PACIFIC STATES/BRITISH COLUMBIA OIL SPILL TASK FORCE

2010 ANNUAL REPORT

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Printed on recycled paper

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COVER: The Hawaiian monk seal is an endangered earless seal endemic to Hawaii. Its common name derives from its round head covered with short hairs, giving it the appearance of a medieval friar.

The states of Alaska, Washington, Oregon, California and Hawaii have joined with the Province of British Columbia in order to combine resources and coordinate efforts to protect their shared waters and 56,660 miles of sensitive coastlines from the devastating impacts of oil spills.

This Annual Report of the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force is submitted to the Governors of California, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii and Alaska, and to the Premier of British Columbia, as well as to the citizens whom they represent. It provides information on the activities and accomplishments of the Task Force and its member agencies from July 2009 through June 2010.

The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force was established by a Memorandum of Cooperation signed in 1989, following two West Coast oil spill incidents. The first involved the tank barge *Nestucca,* which spilled oil impacting the coasts of Washington and British Columbia in December of 1988. The second incident was the catastrophic spill by the T/V *Exxon Valdez* in Alaska's Prince William Sound in March of 1989. These events highlighted common concerns shared by West Coast states and the Province of British Columbia related to spill risks from coastal vessel traffic, the need for cooperation across shared borders and a shared commitment among West Coast citizens of both the US and Canada to protect their unique marine resources.

The Oil Spill Task Force produced a report in October of 1990 that included 46 joint recommendations for spill prevention and response, as well as recommendations specific to each member's jurisdiction. Most of these recommendations have since been incorporated into state or provincial statutes, rules, or programs. They are also reflected in the U.S. Federal Oil Pollution Act passed in 1990 (OPA '90), as well as the Canadian Shipping Act Amendments adopted in 1993.

When the State of Hawaii authorized its Department of Health, Environmental Health Division, to join the Task Force in 2001, the governing Memorandum of Cooperation was updated and signed by Hawaii Governor Benjamin Cayetano, Alaska Governor Tony Knowles, Washington Governor Gary Locke, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber, California Governor Gray Davis and Gordon Campbell, Premier of British Columbia. The organization's name was changed to the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force.

The continuing focus of the Oil Spill Task Force is on fostering regulatory compatibility, sharing information and resources, and coordinating regional projects to improve oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response in the shared Pacific waters of the U.S. and Canada. These efforts are guided by our Strategic Plan and Annual Work Plans and are based on our Mission, Goals, and Objectives as stated on the following page.

This Annual Report does not reflect oil spill prevention and response activities on the part of any federal agencies or industry organizations except as may have occurred in response to or in cooperation with the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force or a member agency.

Long Term Vision Statement:

No Spilled Oil.

Mission Statement:

The mission of the Oil Spill Task Force is to strengthen state and Provincial abilities to prevent, prepare for and respond to oil spills.

Ongoing Goals:

Prevent spills that impact natural resources in our member jurisdictions, both large spills with significant impacts and chronic small spills with cumulative impacts.

Facilitate communication among member agencies in order to promote policy uniformity and consistency, improve prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities, and maximize efficiency of effort by sharing ideas and "products";

Clarify the roles and responsibilities of state and provincial agencies with regard to federal agencies in order to reduce regulatory gaps and overlaps while avoiding potential conflicts;

Advocate in national and international arenas on issues of common concern, building respect through credibility, clarity of purpose and collaboration;

Serve as a catalyst for improvements by working cooperatively with federal agencies, other states and provinces, industry, response contractors, public interest groups and concerned citizens to create opportunities for policy and technology breakthroughs;

Educate the public and stakeholders on the impacts of oil spills and issues relating to spill prevention, preparedness, response and restoration;

Identify emerging trends in oil transportation, production and storage in order to assist member agencies with their strategic planning; and

Serve as a model of proactive regional cooperation and coordination.

Objectives:

Spill Prevention: To prevent oil spills from a variety of sources, including vessels, pipelines, facilities, vehicles and railroads.

Spill Preparedness and Response: To enhance oil spill preparedness and response capabilities throughout our region.

Communications: To continuously improve communications within the Task Force as well as with key stakeholders and the general public and to maintain a high level of public and stakeholder involvement in Task Force activities.

Task Force Members

Stephen Edinger (2008-2010)
Administrator, Office of Spill Prevention and Response, California Department of Fish and Game

Larry Hartig (2007-2010)
Commissioner, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

Doug Konkin (2010)
Deputy Minister, British Columbia Ministry of Environment

Laurence Lau (2003-2010)
Deputy Director for Environmental Health, Hawaii Department of Health

Dale Jensen (2010)
Spills Program Manager, Washington Department of Ecology

Dick Pedersen (2007-2010)
Director, Oregon Department of Environmental Quality

Coordinating Committee Members:

Larry Dietrick (1999-2010)
(Alternates: Betty Schorr and Bob Mattson)
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

Graham Knox (2006-2010)
British Columbia Ministry of Environment

Curtis Martin (2001-2010)
Hawaii Department of Health

Jon Neel (1989-1998, 2005-2010)
Washington Department of Ecology

Scott Schaefer (2000-2004, 2009-2010)
Office of Spill Prevention and Response, California Department of Fish and Game

Mike Zollitsch (1997-2010)
Oregon Department of Environmental Quality

Executive Coordinator:

Jean Cameron (1993-2010)
Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force

1989–2009

OIL SPILL TASK FORCE **TWENTY YEARS OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS**

INITIAL REPORT

The Oil Spill Task Force produced a report in October of **1990** that included 46 joint recommendations for spill prevention and response, as well as recommendations specific to each member's jurisdiction.

OIL SPILL PREVENTION INITIATIVES

Recommendations regarding Training and Standards to minimize human errors were adopted in **1995**.

A review of West Coast pilotage and recommendations to improve pilotage safety were completed in **1997**.

A survey of state/federal pipeline spill prevention standards to identify regulatory gaps and overlaps was completed in **1998**; recommendations for interagency coordination to improve pipeline spill prevention were made in **1999**.

The Task Force partnered with the US Coast Guard and Canadian authorities to sponsor a stakeholder workgroup that assessed the oil spill risks associated with offshore vessel traffic on the west coast and, in **2002**, this West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project workgroup recommended a number of steps to reduce that risk, including voluntary minimum distances from shore for coastwise vessel traffic.

Since **2002**, the Task Force has collected data on spills of one barrel or larger in the West Coast states and uses a common Data Dictionary to ensure standardized entries. We also sponsor investigator training every two years or as needed.

The Task Force worked with tank vessel operators in **2003** to rank voluntary practices that help prevent oil spills. We have done educational outreach regarding these "Best Industry Practices" to both the commercial vessel and tug/tank barge industries.

A review of the status of implementation of the 2002 West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project recommendations was conducted in 2007; new recommendations generated by a stakeholder workgroup were adopted in **2008**.

We tracked the double-hull conversion status of tankers in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS) trade from **2003-2010.** All TAPs tankers are now double-hulled.

Ongoing: We have initiated a new project to track the double-hull status of all tank ships and barges serving ports in our member jurisdictions.

Ongoing: We support the Pacific Oil Spill Prevention Education Team (POSPET) whose members do spill prevention outreach to recreational boaters and marinas. The Task Force provides staff support, a web page, a listserve and funding for outreach materials.

Ongoing: We have supported and encouraged federal adoption of salvage and firefighting regulations for both tank and nontank vessels.

OIL SPILL PREPAREDNESS/RESPONSE INITIATIVES

The Task Force adopted a Mutual Aid Plan in **1993** to facilitate sharing member agency staff and resources.

A comparison of contingency plan requirements for vessels and facilities was completed in **1995** and was updated in 2009. This is available on our website.

Recommendations regarding policies governing the use of alternative response technologies such as in-situ burning and dispersants were adopted in **1995** and the status of such policies is continuously reviewed by the Task Force.

A review of oiled wildlife care facilities on the West Coast was completed in **1995**.

We adopted a Mutual Aid Agreement in **1996** that outlines protocols for releasing private sector equipment cited in approved contingency plans for the purpose of Mutual Aid.

In **1997** we adopted a voluntary Integrated Vessel Response Plan (IVRP) format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard's Vessel Response Plan. This format allows correlation with west coast state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by Transport Canada.

A subsequent Task Force Agreement to accept vessel contingency plans in a format that integrates both state and federal planning requirements was adopted in **1998**.

Recommended protocols for oiled bird and marine mammal rescue and rehabilitation were published in **1998**.

The Task Force partnered with the US Coast Guard to sponsor a stakeholder workgroup which updated the Oil Spill Field Operations Guide, effective **2000**.

A set of updated and simplified "Recommended Contingency Planning Elements" was adopted by the Task Force members in **2003**.

In partnership with the U.S. Coast Guard and a stakeholder workgroup, we developed guidelines for decision-making in response to vessel requests of a Place of Refuge in **2005**.

We developed Area Committee planning guidelines for Volunteer Management in **2008**.

We sponsored a webinar on using Social Media during a spill response in April **2009**.

