harbor and the waters of the State. A petroleum extraction system and removal of product from old abandoned pipelines has resulted in the recovery of over 3300 gallons of oil to date. This has required cooperation between the State Department of Health, the Office of Hazard Evaluation and Emergency Response, the State Department of Transportation, the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region IX, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Participating Parties representing private business. The overall goal of the Environmental Response Working Agreement is to develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to solve past, present, and future environmental contamination problems in the Honolulu Harbor area. The desired endpoints are to achieve overall compliance, future prevention and cleanup of petroleum contamination. In FY2002 a second Agreement was signed with current operating companies in the area which will
require them to conduct evaluations of present facilities and take actions to eliminate future releases. It is envisioned that this project will require several more years of effort. The EPA is actively supporting and participating in this effort.

- **Hilo Bayfront Soccer Fields** In November flooding pushed contaminated soil from an old gasification plant onto the Hilo bay-front soccer fields. Tar and soil contaminated with polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) were removed and the fields capped with clean soil.

- **Anthrax Response** SOSCs responded to over 250 reports of possible anthrax. The increasing concern for acts of terrorism has required more involvement by the Department of Health in coordination and support of HAZMAT units, other State and Federal agencies, and the State Labs.

- **Kekaha Sugar Mill** Oil from aboveground storage tanks (AST) piping contaminated soil and groundwater in an area that was formally a sugar mill site. Soil removal and groundwater remediation is part of a larger surrounding area cleanup plan with oversight by the SOSCs.

Additional information about the environmental program and available documents can be obtained at the Department of Health web site at: www.hawaii.gov/health/eh
OREGON:

Emergency Response and Site Assessment Program, Oregon Department of Environmental Quality

- The Environmental Quality Commission adopted rules related to Oil Spill Contingency Planning, Emergency Response, Enforcement and Ballast Water. House Bill 2150 (HB 2150) was passed by the Oregon legislature during the 2001 session and amended laws related to oil spill planning fees that provide funding for the oil spill prevention program, clarified the role of the state on-scene coordinator, consolidated financial responsibility requirements, required oil spill contingency plans for inland pipelines, and directed DEQ to create a workgroup to examine the benefits of preparedness planning and response strategies for inland facilities. This bill was crafted in coordination with the maritime and petroleum community. Senate Bill 895 required DEQ to adopt rules related to ballast water management.

- In developments regarding the M/V NEW CARISSA from June 2002 to May 2003:
  - Situation: The Final Incident Status Summary dated 1 January 2003 reported, “Wreck removal activities remain suspended. Deterioration of the wreck continued to be noted throughout the period.” Twice weekly beach surveys ended in December 2002.
  - Lawsuit: “A Coos County jury...found the owners of the New Carissa guilty of negligent trespass and awarded Oregon $25 million to pay for removing the shipwreck’s rusting 1,500-ton stern, mired in sand off the beach in Coos Bay.” (The Oregonian, 14 November 2002) According to press reports the owners have agreed to pay the $25 million, but the state will hold the payment in an account pending an appeal of the verdict.
  - Natural Resource Damage Assessment: The trustees continue to conduct restoration planning and studies to refine the extent of seabird injury.

- DEQ received 2,343 spill notifications from the Oregon Emergency Management Division in 2002, as follows:
  - One hundred eighty two (182) of these spills were petroleum products greater than 42 gallons;
  - Eleven (11) of the petroleum spills were over 1000 gallons;
  - There were only 40 spills to navigable waters of the state, 34 involved petroleum products;
  - There were only two (2) oil spills from regulated facilities or covered vessels; and
Thirty four (34) spills were from fishing vessels or other harbor craft.

The most significant spill during the year was an inland spill from a petroleum tank truck. The response activities began when a tanker crashed December 5th on Highway 22, spilling 11,000 gallons of gasoline on the road just above Detroit Lake. A Unified Command consisting of the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, the Oregon Department of Transportation, the US Environmental Protection Agency, and the responsible trucking company directed the investigation and cleanup activities at the site through the emergency phase. Agency support also came from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the City of Salem. DEQ directed cleanup activities on Detroit Lake and the slope leading to the highway.