Ongoing: We formed an Oil Spill Research and Development Workgroup in 2009 which will meet biannually by conference call to provide updates on oil spill R&D projects.

Ongoing: Member jurisdictions along the West Coast now require oil spill contingency plans from nontank vessels. We have also supported U.S. Coast Guard adoption of contingency plan regulations for nontank vessels.

Ongoing: A table illustrating the Financial Responsibility requirements of member agencies is maintained on the Task Force website.

Ongoing: We advocate for increasing the Limits of Liability for both vessels and facilities in order to protect the U.S. Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.

Ongoing: We monitor developments in the use of the Incident Command System as a response paradigm in order to advance the interests of our member agencies and promote improved training concepts.

Ongoing: The Task Force maintains an easy-to-remember oil spill reporting number (1-800-OILS-911) for use by recreational and fishing vessels operating from British Columbia to California.

Ongoing: We regularly monitor oil spill research and development of new technologies and advocate for research priorities.

Current: We are conducting a comprehensive review of the status of planning and response capabilities on the two U.S./Canadian borders within our region.

COMMUNICATIONS INITIATIVES

The Task Force was created in **1989** by a Memorandum of Cooperation signed by the Governors of Alaska, Washington, Oregon and California and the Premier of British Columbia.

The Legacy Awards Program has been ongoing **since 1999**, honoring groups or individuals who go beyond regulatory requirements to improve oil spill prevention, preparedness and response.

A second Memorandum of Cooperation was signed by the Governors and Premier in **2001** when the State of Hawaii joined the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force.

The Task Force signed a partnership Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area in May of **2008**. The Coordinating Committee meets with Pacific Area representatives annually as a "Steering Committee" to implement this MOU.

We posted contact information for our project "points of contact" in each member agency, as well as links to member agency information on incident responses, on our website in **2010**.

Ongoing: The Task Force hosts a one–day Annual Meeting, open to the public and rotated among our member jurisdictions, every other year.

Ongoing: The Task Force hosts a multi-day "Clean Pacific" conference, also rotated among our member jurisdictions, ever other year.

Ongoing: The Task Force has sponsored public roundtable discussions on Spill Response Readiness, Natural Resource Damage Assessments, Spills from Trucks, Green Ports, Places of Refuge, response in low-visibility conditions and Cruise Ship Pollution.

Ongoing: Stakeholder participation is encouraged in Task Force Annual Meetings, at the Clean Pacific Conferences and at Roundtables, as well as in project workgroups as appropriate.

Ongoing: A Task Force website is maintained at http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org.

Ongoing: We produce an Annual Report which includes updates on Task Force and Member Agency activities as well as the spill data for the preceding year.

Ongoing: Participation in the West Coast trustee/industry Joint Assessment Team's efforts to coordinate natural resource damage efforts is ongoing.

Ongoing: The Task Force provides comments on US and Canadian regulatory initiatives of interest to our members.

Ongoing: We have identified Points of Contact in other coastal states and provinces for information sharing.

Ongoing: The Task Force Members meet annually; the Coordinating Committee members meet at least quarterly, either in person or by conference call.

Ongoing: Internal communication and information exchange among member agencies are facilitated by Task Force staff.

Ongoing: We regularly share information on spill prevention, preparedness and response Topics of Concern among member agencies.

Ongoing: The Task Force Executive Coordinator responds to information requests and represents the Task Force at meetings, workshops and conferences as time and budgets allow.

Ongoing: We operate on the basis of multi-year Strategic Plans which are implemented through Annual Work Plans.

Dear Reader,

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico has been designated a "Spill of National Significance," and the true meaning of that term is becoming more apparent each day that the spill continues. At the "epicenter" of this event, communities and states from Texas to Florida are being impacted by oil as well as by fears for their future livelihoods; other coastal communities around the country watch in alarm. Federal agencies are rotating staff from across the country into the Gulf region. The sheer magnitude and complexity of the response is raising questions about how best to organize at the macro level while staying flexible and responsive at the local level. And our traditional response technologies seem to be overwhelmed by the magnitude of the oil being released as well as the unknowns regarding how much longer the release will continue.

This Spill of National Significance is not only an overwhelming event, but it also has, as implied, nationwide impacts. For example, one possible consequence far from the Gulf Coast could be impacts on shipping agricultural products from the Midwest through the Mississippi River System. A concern here on the West Coast has been movement of oil spill response equipment to the Gulf of Mexico to assist in the response. The oil spill regulatory agencies on the West Coast are eager to provide mutual aid, whether trained personnel or equipment, but the U.S. system is set up in such a way that most spill response equipment is owned by the private sector. State and federal regulators require that vessels (both tankers carrying oil as cargo or large vessels carrying oil as fuel) and oil handling facilities (e.g., refineries, storage tanks, pipelines) have spill response plans in place as well as contracts with private response organizations to implement those plans. So West Coast regulators are now monitoring equipment leaving to assist in the Gulf in order to ensure that an adequate response capability is also maintained "at home" to implement those response plans. At the same time, West Coast regulators and responders want desperately to help with this unfolding catastrophe, and are releasing as much equipment as possible and sending personnel when requested. In addition, representatives of the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force have committed to participate on the Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) Team for this response.

While the Deepwater Horizon oil spill has generated more questions than answers so far, it is likely that oil spill planning standards, development of response technologies and the response relationships between all levels of government and regulated industries will be reviewed after this event. The risks of worst-case events will be re-evaluated, as will the costs of planning for such events and then difficult decisions will be needed regarding how those costs should be distributed between government and the private sector. These decisions will indeed be national in their significance and you can be sure that the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force and its member agencies will be involved in these discussions. Stay tuned!

Sincerely,

Jean R. Cameron
Executive Coordinator

SPILL PREVENTION PROJECTS

THE DATABASE PROJECT

The Task Force's regional oil spill database was initiated in 2003 with the collection of the 2002 data. Each subsequent year our Annual Report has included a compilation and analysis of regional data from the prior year. Our ongoing goal is continuous improvement of this database in order to provide information on spill trends and causal factors; this allows us to better target our spill prevention efforts. Spill data from 2002 – 2008 is available in our Annual Reports on the Task Force website at www.oilspilltaskforce.org.

The Database Workgroup is chaired by Camille Stephens of the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation; Camille also compiles the information supplied by other member agencies and produces the final graphics after Workgroup review. Workgroup members include Cathy Conway, Adrian Chatigny and Damon Williams of the California Office of Spill Prevention and Response, Mike Zollitsch of the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, Marcia Graf and Curtis Martin of the Hawaii Office of Hazard Evaluation and Emergency Response and Jack Barfield of the Washington Department of Ecology. The British Columbia Ministry of Environment monitors the project, is developing a spill database and plans to join the Task Force project as soon as possible.

Only spills of one barrel or larger are included in the Database. The Database Workgroup endeavors to refine data submittals consistent with the Task Force Data Dictionary (available at : http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/datadictionary.pdf), with particular emphasis on reducing the amount of data categorized as "other" or "unknown" to no more than 5% in any category. It is an ongoing challenge to refine information entered into the database to a level of specificity that supports effective analysis while also conforming to the varied collection capabilities of member agencies.

The 2009 data is shown on the following pages. Highlights include:

- There were 1,076 spills of one barrel or larger in our reporting jurisdictions in 2009; the total of all 2009 spills was 522,563 gallons. This is 1,000,931 gallons less than was spilled in 2008.
- 88% of the 2009 spills involved non-crude oil products and 12% were crude oils. The volume of non-crude was 77% of the total; the volume of crude was 23%.
- There were eight releases in 2009 which were larger than 10,000 gallons; six were non-crude and two were crude oil. None of these large releases was to water. All were from facilities. Oil Exploration and Production facilities were the top contributors to facility spills.
- Of the non-crude spills, diesel spills were the most frequent by volume (35%), followed by oily water mixture (30%).
- Facilities were the primary source of non-crude (63%), followed by vehicle (21%) and vessel (9%). Facilities were also the main source of spilled crude.
- Equipment failure was the primary cause of non-crude spilled by volume (48%), followed by Human Error (42%). For crude oil spilled, equipment failure represented 80% of the total volume and Human Error represented 9%.

We note that California's spill volumes often exceed that from other West Coast states; this reflects the fact that California faces several unique challenges. California is a large state with the most population of all our member jurisdictions, which results in more transportation of petroleum products as well as the most overall vehicle usage. California is also a state where oil is both produced and refined, which further increases the risk of spills. In addition, there are some inland producers with aging or poorly maintained pipeline infrastructure, which has driven up the number of oily-water spills to land in recent years.

The 2002-2009 data provides us with an opportunity to look at eight-year trends, which is also shown in this report. Here are the highlights:

- There were a total of 7,533 releases over this 8-year period for a total volume of 7, 061, 844 gallons spilled.

- As with 2009, 88% of the spills involved non-crude oil. While crude oil represented 12% of the number of spills, it represents 31% of the total volume over eight years.
- Ninety-two (92) spills were larger than 10,000 gallons; 25 were crude spills and 67 were non-crude.
- Overall, facilities (50%) and pipelines (25%) were the major sources during the 8-year period. Equipment failure and human error were the major causes overall.

The Oil Spill Task Force database is created and maintained for information purposes only. The data represents the respective agencies' best information at the time it was entered into the database. Recorded quantities are often under-reported. Each agency that assists in the creation and maintenance of the Task Force database in no way guarantees the accuracy of the information and no guarantee of accuracy shall be expressed or implied.

2009 ANNUAL SUMMARY OF SPILLS

- A total of 1,076 releases occurred during 2009, with a total volume of 522,563 gallons.
- 88% of the total number of releases were non-crude oil.
- Crude oil represented approximately 12% of the total number of spills and 23% of the total volume.
- Eight (8) releases exceeded 10,000 gallons, including six (6) non-crude oil spills and two (2) crude oil spills. None of the releases was to water. All were from facilities.

SUMMARY OF RELEASES BY PRODUCT (2009)

PRODUCT	COUNT	GALLONS	VOL.
Diesel Oil	518	140,491	27%
Oily Water Mixture	33	121,603	23%
Crude Oil	134	120,972	23%
Asphalt / Creosote	22	32,822	6%
Gasoline	41	24,151	5%
Mineral Oil / Transformer Oil	129	20,107	4%
Other	17	14,225	3%
Kerosene / Jet Fuel	19	13,065	3%
Lube Oil / Motor Oil	40	11,900	2%
Waste Oil	28	5,211	1%
Aviation Fuel	19	4588	1%
Hydraulic Oil	39	3965	1%
Heating Oil	12	3400	0.7%
Bunker C / IFO / HFO	6	2826	0.5%
Unknown	10	1910	0.4%
LNG / LPG	4	792	0.2%
Edible / Vegetable Oil	5	535	0.1%
TOTAL	**1,076**	**522,563**	

SPILLS GREATER THAN 10,000 GALLONS (2009)

PRODUCT	VOL.	STATE	DATE	SOURCE TYPE	CAUSE TYPE	MEDIUM
Oily Water Mixture	36,750	CA	6/24/2009	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Oily Water Mixture	31,500	CA	12/3/2009	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Oily Water Mixture	26,250	CA	6/17/2009	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Diesel Oil	20,000	CA	12/8/2009	Facility	Human Error	Land
Crude Oil	16,800	CA	12/3/2009	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Crude Oil	13,500	AK	11/29/2009	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Oily Water Mixture	12,600	CA	12/3/2009	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Asphalt / creosote	12,600	CA	11/13/2009	Facility	Human Error	Land

2009 NON-CRUDE SPILLS

Total Spills	942
Total Volume (gal)	401,591
Average Spill Size (gal)	426

SUMMARY BY PRODUCT:

Top Products

Product	Gallons
Diesel Oil	140,491
Oily water mixture	121,603
Asphalt / Creosote	32,822
Gasoline	24,151

- 942 non-crude spills totaling 401,591 gallons occurred during the 2009.
- The total volume of non-crude oil spilled during 2009 was 421,606 gallons less than in 2008.
- Together, diesel oil and oily water mixture spills comprised nearly two-thirds (65%) of the total non-crude volume released.
- Diesel oil spills were the most frequent (518 spills) and comprised 35% of the total non-crude oil spill volume. In contrast, oily water mixture spills were far less frequent (33 spills), but comprised 30% of the non-crude oil spill volume.
- Diesel oil dominated the annual non-crude spill volume in all states except California.

NON-CRUDE SPILLS BY PRODUCT, ALL STATES (2009)

(percent total volume)



NOTE: For graphing purposes, "Other" includes product classifications which comprised 1% or less of the total volume released: Hydraulic Oil, Heating Oil, Bunker C / IFO / HFO, Unknown, LNG / LPG and Edible / Vegetable Oil.

NON-CRUDE SPILLS BY PRODUCT AND STATE (2009)

(top 5 percent by volume)



NON-CRUDE SPILLS BY SOURCE, ALL STATES (2009)

(percent total volume)



NON-CRUDE SPILLS BY SOURCE AND STATE (2009)



2009 NON-CRUDE SPILLS

SUMMARY BY SOURCE:

Top Sources

Source	Gallons
Facility	254,492
Vehicle	82,917
Vessel	36,904

- Facilities (63%) and Vehicles (21%) were the major sources of non-crude spills during 2009.
- Facility spills (400) were the most frequent source of non-crude spills during 2009.
- Facilities were the major source for non-crude spills over 10,000 gallons.

2009 NON-CRUDE SPILLS

SUMMARY BY SOURCE:

(continued)

- Oil Exploration and Production facilities (47%) were the top contributors to facility spills.
- Tank Trucks (26%) and Commercial Trucks (59%) were the major contributors for vehicle spills.

NON-CRUDE SPILLS – FACILITY DETAIL (2009)

(percent total volume)



NOTE: For graphing purposes, "Other" includes Facility classifications which comprised 1% or less of the total volume released: Retail petroleum outlet, Commercial Truck, Marina, Leaking Drum or Container, Underground Storage Tank and Marine Terminal

NON-CRUDE SPILLS – VEHICLE DETAIL (2009)

(percent total volume)



NOTE: For graphing purposes, "Other" includes Vehicle classifications which comprised 1% or less of the total volume released: Private Vehicle.

NON-CRUDE SPILLS BY CAUSE, ALL STATES (2009)

(percent total volume)



NON-CRUDE SPILLS BY CAUSE AND STATE (2009)



2009 NON-CRUDE SPILLS

SUMMARY BY CAUSE:

Top Causes

Cause	Gallons
Equipment Failure	191,787
Human Error	168,735
Unknown	29,187

- 90% of the total non-crude spill volume was attributed to Equipment Failure (48%) or Human Error (42%)

2009 NON-CRUDE SPILLS

SUMMARY BY CAUSE:

(continued)

- More than half of the Equipment Failure spills were due to Structural Failure (57%).
- Inattention (40%) was the main cause among Human Error spills.
- We note that 33% of the causal information detail for Human Error was recorded as "Other." This reflects the difficulties faced by our member agencies in tracking down more detail on human error causes for non-crude spills, since many are small and many are also vehicles spills (21%) for which other agencies are first responders.

NON-CRUDE SPILLS – EQUIPMENT FAILURE DETAIL (2009)
(percent total volume)



NON-CRUDE SPILLS – HUMAN ERROR DETAIL (2009)
(percent total volume)



NOTE: "For graphing purposes, "Other" includes: Judgment, Inexperience, Inaccurate computation, Deliberate violation, Communications and Fatigue

NON-CRUDE SPILLS BY ACTIVITY (2009)

(percent total volume)



NOTE: For graphing purposes, "Other " includes activity classifications with less than 5,000 gallons spilled: Fueling , Tank/Hold Cleaning , Cargo (oil) operations, Bilge pumping.

NON-CRUDE SPILLS BY ACTIVITY AND STATE (2009)



2009 NON-CRUDE SPILLS

SUMMARY BY ACTIVITY:

NOTE: Activity was not recorded for spills in Alaska.

Activity	Gallons
Underway/Transiting	226,229
Other	38,225
Maintenance/Testing	25,183
Stationary/In Port	18,668

- Underway/Transiting/Pipeline in Operation[1] (67%) was the main activity at the time of the spill.

[1]Underway/Transiting/Pipeline in Operation: Normal and controlled operations of a pipeline, vessel, or vehicle while carrying out normal operations.

2009 NON-CRUDE SPILLS

SUMMARY BY SPILL SIZE:

Size Class	Gallons
42 to 100	40,412
101 to 500	61,125
501 to 1000	30,405
>1000	269,649

- More than 65% of the total non-crude spill volume was due to spills greater than 1,000 gallons.

NON-CRUDE SPILLS BY SPILL SIZE (2009)

(percent total volume)



NON-CRUDE SPILLS BY SPILL SIZE AND STATE (2009)

NON-CRUDE SPILLS BY MEDIUM IMPACT (2009)

(percent total volume)



NON-CRUDE SPILLS BY MEDIUM AND STATE (2009)

2009 NON-CRUDE SPILLS

SUMMARY BY MEDIUM:

Size Class	Gallons
Fresh Water	27,376
Imperm. Surface*	17,636
Land	312,100
Marine	44,479

- Nearly 80% of the non-crude volume was spilled to land.
- During 2009, approximately 18% of the non-crude spill volume was to freshwater or marine environments.
- During 2009, non-crude spills to land comprised the highest percent total volume for all states except Hawaii.
- Nearly 90% of total non-crude volume in California was spilled to land.

*Impermeable Surface

2009 CRUDE SPILLS

Total Spills	134
Total Volume (gal)	120,972
Average Spill Size (gal)	903

SUMMARY:

Product Type

Product	Gallons
Non-Crude Oil	401,591
Crude Oil	120,972
Total	**522,563**

- Crude Oil comprised 23% the total volume for 2009.
- The largest Crude Oil spill occurred in California and had a volume of 16,800 gallons.
- The volume of Crude Oil released in 2009 was 579,325 gallons less than the volume spilled in 2008.
- Facilities were the major source type for Crude Oil spills during 2009.