Just off the shoreline, the water was treated with an aeration system and was sampled 100 feet outside the area of aeration. The effective aeration area was within a boomed area that was established during the initial cleanup effort. Seven aeration units were lined up by the shore. The units extended about 30 feet below the water surface. Air piped into the system and blown into the units was released into the water in the form of bubbles designed to be the optimal size for carrying dissolved gasoline constituents to the surface, where they evaporate. Sampling has found that benzene levels outside the boomed area are below one part per billion. The latest samples indicate benzene levels between one and 50 ppm within the boomed area. The federal drinking water standard is five parts per billion.

Some gasoline vapor continues to be recovered from a soil vapor extraction system set up at the roadside, with nine wells in operation just below the road's surface.

The Unified Command was disbanded December 16 after the emergency response phase ended. The DEQ Cleanup Program is now overseeing the ongoing investigation and cleanup activities.

For more information on the emergency response programs at DEQ, go to http://www.deq.state.or.us/wmc/cleanup/cugrpmain.htm
WASHINGTON:

*The Spill Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Program of the Washington Department of Ecology*

- Vessel Inspections: There were 4,951 vessel transits entering Washington waters in 2002. The Spills Program Prevention Section staff from the Portland and Seattle field offices conducted 871 inspections of these vessels. These figures represent a decrease of 257 entering transits and 219 vessel inspections from 2001. The decrease in inspections is due primarily to the assistance offered to the federal government in the criminal prosecution of cases involving illegal oil dumping.

Washington’s bunkering (vessel refueling) inspection activities continue to influence a decrease in the number of bunkering spills from vessels that have undergone a bunkering inspection, as compared to the “all vessels” spill count. For the third consecutive year, vessels that were inspected showed no spills within 60 days of the inspection. The number of spills from this group is approximately 10 percent of the total bunker spills. This diminished spill rate continues for up to six months after the inspection. Recognizing this influence on vessel spills, Spills Program inspectors have continued a high rate of bunkering inspections. These inspections made up over 53 percent of the total inspections for the second straight year, compared to 38 percent and 41 percent in the previous two years (1999 & 2000).

**Influence of Bunker Monitor Inspections on Bunkering Spills**

![Graph showing the influence of bunker monitor inspections on bunkering spills from 1996 to 2002. The graph includes lines for all bunker spills and spills within 2 months, 6 months, and 1 year of inspection.](image)
Reported Spills: Forty-two spills were reported of at least one barrel (42 gallons) or larger to land or water, for a total of 31,010 gallons. Sources included vessels (22), vehicles (8), facilities (5), and above-ground storage tanks (7). Eighteen of these spills were caused by human error, 14 by equipment or material failure, one due to environmental conditions, four due to organizational/management failure, and five were due to other or unknown causes.

Vessel Investigations 2002: Five (5) detailed investigations of marine incidents (including spills) were completed in 2002. Three of these incidents involved spills for which an Investigation Findings report was produced to support program-wide activities (i.e. prevention recommendations, spill penalties, NRDA recovery efforts). All involve an analysis of an incident to determine lessons-learned for distribution to interested parties within the marine industry.

The program worked cooperatively with the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Coast Guard in detecting ships that showed signs of conducting illegal oil discharges. Substantial investigative follow-up assistance was also provided. Several of the investigations have led to Federal criminal convictions and fines-others are ongoing. One of these investigations involved a discharge of about 50 gallons of oil at Tacoma, Washington. As a result of the conviction resulting from cooperative Federal-State investigation of this case, $300,000 of the Federal fine was earmarked for environmental projects benefiting the marine environment of Washington State. The state-issued penalty for the 50-gallon Tacoma spill was $34,000.

Our experience in investigating human factors such as fatigue resulted in Ecology’s participation in a US Coast Guard/American Waterways Operators Quality Action Team (QAT) on crew alertness in the towing industry. The final QAT report, providing background on fatigue and best management practices for promoting crew alertness, was issued in May 2002.

Incidents provide an opportunity to learn from mistakes and system shortcomings. Detailed analysis of these incidents allows for systematic improvements in marine safety in the form of lessons-learned and prevention recommendations. It also provides detailed and verified information upon which informed decisions regarding marine safety and spill prevention can be made by Ecology.

The findings of a 2001 tanker oil spill investigation resulted in an invitation by a respected monthly maritime journal to present the incident as a case study at their February 2002 marine casualty conference. The
presentation, presented jointly with a representative of the tanker company involved, was well-received by the audience of maritime professionals. The presentation focused on the role of latent errors in events leading up to the spill, which put 462 gallons into the waters around Port Angeles, Washington.

- **VBAP Program:** The Voluntary Best Achievable Protection (VBAP) Program and Exceptional Compliance Program (ECOPRO) for tank vessels marked its third year of successful operation in 2002. Participants included 36 tank ship and tank barge companies from 14 foreign countries and the U.S. Under this program, owners and operators voluntarily meet Washington's VBAP and ECOPRO standards, increasing their overall level of marine safety and reducing the probability of a spill. One of the highlights of 2002 was Alaska Tanker Company's upgrade to ECOPRO - full member status. Two of the three companies operating tank ships in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System trade are ECOPRO - full members (Alaska Tanker Company and SeaRiver Maritime). This represents approximately two-thirds of crude oil tanker entries into Washington waters during 2002. Interest in these voluntary programs continued to increase in 2002 with two new companies preparing ECOPRO plans and two companies pursuing upgrades from VBAP to ECOPRO.

- **Ecology and US Coast Guard Cooperation:** The Spills Program and the Coast Guard continue to make good progress on implementing the recommendations of the 2000 North Puget Sound Oil Spill Risk Management Panel that can be accomplished locally. Several recommendations will require action at the national level by US Coast Guard Headquarters.

- **Progress on protocols to implement the 2001 Oil Spill Prevention and Response Memorandum of Agreement between the Thirteenth Coast Guard District and Washington State continues at a slow but steady pace. The Coast Guard's renewed focus on port security and transfer to the Department of Homeland Security have reduced staff time available to work on the protocols.

- **Neah Bay Rescue Tug:** The 2002 Legislature provided $1.4 million for the dedicated rescue tug and for providing an additional “stand-by tug” capability. The stand-by tug fund allows the Department of Ecology to spot charter and pre-position tugs as a preventative measure, during periods of increased risk, when requested by the U.S. Coast Guard Captains of the Ports. Ecology continued to pursue long-term funding to make the dedicated tug a permanent spill prevention measure for Washington's
outer coast and the Strait of Juan de Fuca. The rescue tug began its fourth season at Neah Bay in October 2001. During 2002, the tug assisted four vessels for a total of 20 assists since 1999. The following is a description of the 2002 events:

• On January 3, 2002 the tug Pacific Avenger lost its power steering about 15 miles west of Cape Flattery. At that time, the Pacific Avenger was towing a 450-foot barge, Barge 103, to Portland from Puget Sound. The barge was loaded with about 2,100,000 gallons of diesel. The tug/barge experienced winds from the south at 18–23 mph and 12 foot swells. Initially, the tug rudder went “hard over” and tripped off all power to the steering system. A backup hand-operated hydraulic pump allowed limited rudder control. The crew partially restored operation of the power hydraulic steering system, but was not able to reference the rudder angle indicator or use the autopilot. As a precautionary measure, they requested an escort tug and turned back toward the Strait of Juan de Fuca to complete steering system repairs and testing. The tug and tow were escorted by the Barbara Foss to Port Angeles. Upon inspection, it was discovered that one of the Pacific Avenger’s two rudders was missing.