Top Sources

Source	Gallons
Facility	103,297
Pipeline	13,701
Private Property	2,226
Vehicle	1,488

CRUDE VS. NON-CRUDE SPILLS, ALL STATES (2009)

(percent total volume)



CRUDE SPILLS BY SOURCE TYPE AND STATE (2009)



2009 CRUDE SPILLS

CRUDE SPILLS BY CAUSE, ALL STATES (2009)

(percent total volume)



CRUDE SPILLS – EQUIPMENT FAILURE DETAIL (2009)

(percent total volume)



SUMMARY BY CAUSE:

Top Causes

Cause	Gallons
Equipment Failure	96,346
Unknown	12,290
Human Error	10,488
External Conditions	1,848

- Equipment Failure (80%) was the predominant cause of crude oil spills during 2009.
- Structural Failure was responsible for 74% of the total crude oil released due Equipment Failure.

2009 CRUDE SPILLS

SUMMARY:

Human Error Detail

Cause	Gallons
Inattention	9,826
Improper Equip Use	420
Other	200
Judgment	42

- Inattention (94%) was the cause of nearly all Human Error spills.

CRUDE SPILLS – HUMAN ERROR DETAIL (2009)
(percent total volume)



CRUDE SPILLS BY MEDIUM IMPACTED (2009)

(percent total volume)



CRUDE SPILLS BY MEDIUM AND STATE (2009)

(percent total volume)



2009 CRUDE SPILLS

SUMMARY BY MEDIUM:

Top Causes

Medium	Gallons
Fresh Water	15,918
Imperm. Surface*	1,021
Land	104,033

- More than 85% of the total crude volume was spilled to land.
- During 2009, crude spills to land comprised the highest percent total volume for all states. In Alaska, 95% of total crude oil volume was spilled to land

SUMMARY OF SPILLS (2002 - 2009)

- A total of 7,533, releases occurred during the 8-year period 2002-2009, with a total volume of more than 7 million gallons.
- 88% of the total number of releases were non-crude oil.
- Crude oil represented approximately 12% of the total number of spills and nearly 31% of the total volume
- Ninety-two (92) releases exceeded 10,000 gallons, including 25 crude oil spills and 67 non-crude oil spills. Fourteen (14) releases were to water. Facilities (52 releases) and Pipelines (25 releases) were the major sources for large spills.

RELEASES BY PRODUCT (2002 - 2009)

PRODUCT	COUNT	GALLONS	VOL.
Crude Oil	875	2,157,801	30.6%
Diesel Oil	3,710	1,832,224	25.9%
Oily water mixture	306	967,933	13.7%
Bunker C/IFO/HFO	67	705,119	10.0%
Gasoline	266	344,390	4.9%
Other	306	264,448	3.7%
Aviation Fuel	104	142,853	2.0%
Kerosene / Jet Fuel	124	126,997	1.8%
Mineral Oil / Transformer Oil	615	123,401	1.7%
Asphalt / Creosote	90	120,356	1.7%
Lube oil / Motor oil	314	71,790	1.0%
Waste oil	192	59,791	0.8%
Hydraulic oil	360	49,653	0.7%
Unknown	58	38,489	0.5%
Heating Oil	113	28,915	0.4%
Edible / Vegetable oil	21	16,174	0.2%
LNG / LPG	12	11,510	0.2%
TOTAL	**7,533**	**7,061,844**	

NUMBER OF SPILLS AND VOLUME RELEASED (2002 - 2009)



CRUDE VS. NON-CRUDE SPILLS BY YEAR (2002 - 2009)

	NON-CRUDE		CRUDE		TOTAL	
YR	COUNT	GALS	COUNT	GALS	COUNT	GALS
2002	519	406,229	23	12,769	542	418,998
2003	533	225,721	16	28,015	549	253,736
2004	573	973,545	7	2,092	580	975,637
2005	580	299,516	19	172,871	599	472,387
2006	1,155	594,280	242	589,867	1,397	1,184,147
2007	1,202	1,179,964	209	530,918	1,411	1,710,882
2008	1,154	823,197	225	700,297	1,379	1,523,494
2009	942	401,591	134	120,972	1,076	522,563
8 YEAR CUMULATIVES						
Total	6,658	4,904,043	875	2,157,801	7,533	7,061,844
Avg	832	613,005	109	269,725	942	882,731

CRUDE VS. NON-CRUDE SPILLS (2002 - 2009)



SUMMARY OF SPILLS (2002 - 2009)

SUMMARY BY PRODUCT:

- Over the 8-year period, the combined volume of Non-Crude spills was more than two times that for Crude Oil spills.

Crude Oil Spills

- The top two Crude Oil spills during the 8-year period were 463,848 gallons in California (2008) and a 267,000 gallon spill in Alaska (2006). The combined volume of these two incidents comprised 34% of the total Crude Oil volume released for the period.

Non-Crude Oil Spills

- Bunker C/IFO/HFO spills represented 10% of the total volume (Crude and Non-Crude combined) with only 67 spills.
- Diesel Oil comprised 26% of the total spill volume and 37% of the Non-Crude spill volume.

SPILLS GREATER THAN 10,000 GALLONS (2002-2009)

PRODUCT	VOL.	STATE	DATE	SOURCE	CAUSE	MEDIUM
Crude Oil	463,848	CA	04/24/08	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Land
Diesel Oil	420,000	CA	10/30/07	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Bunker C/IFO/HFO	321,052	AK	12/08/04	Vessel	Human Error	Marine
Bunker C/IFO/HFO	270,000	WA	08/25/04	Facility	Human Error	Land
Crude Oil	267,000	AK	03/02/06	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Land
Diesel Oil	145,000	AK	03/23/08	Vessel	Human Error	Marine
Oily Water Mixture	128,000	Ca	11/26/08	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Crude Oil	126,000	CA	03/09/07	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Crude Oil	126,000	CA	03/23/05	Pipeline	External Conditions	Fresh Water
Aviation Fuel	115,353	CA	11/22/04	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Land
Crude Oil	87,192	CA	01/10/07	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Crude Oil	63,000	CA	04/23/07	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Oily Water Mixture	63,000	CA	07/29/08	Facility	Unknown	Land
Diesel Oil	58,800	CA	07/07/07	Facility	Human Error	Land
Bunker C/IFO/HFO	58,000	CA	11/07/07	Vessel	Human Error	Marine
Crude Oil	42,000	CA	06/12/07	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Land
Crude Oil	40,000	CA	04/17/07	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Land
Oily Water Mixture	37,306	CA	11/11/06	Facility	Equipment Failure	Impermeable Surface
Oily Water Mixture	33,600	CA	04/14/06	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Impermeable Surface
Oily Water Mixture	31,500	CA	06/10/08	Facility	External Conditions	Land
Oily Water Mixture	30,240	CA	04/20/07	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Diesel Oil	30,000	OR	05/09/02	Other	External Conditions	Fresh Water
Gasoline	29,400	CA	08/14/05	Pipeline	Human Error	Land
Crude Oil	29,400	CA	10/01/06	Facility	Equipment Failure	Impermeable Surface
Gasoline	27,500	CA	04/25/07	Vehicle	Equipment Failure	Land
Crude Oil	26,460	CA	01/30/06	Pipeline	Human Error	Land
Crude Oil	26,250	CA	06/11/08	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Crude Oil	25,200	CA	11/27/05	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Land
Gasoline	24,500	HI	10/06/04	Unknown	Equipment Failure	Land
Kerosene	24,000	WA	03/01/05	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Land
Oily Water Mixture	21,546	CA	06/27/08	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Diesel Oil	21,000	CA	05/18/06	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Land
Oily Water Mixture	21,000	CA	07/11/08	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Crude Oil	21,000	CA	11/06/06	Facility	Unknown	Land
Oily Water Mixture	21,000	CA	03/29/07	Pipeline	Human Error	Land
Other	21,000	CA	06/04/03	Facility	Equipment Failure	Marine
Crude Oil	20,622	CA	09/06/08	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Diesel Oil	20,000	CA	05/02/05	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Land
Gasoline	18,900	HI	02/13/08	Facility	Human Error	Land
Crude Oil	18,900	CA	05/15/06	Facility	Human Error	Land
Diesel Oil	18,200	WA	11/03/06	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Gasoline	16,800	CA	03/24/06	Vehicle	Unknown	Land
Crude Oil	16,800	CA	10/13/06	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Land
Crude Oil	16,800	CA	06/02/06	Facility	Equipment Failure	Impermeable Surface

Continued on next page

SPILLS GREATER THAN 10,000 GALLONS (2002-2009) Continued

PRODUCT	VOL.	STATE	DATE	SOURCE	CAUSE	MEDIUM
Crude Oil	16,800	CA	12/03/09	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Gasoline	16,800	CA	03/24/06	Vehicle	Unknown	Land
Waste Oil	15,750	WA	06/12/06	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Diesel Oil	15,000	OR	10/31/05	Facility	Human Error	Fresh Water
Diesel Oil	15,000	WA	08/01/08	Facility	Equipment Failure	Impermeable Surface
Other	14,700	CA	12/04/04	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Fresh Water
Diesel Oil	14,680	AK	12/08/04	Vessel	Human Error	Marine
Other/Unknown	14,138	AK	12/18/02	Facility	Other	null
Oily Water Mixture	14,070	CA	07/29/07	Facility	Human Error	Land
Oily Water Mixture	14,000	CA	09/16/06	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Land
Crude Oil	14,000	CA	03/07/03	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Land
Oily Water Mixture	13,659	CA	01/10/07	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Kerosene / Jet Fuel	13,630	AK	10/30/08	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Bunker C/IFO/HFO	13,524	WA	04/07/05	Facility	Human Error	Land
Crude Oil	13,500	AK	11/29/09	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Oily Water Mixture	13,440	CA	01/21/07	Facility	External Conditions	Land
Mineral/Transf. Oil	13,000	HI	03/22/07	Vessel	Equipment Failure	Marine
Diesel Oil	13,000	HI	07/20/06	Vessel	Equipment Failure	Marine
Asphalt / Creosote	13,000	OR	08/11/04	Vehicle	Equipment Failure	Land
Other/Unknown	12,800	AK	06/18/02	Facility	Unknown	null
Oily Water Mixture	12,684	CA	04/03/08	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Oily Water Mixture	12,600	CA	10/12/07	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Land
Oily Water Mixture	12,600	CA	12/03/09	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Asphalt / Creosote	12,600	CA	11/13/09	Facility	Human Error	Land
Crude Oil	12,600	CA	07/15/07	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Crude Oil	12,600	CA	11/26/07	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Oily Water Mixture	12,600	AK	01/29/07	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Diesel Oil	12,500	AK	06/23/02	Vehicle	Equipment Failure	null
Diesel Oil	12,248	AK	04/24/05	Facility	Human Error	Land
Mineral/Transf. Oil	12,096	CA	09/30/07	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Land
Crude Oil	12,000	CA	03/15/07	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Oily Water Mixture	11,970	CA	05/01/07	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Land
Crude Oil	11,676	CA	03/04/06	Facility	Equipment Failure	Land
Other/Unknown	11,611	AK	02/26/02	Facility	Other	null
Diesel Oil	11,000	AK	11/17/03	Facility	Human Error	Land
Gasoline	11,000	OR	12/02/02	Vehicle	Human Error	Fresh Water
Diesel Oil	11,000	AK	09/16/02	Unknown	Equipment Failure	null
Gasoline	11,000	WA	11/27/03	Vehicle	Unknown	Fresh Water
Diesel Oil	10,584	HI	08/05/05	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Land
Other	10,500	WA	09/13/07	Facility	Human Error	Land
Oily Water Mixture	10,500	CA	08/12/06	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Land
Oily Water Mixture	10,500	CA	04/11/08	Facility	Human Error	Land
Oily Water Mixture	10,500	CA	05/29/06	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Fresh Water
Crude Oil	10,080	CA	07/21/08	Pipeline	Equipment Failure	Land

SUMMARY
2002 - 2009

SUMMARY BY SOURCE:

- Overall, Facilities (50%) and Pipelines (25%) were the major sources of spills during the 8-year period. They were also the major sources of Crude Oil spills. facilities were the major source of Non-Crude Oil spills.

Non-Crude Oil Spill Sources

Source	Gallons
Facility	2,593,797
Vehicle	806,647
Vessel	748,811
Pipeline	525,637
Other/Unknown	229,151
Total	**4,904,043**

- Facilties were the source of 53% of the Non-Crude spill volume.

Crude Oil Spill Sources

Source	Gallons
Pipeline	1,213,465
Facility	909,337
Vehicle	26,507
Vessel	5,292
Other/Unknown	3,200
Total	**2,157,801**

- Pipelines (56%) and Facilities (42%) were the source of 98% of the Crude Oil spill volume.

ANNUAL SPILL VOLUME BY SOURCE (2002 - 2009)



SPILLS BY PRODUCT (2002 - 2009)

(percent total volume)



ANNUAL SPILL VOLUME BY CAUSE (2002 - 2009)



SUMMARY
2002 - 2009

SUMMARY BY CAUSE:

- Overall, Equipment Failure (57%) and Human Error (31%) were the major spill causes.

Non-Crude Oil Spill Sources

Source	Gallons
Equipment Failure	2,238,669
Human Error	1,990,774
Other/Unknown	438,152
External Conditions	203,544
Org./Mgt. Failure	32,904

- Equipment Failure (46%) and Human Error (41%) were the predominant causes for Non-Crude spills.

Crude Oil Spill Sources

Source	Gallons
Equipment Failure	1,771,009
Human Error	172,009
External Conditions	143,290
Other/Unknown	65,592
Org./Mgt. Failure	5,901

- 82% of the total Crude Oil spill volume was due to Equipment Failure

IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS FROM OUR FIVE-YEAR REVIEW OF THE STATUS OF THE WEST COAST OFFSHORE VESSEL TRAFFIC RISK MANAGEMENT PROJECT RECOMMENDATIONS

The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management (WCOVTRM) Project was co-sponsored by the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force and the US Coast Guard Pacific Area from 1999 to 2002. Rick Holly of the California Office of Spill Prevention and Response served as the Task Force co-chair. USCG Pacific Area co-chairs included CAPT Ed Page, CAPT Frank Whipple, CAPT Glenn Anderson and CDR Stephen Danscuk. The goal of the project was to reduce the risk of collisions or drift groundings caused by vessel traffic transiting 3 to 200 nautical miles off the West Coast between Cook Inlet in the North and San Diego in the South. Vessels of concern included tank, cargo/passenger and fishing vessels of 300 gross tons or larger, as well as tank barges.

The WCOVTRM stakeholder workgroup collected and reviewed data on typical coastwise traffic patterns, traffic volume, existing management measures, weather data and ship drift patterns, historic casualty rates by vessel type, the availability of assist vessels, the environmental sensitivity of the coastlines, socio-economic consequences of a spill and projections of relevant future initiatives. Using the drift and tug availability data, they modeled likely tug response times under both average and severe weather conditions. The Workgroup then developed a Relative Ranking/Risk Indexing Worksheet that evaluated nine factors: volume of oil/vessel design; drift rates; areas of higher collision hazards; distance offshore; weather/season; tug availability; coastal route density; historic casualty rates by vessel type; and coastline sensitivity. Using this tool, they developed and ranked a total of fifty-two casualty scenarios in all the West Coast jurisdictions. These were then extrapolated into 1,296 additional scenarios on the West Coast, a modeling process which defined both average and "higher risk" areas from Alaska to California.

Workgroup members then addressed four risk factors considered most amenable to change: tug availability, collision hazards, historic casualty rates by vessel type and distance offshore. They adopted final Findings and Recommendations focused on these four factors in April of 2002. The WCOVTRM report is available at: http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/wcovtrm_report.htm

The last recommendation in the 2002 WCOVTRM Project report was to conduct a five-year review on the implementation status and effectiveness of the 2002 Recommendations. Accordingly, in 2007 the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force worked with Rick Holly of the Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) of the California Department of Fish and Game, who had served as the initial Project Co-Chair and Mr. Steve Danscuk of the USCG Pacific Area, plus the stakeholders involved in the original project, to conduct a review. After a series of conference calls and an iterative review/comment process, the Workgroup adopted "Recommendations for Further Action" in 2008. Those recommendations covered the following categories:

- Recommendations to improve navigation safety and avoid vessel casualties;
- Recommendations regarding rescue tug availability;
- Steps to track observance of recommended vessel transit distances offshore:
- Recommendations regarding data improvements; and
- Recommendations regarding further implementation reviews.

The final 5-Year Review report and recommendations are posted on the Task Force at: http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/wcovtrm_5_year_status_review_report_04_09.pdf

Pursuant to these recommendations, Jean Cameron met with the California Harbor Safety Committees (HSCs) in November 2009 and briefed them on the WCOVTRM recommendations which applied to HSCs. They were enthusiastic about our offer to establish a webpage with links to their Harbor Safety Plans, so this was done and the Harbor Safety Committees for Puget Sound and the Columbia River were also advised of the WCOVTRM recommendations and their weblinks included on the page. In addition, the webpage includes information on Best Maritime Practices. Please see: http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/harborsafety.htm.

We have also advocated that HSCs work with their U.S. Coast Guard Sector Commanders to ensure 24/7 access to tug company dispatchers for vessel rescue purposes. We are also tracking adoption of the Dutch Harbor model emergency towing packages; a towing package for vessels < 50,000 GT has been

purchased by U.S. Coast Guard District 13 for the entrance to the Columbia River and will be deployed to the Air Station in Astoria. We also continue to work with the U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area to track vessels transiting coastwise to determine whether they're observing the recommended minimum distances from shore.