• On February 5, 2002 at about 6:30 a.m., the Maltese-flagged bulk carrier, Red Cedar, which had been outbound in heavy winds, reported a propulsion problem when it was about 10 miles southwest of Buoy “J”. The ship was laden with a cargo of grain. The ship requested that it be allowed to anchor off the coast for about 3 hours to make repairs, but was advised by Canada’s Tofino Vessel Traffic Service to return to Victoria for repairs due to weather concerns. The US Coast Guard required a tug escort. The Barbara Foss was notified and departed Neah Bay almost immediately. Winds reported at the time were southeast at 30 knots with a 4-foot wind wave and a 5-foot swell from the west. The ship’s log book indicated that at 8 a.m. the ship was rolling and pitching heavily in high seas and heavy swells, and taking seas over the bow to about amidships. The Barbara Foss ran approximately 4 miles to intercept the ship at 8:15 a.m. just north of Neah Bay. The escort duty continued until 11:25 a.m. when another tug, Hunter, was able to arrive and assume the escort to anchorage in Port Angeles harbor. Investigation of the nature of the propulsion problem by an Ecology vessel inspector indicated that a cooling water leak in one of the main engine cylinders was the source of the problem.

• On October 9, 2002 the 98-foot tug Altair was towing the 316-foot, double-hulled, tank barge Rigel from Puget Sound to Portland, Oregon. The tank barge was loaded with over three million gallons
of diesel oil. A medical condition of a crewmember caused the pair to turn back for the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Upon entering the Strait, about 2 miles from Neah Bay, the twin-engine Altair experienced an engine casualty, reducing the number of available main engines to one. At 12:55 p.m. the Master of the Altair requested the assistance of the Barbara Foss through Foss Maritime. The Barbara Foss took the vessels under tow at 1:20 p.m. Weather conditions on-scene were good with southwest winds of 5 to 10 knots and 4 to 6 foot swells. The three vessels rendezvoused with another tug, Nakoa, at about 7 p.m. off Pillar Point. The Nakoa relieved the Barbara Foss, allowing it to return to standby duty in Neah Bay by 9:20 p.m.

- On October 29, 2002 the 677-foot container ship Cristoforo Colombo was inbound to Vancouver, B.C. via the Strait of Juan de Fuca. At 9:30 p.m. the ship reported to Puget Sound Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) that the ship’s main engine temperature was rising and that it would be shut down. The ship’s position was reportedly about 2.5 miles north-northwest of Neah Bay in the inbound vessel traffic lane. Winds were reported as easterly at 25-30 miles per hour. The estimated time for repairs was 30 minutes. The ship also reported they had anchors prepared for letting-go as a precaution. At 10 p.m., the ship reported to VTS that the ship’s main engine was shut down and they were showing lights for a vessel not able to maneuver. At 10:15 p.m., the USCG advised the ship to obtain tug services. At 10:19 p.m., with the ship refusing to order tug services, the Neah Bay rescue tug notified VTS that they were exiting Neah Bay to shadow the Cristoforo Colombo. The Barbara Foss departed from Neah Bay and arrived at the drifting vessel at 10:30 p.m. At 10:39 p.m. the Cristoforo Colombo reported to VTS that the ship’s main engine had been restarted and the ship was proceeding to Victoria Pilot Station. The Barbara Foss stood by the ship until 11:00 p.m., and then returned to Neah Bay at 11:30 p.m. without having to provide assistance to the ship.

Deployment and Tabletop Drills: The Preparedness Section completed 35 tabletop drills, including nine (9) worst case scenario drills, and 51 deployment drills. Approximately 75 percent of the facilities did two deployment exercises in 2002. Almost 89 percent of the facilities did at least one tabletop exercise in 2002.