PROMOTING BEST INDUSTRY SPILL PREVENTION PRACTICES FOR VESSELS

Following the Locke vs. Intertanko U.S. Supreme Court decision in March 2000, the 13th Coast Guard District and the Washington Department of Ecology set out to identify gaps between the existing international and federal regulatory regimes for tank vessels and the Washington State standards that were pre-empted by the Supreme Court decision. Once the gaps were identified, they were ranked by Coast Guard marine safety professionals and the licensed mariners at Ecology to determine which practices were most important for reducing the risk of an oil spill. The industry practices for tankers and tank barges were identified and ranked separately and consensus was reached on the relative ranking.

In 2003, the Task Force took this analysis to the next level by enlisting the input of industry leaders in the ranking process. Based on the strong recommendation of the very experienced and respected tanker operators who contributed to the ranking process, the voluntary industry practices for self-propelled tank vessels were expanded to all large commercial vessels. To access our report on this project and the industry rankings, please go to the following site: http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/project_reports/VesselBipReport.pdf.

Since 2003, the Task Force has communicated these Best Industry Practices in various forums of large vessel operators. At a February 2010 meeting of the Pacific Area USCG/American Waterways Operators (AWO) Quality Steering Committee, we presented the Tank Barge Best Industry Practices for their consideration. The AWO representatives felt that their Responsible Carrier Program was already incorporating most of these practices and have

committed to send us a formal reply regarding each recommended practice.

SUPPORTING THE PACIFIC OIL SPILL PREVENTION EDUCATION TEAM

The Pacific Oil Spill Prevention Education Team (POSPET) met in September 2009 and again in April of 2010 to share outreach strategies and plan for collaborative projects. POSPET members represent Washington Sea Grant, Washington's Department of Ecology, the Puget Soundkeeper Alliance, the USCG Marine Safety Auxiliaries in Oregon and Washington, the Washington Department of Natural Resources, the City of Des Moines Marina, the Georgia Strait Alliance, the OceanWatch Boaters Association of British Columbia, the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, the Cook Inletkeeper, the British Columbia Ministry of Environment, the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, the Oregon Marine Board, the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission Habitat Education Program, the Pacific Shellfish Institute, the California Coastal Commission and the California Department of Boating and Waterways, the Boat U.S. Foundation, Washington State University Extension in Clallam County and the California Office of Spill Prevention and Response. POSPET is chaired by Eric Olsson of Washington Sea Grant.

POSPET encourages networking in order to exchange ideas and promote innovative approaches to outreach and education. Through informal collaboration and access to beneficial member review and feedback, POSPET adds value and has improved the quality and reach of individual outreach efforts. POSPET maintains a listserve to facilitate this information exchange in the interims between its Fall and Spring meetings.

POSPET member organizations and agencies have collaborated to design, produce and distribute placards, decals, brochures and fuel pump tags with the ***Spills Aren't Slick*** messages. In addition to this campaign, POSPET also promotes the innovative 1-800-OILS-911 spill reporting number in British Columbia, Washington, Oregon and California. Using this easy-to-remember number, a boater reporting an oil spill is automatically routed to the correct emergency response call center in any of those jurisdictions. The Pacific States/BC Oil Spill Task Force provides staff support for POSPET and maintains this valuable spill reporting number.

Summary notes from POSPET meetings, photos, a featured POSPET member, a list of all POSPET members with links to their websites, as well as PDFs of the ***Spills Aren't Slick*** poster, brochure, pump tag and decals are posted on the POSPET page at: http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/pospet.htm.

POSPET members tour a marina on the Columbia River

MONITORING THE STATUS OF DOUBLE HULL TANKERS AND VESSELS TRANSITING BETWEEN MEMBER JURISDICTIONS

International double hull requirements for tank vessels are specified in MARPOL 73/78, Annex I, 13 F and 13 G. For U.S. flag tankers and foreign-flag tankers entering U.S. waters, the U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) requires new tank ships and barges to be of double hull construction. OPA 90 also required that existing single hull tank vessels be retrofitted with a double hull or, beginning in 1995, be phased out of operation by 2015, with the phase-out schedule specified in section 4115 of OPA 90.

A true "single hull" tanker must have already been phased out by Jan 1, 2010.

Only existing double-bottomed or double-sided tankers may still be allowed to operate in U.S. waters, including our EEZ, until their phase-out date (no later than Jan 1, 2015). As a result of these regulations, double-hulled tankers calling on West Coast ports are now more the rule than the exception. Although single hull tank barges that are less than 5000 GT may continue to operate until 2015, the data provided in the table on page 36 indicates that the percent of double hull tank barges serving the West Coast is only somewhat less than that of double hull tank ships.

For many years, CAPT Laura Stratton of the Washington Department of Ecology has provided the Task Force agencies with regular updates on the status of the U.S. flag Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS) tankers which transit along the West Coast. These reports covered owner/operator, date of build or scheduled date of build, hull configuration, dead-weight tonnage, conversion date if single hull or double bottom and retirement date. As of this year, all the TAPS tankers are now double-hulled, so we will no longer track their conversion status. The final report is available at: http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/project_reports/2010_TAPS_Trade_Tanker_Report.pdf.

We will continue to monitor trends in the U.S. Coast Guard's Critical Area Inspection Program for the TAPS tankers.

We have begun a new project this year, i.e., to track the double-hull conversion status of all tank ships

2009 TANK VESSEL DATA

Port/Area	2009 Tank Vessel Arrivals	Double Hull	Double Bottom	Single Hull	% Double Hull
Valdez, AK	302	287	12	2	95
Cook Inlet, Anchorage, Drift River, AK	83	83	0	0	100
Other AK (Adak, Dutch Harbor, Port Clarence)	7	5	2	0	71
British Columbia (Vancouver & Kitimat)	286	254	26	6	89
Puget Sound, WA area ports	505	489	14	2	97
Portland, OR area ports	52	51	1	0	98
San Francisco, CA area ports	815	686	64	65	84
Southern California area ports	883	859	5	19	97
Honolulu, HI	165	138	6	21	84
TOTALS	**3,098**	**2,852**	**130**	**115**	**92**

NOTES:

- Vessel information available through MISNA's tracking system did not differentiate between chemical and petroleum tankers and some tankers can be used to carry either cargo.
- Honolulu does not have a Marine Exchange, so tanker data was taken from AIS data. Although we know that a total of 104 oil tankers made calls for the two major oil companies, the AIS data for 2009 noted a total of 165 tank vessels in the port, some of which may have been carrying products other than crude or refined petroleum products.

and tank barges visiting West Coast ports. Mr. Neil Kelly at the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation compiled this information for Alaska and John Ventjeer of the Marine Information Services of North America (MISNA) compiled tank vessel data from the Marine Exchanges in other West Coast jurisdictions. The American Waterways Operators provided data on tank barges operating in the port areas of Southern California, San Francisco, Portland, and Puget Sound. The data is presented in the two tables. While we did encounter some data collection challenges as described in the notes under each table, the data is revealing. Overall, 92% of all tank ships calling on ports in our member jurisdictions are double-hulled and an average of 79% of the tank barges operating in four major West Coast port areas are also double-hulled.

In addition to tracking the double hull status of tank vessels and barges, Task Force member agencies share information among themselves regarding casualties and incidents involving both tank and nontank vessels which are transiting between our member jurisdictions.

PIPELINE SPILL PREVENTION

Pipelines were the source of only 1% of non-crude oil spills recorded in the Task Force 2009 Database, but they were the source for over 11% of the crude oil spills in 2009. Our 2002-2009 trend data indicates that pipelines were the source for 25% of all spills and 56% of crude oil spills for that eight-year period. These statistics support the continuing need for our focus on preventing spills from pipelines, as well as improving preparedness and response strategies for this source.

As outlined in our 2009-2010 Annual Work Plan, we hoped to complete a table comparing U.S. and Canadian federal, provincial and state regulations governing pipelines. Unfortunately, we have not been able to implement this project to date.

2009 TANK BARGE DATA

Port/Area	Double Hull operating in area	Hull design unknown	Single Hull operating in area	% Double Hull operating in area
Puget Sound, WA area ports	35	3	14	67%
Portland, OR area ports	34	1	4	87%
San Francisco, CA area ports	34	0	2	94%
Southern California area ports	20	0	10	67%
Average % of DH tank barges in these four (4) port areas				**79%**

NOTES:

- Tank barge arrival data was not available for British Columbia, Alaska, Puget Sound, or Hawaii. Since the American Waterways Operators provided data on the hull design of tank barges operating in Puget Sound, Portland, San Francisco, and Southern California port areas, we calculated the double hull data based on the percent operting in the area, rather than on arrivals. Also please note, since some tank barges operate in more than one port area, totals would be misleading and are therefore not provided.

MONITORING SPILL PREVENTION TOPICS OF CONCERN

Each year the Coordinating Committee monitors and shares information on selected spill prevention topics. Our spill prevention topics for 2009 - 2010 included:

- Cruise ship operations with regard to spills and other water pollution impacts
- NPDES for vessel wastewater discharges
- Oil spill risks from sunken vessels
- Waste oil dumping by deep draft commercial ships
- Vessel and Facility Oil Transfer regulations
- Spills from trucks and railroads
- Salvage capabilities and regulations (refers to emergency stabilization, firefighting and lightering)
- Liquefied Natural Gas shipping and terminal operations
- Tug escort requirements
- Towing vessel inspection regulations
- Green Ports
- Ballast water regulations preventing spread of invasive aquatic species
- Federal preemption issues
- Spill Prevention Lessons Learned
- Vessel traffic trends and risk assessments or studies.

Board simulation with (left to right) Dave Owings, SEAPRO; Bob Mattson, SOSC; Cdr. John Sifling, FOSC

SPILL PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PROJECTS

REVIEWING U.S./CANADIAN TRANSBOUNDARY SPILL PLANNING AND CAPABILITIES

The Task Force launched a multi-year initiative in 2008 to review U.S. and Canadian Transboundary Spill Planning and Response Issues, with the goal as follows: *Review and document existing U.S./Canadian Transboundary oil spill response plans and capabilities for the British Columbia/Alaska and British Columbia/Washington borders, acknowledging existing authorities and response management systems. Recommend improvements as needed for both joint response and planning efforts, as well as for planning and capacity building within each jurisdiction.* The Project will focus only on marine areas affecting the borders between Alaska, British Columbia and Washington. Dave Byers, Response Section manager at the Washington Department of Ecology chairs this Project Workgroup.

The first meeting of the U.S./Canadian Transboundary Spill Planning and Response Project Workgroup was hosted by the Washington Department of Ecology in Lacey, WA in June of 2008. Workgroup members were briefed on existing paradigms and authorities, including the Joint Contingency Plan (JCP) and the CANUSPAC and CANUSDIX annexes to the JCP, the roles of the Joint Response Team, Regional Response Teams and the Regional Environmental Emergency Team (REET), ICS and the Response Management System, Mutual Aid agreements between the Task Force member agencies and among the oil spill response organizations covering the boundary areas and the CANUSDIX guidelines for wildlife and resource agency decision-making. Workgroup members also brainstormed a list of topics to be covered, subcommittee membership, the Project Workplan and a Project Timeline. Summary notes from this meeting are available at http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/June_2008_Workgroup_meeting_notes.pdf.

The Project Workgroup adopted the final Project Work Plan in October of 2008; see (http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/Transboundary_Project_Workplan.pdf). They chartered five subcommittees to review assigned topics and develop reports; each is chaired by a Workgroup member: Dave Byers of the Washington Department of Ecology chairs the Command subcommittee; Graham Knox of the British Columbia Ministry of Environment chairs the Planning subcommittee; Kevin Gardner of the Western Canada Response Organization chairs the Operations subcommittee; Bob Mattson of the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation chairs the Logistics Subcommittee; and David Owings of the Southeast Alaska Petroleum Resource Organization (SEAPRO) chairs the Finance/Administration subcommittee.

The five subcommittees convened by conference call and worked by email from October 2008 through February 2009 to develop the first draft reports on the topics assigned by the Project Workgroup. In some cases they added more topics and in a few cases they sent some topics to other Subcommittees. Subcommittee members volunteered as "leads" for each topic. The Task Force's Executive Coordinator then edited and compiled the reports into the First Draft U.S./Canadian Transboundary Spill Project Report. This report included 36 topic reports; more were actually drafted, but some were merged with other reports where appropriate.

The Subcommittee chairs completed a three-week review/comment on this First draft, and it was also provided to key U.S. and Canadian federal agencies for their review and comment. The Project Workgroup and Subcommittee members, as well as representatives of seventeen tribes in the border areas of Washington and Alaska and five First Nations and Treaty governments in British Columbia, representatives of EPA Region 10, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, the Seattle Audubon Society and the Pacific Merchant Shipping Association were then given an opportunity to review/comment.

We received seven sets of comments on this First Draft of the Project Report. The Task Force Executive Coordinator has been making revisions section by section based on these comments; she has also been making additional edits and revisions recommended by subject experts or based on new information. Each Subcommittee reviews and comments on their revised Section, and it is subsequently sent to the full Project Workgroup and federal agencies for review and comment.

We had hoped to convene the Project Workgroup in June to adopt draft recommendations based on the 2nd Draft Report, but had to cancel that meeting in the face of demands on everyone's time resulting from the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Instead, we plan to convene the workgroup in a series of conference calls over the summer to adopt draft recommendations. Their draft recommendations will then be added to the draft report and made available for public comment this fall. The Workgroup will then convene in early 2011 to adopt a final report with recommendations.

There is extensive stakeholder involvement in this project. Twenty-seven stakeholders are serving on the Project Workgroup. They represent Environment Canada, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Alaska and Washington), the U.S. Department of the Interior's Office of Environmental Policy and Compliance for the Alaska region, the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary, the Makah Tribe Office of Marine Affairs, the British Columbia Chamber of Shipping, the Washington State Maritime Cooperative (WSMC), the Marine Spill Response Corporation (MSRC) for the Pacific/NW Region, Burrard Clean Operations/Western Canada Marine Response Corporation, the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Alaska Region, the Pacific Region of the American Waterways Operators, O'Brien's Oil Pollution Services, the SE Alaska Petroleum Resource Organization (SEAPRO), the National Response Corporation's Environmental Services, ECM Maritime Services LLC, the Georgia Strait Alliance, U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area Response Division, BP Crises Management and Emergency Response, the Council of Marine Carriers in British Columbia, the Marine Exchange of Puget Sound, People for Puget Sound, NOAA's Office of Response and Restoration and the Task Force member agencies in Alaska, British Columbia and Washington.

In addition to the Project Workgroup members, thirty-six subject matter experts are also working on the Subcommittees; they represent NOAA's Assessment and Restoration Division, Burrard Clean Operations, SEAPRO, the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife, the Makah Office of Marine Affairs, the 13th U.S. Coast Guard District, the Canadian Wildlife Service, the Canada Border Services Agency Pacific Region, U.S. Customs and

Border Protection, attorneys from Vancouver, British Columbia and Seattle, Washington who represent various protection and indemnity (P&I) clubs and the Task Force member agencies in Alaska, British Columbia and Washington.

Representatives from the Canadian Coast Guard, the U.S. Coast Guard Districts 13 and 17, Environment Canada and Transport Canada – who declined to participate on the Project Workgroup – are being provided opportunities to review and comment on each draft.

INCREASING THE U.S. LIMITS OF LIABILITY

In November, 2005 the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force petitioned the U.S. Coast Guard to adjust the Limits of Liability for tank vessels, tank barges, nontank vessels and appropriate facilities by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) increase since the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) was passed in 1990. That petition for rulemaking and response are located at http://www.regulations.gov. The complete docket number is USCG-2005-23163. Documents on this site include our 11/7/2005 letter of petition and the National Pollution Fund Centers' replies of 12/8/2005 and 12/4/2006.

The Delaware River Protection Act of 2006 amended and increased liability limits under OPA for all vessel types - i.e. all tank vessels, which includes tank barges, as well as other nontank vessels. The increases to limits were approximately 50%, which roughly corresponds to the consumer price index increases since OPA was enacted. Increases to liability limits for single hull tank vessels (approximately 150%) exceeded consumer price index increases.

OPA section 1004(d)(4) states that *"The President shall, by regulations issued not less often than every 3 years, adjust the limits of liability specified in subsection (a) to reflect significant increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI)."* The 2006 Act amended the provision authorizing further increases to limits based on consumer price index increases to begin from the date of enactment of the Act. Authority for future rulemaking to increase vessel limits of liability is limited to consumer price increases.

Regarding facilities, a letter from Jan Lane, Director of the National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC), sent on 12/4/2006 in response to our continued request that the USCG Limits of Liability for facilities be increased by the CPI, stated that "For those oil handling facilities falling within the responsibility of the Coast Guard…the NPFC will initiate rulemaking to adjust limits for significant CPI increases consistent with OPA section 1004(d) (4)." Ms. Lane also explained that the following agencies are responsible for OPA facility limits of liability:

- EPA for non-transportation related onshore facilities;
- DOI (MMS) for offshore facilities and related pipelines, except deepwater ports;
- DOT for onshore pipelines, motor carriers and railroads; and
- The USCG for transportation-related onshore facilities and deepwater ports, except onshore pipelines, motor carriers and railroads

Our 2008-2009 Preparedness/Response Objective called for us to petition EPA, MMS and DOT to initiate rulemaking to adjust the limits of liability for the oil-handling facilities which they regulate. In preparation for doing so, we contacted these agencies to inquire whether they have increased the limits of liability for the oil-handling facilities which they regulate. No reply was received from EPA, but both DOT and MMS replied that they have not done so. Consequently, the Task Force plans to submit petitions for increases to facility limits of liability to EPA (if needed), MMS and DOT.