The largest drills completed in 2002 included:

- BP Cherry Point Refinery/BP Shipping - Worst Case Exercise
- Chevron/Texaco Richmond Beach - Worst Case Tabletop Exercise
- Marine Fire and Safety Association (MFSA) - Worst Case Exercise
• Trans Mountain Pipe Line Company (now Terasen Pipeline) - Worst Case Exercise
• Crowley Marine Services - Worst Case Exercise
• US Oil - Worst Case Exercise

Many of the drills at smaller facilities were significant in that Ecology helped with both the training and drill design. Ecology hopes to be able to offer more training in the next few years. Ecology has found that when they train and coach facilities during drills then they are able to work more effectively as a team when a spill occurs. Drills exercise several important functions for response organizations, as they:

• Increase readiness in the event of an actual emergency;
• Provide a means to assess the effectiveness of response plans and response capabilities;
• Demonstrate the knowledge and skill of the plan implementers;
• Serve as a training tool for response personnel;
• Provide an opportunity to practice skills and improve individual performance in a non-threatening environment;
• Require participants to network with each other and pre-plan decisions on resources;
• Provide a means to educate and involve the public, media, and key community organizations in response planning;
• Validate existing policies and procedures;
• Identify planning conflicts;
• Identify resource needs; and
• Clarify roles and responsibilities.

During 2002, the Spills Program:
• Received 4,077 reports of spills in Washington. Of these, there were 2,125 reports for petroleum products, 63 reports for hazardous substances, 1,697 reports for substances from clandestine drug labs, and 192 reports for miscellaneous substances;
• Conducted 2,395 field responses based on those reports. Of those field responses, 1,569 involved clandestine drug lab cleanups;
• In addition to the field responses the program also did follow-up phone interviews on 1,895 of these reports;
• Created and posted eight “Pictures of the Month” and two “Events of the Month” on the agency website to highlight marine safety incidents;
• Received resource damage assessment payments of $62,867 in compensation for oil spills; and
• Completed updates of the response strategies for all of the marine Geographic Response Plans (GRPs), and converted the strategies to a Geographic Information System (GIS) format. New strategy maps
will be produced based on GIS and then converted to “pdf” format for distribution on the Spills Program website by mid-2003. The Mid-Columbia River GRPs have been updated and are available at the Northwest Area Committee website at: http://www.rrt10nwac.com/ as a draft; comments are welcome.

For more information on the Spill Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Program, visit the Spills Program Web site at: http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/spills/spills.html

To view publications mentioned in this report online, or to order printed copies, visit the Spills Program Publications page on the Department of Ecology Web site at: http://www.ecy.wa.gov/biblio/spills.html
NUMBER OF SPILLS BY SIZE

REGIONAL

- 42-100 (228 spills)
- 101-500 (189 spills)
- 501-1000 (51 spills)
- >1001 (71 spills)

CATEGORY AND STATE

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NUMBER OF SPILLS BY PRODUCT

REGIONAL

PRODUCT AND STATE

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- BunkerC/HFO: 1,729 gal
- Crude Oil: 12,769 gal
- Diesel: 117,389 gal
- Gasoline: 42,298 gal
- Home Heating Oil: 2,685 gal
- Hydraulic Oil: 6,282 gal
- Jet Fuel/Kerosene: 9,938 gal
- Lube Oil: 2,588 gal
- Waste Oil: 6,092 gal
- Other/Unknown: 174,588 gal
NUMBER OF SPILLS BY SOURCE

REGIONAL

![Pie chart showing the number of spills by source.]

- Facility: 221,806 gal
- Pipeline: 12,627 gal
- Vessel: 25,614 gal
- Vehicle: 50,972 gal
- Unknown: 11,550 gal
- Other: 53,789 gal

SOURCE AND STATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Pipeline</th>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th>Vehicle</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
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<td>21%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
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<td>17%</td>
<td>56%</td>
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</table>
NUMBER OF SPILLS BY CAUSAL FACTOR

REGIONAL

CAUSAL FACTOR AND STATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>Equipment Failure</th>
<th>External Conditions</th>
<th>Human Error</th>
<th>Org/Mgmt Failure</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
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<tr>
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<td>0%</td>
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