On January 6, 2010 the U.S. Coast Guard adopted a final rule adjusting Limits of Liability for vessels and deepwater ports. The new Limits of Liability for vessels are as follows:

- For a single-hull tank vessel greater than 3,000 gross tons, the greater of $3,200 per gross ton or 23,496,000;
- For a tank vessel greater than 3,000 gross tons, other than a single-hull tank vessel, the greater of $2,000 per gross ton or $17,088,000;
- For a single-hull tank vessel less than or equal to 3,000 gross tons, the greater of $3,200 per gross ton or $6,408,000;
- For a tank vessel less than or equal to 3,000 gross tons, other than a single-hull tank vessel, the greater of $2,000 per gross ton or $4,272,000; and
- For any other vessel the greater of $1,000 per gross ton or $854,400.

The adjustments for tank ships and nontank vessels were only a little less than those recommended in the National Pollution Funds Center's 2009 Report to Congress. However, the NPFC's recommendations

for tank barges were the greater of $7000/GT or $29,100,000 for single hull tank barges and $7000/GT or $36,900,000 for double hull tank barges. These suggested Limits of Liability were "to achieve an equal cost share" with the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, based on past claims. See: http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/docs/PDFs/Reports/Liability_Limits_Report_2009.pdf.

The following statement was in the rule: *…to ensure future consistency in inflation adjustments to the limits of liability for all OPA 90 oil spill source categories, the Coast Guard has coordinated the CPI adjustment methodology with DOT, EPA and DOI. In addition, the Coast Guard, DOT, EPA and DOI have agreed to coordinate the CPI inflation adjustments to the limits of liability for facilities (i.e., for MTR onshore facilities regulated by Coast Guard, NMTR onshore facilities regulated by DOT, NTR onshore facilities regulated by EPA and offshore facilities regulated by DOI), as part of the next cycle of inflation adjustments to the limits of liability. This phased approach will allow adequate time for the additional interagency coordination necessary to ensure consistency in implementing the CPI adjustments to the OPA 90 limits of liability for all onshore and offshore facilities.*

We contacted the National Pollution Funds Center and asked when the next cycle of inflation adjustments to limits of liability was scheduled to occur. No specific time has been set, but it is likely that the Deepwater Horizon oil spill will result in legislative mandates to increase Limits of Liability, at least for offshore drilling and exploration. We will monitor the ongoing need for rulemaking petitions to increase the Limits of Liability for other types of facilities.

TRACKING ICS GUIDANCE, FORMS AND APPLICATIONS

Another initiative under our Preparedness/Response objective has been the establishment of a standing project workgroup to track changes to Incident Command System (ICS) guidance, forms and practices for oil spill response. Larry Iwamoto of the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation chairs this workgroup; other member agency representatives include: Mike Zollitsch of Oregon DEQ, Elin Storey of the Washington Department of Ecology, D'Arcy Sego of the British Columbia Ministry of Environment, Chris Klumpp from California OSPR and Curtis Martin from the Hawaii Department of Environmental Health.

In October 2009, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) took leadership on an effort to develop a job description for the Environmental Unit Leader. The Task Force ICS workgroup members are participating, as well as representatives from other states. Randy Imai at OSPR is maintaining the website where documents are posted. The ICS Workgroup also reviewed FEMA's proposed changes to ICS Forms.

The ICS Workgroup has noted that, regarding incorporation of Local Government On-Scene Coordinators (LGOSCs) into Unified Command as outlined in the San Francisco Area Plan, either the Federal OSC or the LGOSC can request it. The selection of the LGOSC must take place separate from the incident response and all affected local governments must agree on the person chosen. That person should have training and should be prepared to commit the time necessary and be able to identify a backup LGOSC. Alaska plans already include provisions for inclusion of a Local On-Scene Coordinator (LOSC) as part of the Unified Command."

MAINTAINING THE 1-800-OILS-911 SPILL REPORTING SYSTEM

The Task Force maintains this toll-free spill reporting number in California, Oregon, Washington and British Columbia. The number automatically reaches the 24-hour emergency reporting center in each of these four jurisdictions as a function of the location from which the call originates. For example, a call made to 1-800-OILS-911 from anywhere in California will automatically be routed to California's emergency reporting center.

Although it is available for anyone to use, information regarding the number is targeted at recreational boaters and fishermen by POSPET members. Usage analysis for July 2009 through June of 2010 shows that 371 spills were reported using 1-800-OILS-911 during that period.

MONITORING MUTUAL AID ISSUES

The Task Force Coordinating Committee has discussed FEMA's Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and how it differs from our 1993 Mutual Aid Agreement. In addition, the Coordinating Committee members have sent OSPR lists of SCAT-trained personnel in their agencies at their request.

Our U.S. member agencies were contacted by FEMA under the EMAC as a result of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and have all submitted lists of trained personnel ready to respond. The British Columbia Ministry of Environment is working through the Canada Department of Foreign Affairs to participate on a Canadian team representing both federal and provincial agencies to assist in the spill response.

The Task Force agencies have provided technical advice and expertise as requested by the Gulf States; for example, the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation provided advice on cost recovery documentation and seafood analysis, plus fishing vessel decontamination and recertification procedures. The Office of Spill Prevention and Response at the California Department of Fish and Game has deployed a number of staff as well as the Director of California's Oiled Wildlife Care Network. In addition, OSPR's Deputy Administrator deployed to the Incident Command Post in Mobile, Alabama in his U.S. Coast Guard Reserves capacity to serve as a Deputy Incident Commander.

The Task Force member agencies are also actively tracking the spill response resources which have left their jurisdictions to assist in the Deepwater Horizon response. Over 200,000 gallons of dispersant have been sent from the West Coast and Hawaii to the Gulf, plus one Aerial Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) pack from Alaska. Fireboom has been shipped from Puget Sound, Alaska's North Slope and a spill response cooperative on the Columbia River sent 26,500 feet of boom. Numerous personnel from our federal partners (the U.S. Coast Guard, EPA and NOAA) have been deployed to the Gulf and spill response organizations and cooperatives are also sending personnel and equipment from the West Coast.

Part of the focus of our member agencies is to ensure that adequate response capacity is maintained at home, should it be needed for a spill response on the West Coast; they are working with the regulated industry and response contractors to meet this goal, while also providing as much assistance as possible to the heroic efforts underway in the Gulf of Mexico.

GOM Spill (photo courtesy of Associated Press)

MONITORING OIL SPILL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Judd Muskat of the California Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) chairs an R&D Workgroup which the Task Force established this year. Other members include Dianne Munson, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation; Laurie Boyle, British Columbia Ministry of Environment; Myola Martinez, Washington Department of Ecology; Don Petit, Oregon Department of Environmental Quality; Joy Lavin-Jones, California Department of Fish and Game, OSPR; Joe Mullin, U.S. Minerals Management Service (now the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management); Kurt Hansen, U.S. Coast Guard; Steve Lehman and Ruth Yender, NOAA; Dr. Bruce Hollebone, Environment Canada; and Dr. Nancy Kinner, Coastal Response Research Center.

The Workgroup convened by conference call in December 2009 to share information on current oil spill R&D projects. Summary notes from the meeting, which include links to numerous oil spill R&D project reports, are available at: http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/RandD_Project_Dec_2009_Summary_Notes.pdf. The R&D Workgroup plans to hold conference calls twice/year.

CONDUCTED A SOCIAL MEDIA WORKSHOP

Dr. Todd Hass of the Washington Department of Ecology hosted a Social Media webinar workshop for us on April 19, 2010. Participants included representatives from our member agencies as well as representatives form the U.S. Navy, the Canadian Coast Guard, the Clean Islands Council, EPA, Tesoro and the U.S. Coast Guard.

The focus of the discussion was on use of social media techniques to communicate and network with the public in real-time during a spill response.

Topics covered included:

- Defining "social media";
- Who's using it;
- Exploring Twitter as a representative tool;
- A case study of the Columbia River barge grounding , July 2009; and
- Next steps.

Summary notes from the seminar will be posted on the Task Force website under "Project Reports."

MONITORING SPILL PREPAREDNESS/RESPONSE TOPICS OF CONCERN

The Coordinating Committee has monitored and shared information on the following oil spill preparedness/response "topics of concern" throughout the past year:

- Volunteer registration and tracking software
- Oil spill drill programs
- Applied response technologies and regulations
- Oil Spill research and development, including BAT and BAP
- Oil Spill Response Organization (OSRO) certifications, mergers, mutual aid and response capabilities
- Joint Information Center (JIC) planning, training and guidelines
- Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) initiatives, issues and activities, including NRDA assessments and collections
- Coordination of inter-jurisdictional wildlife care
- West Coast sea bird and other vulnerable marine populations threatened by oil spills
- Development of remote sensing capabilities, application of RADARSAT and implementation of 24-hour response operations where it would be safe and effective
- Preparedness/Response Lessons Learned
- Contingency plan regulations and preparedness/response issues re: nontank vessels
- Track planning for Potential Places of Refuge and applications of POR decision-making guidelines
- Status of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund
- Plans for the 2010 Spill of National Significance Drill.

COMMUNICATIONS PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES

THE 2009 CLEAN PACIFIC CONFERENCE

Our 2009 Clean Pacific Conference was held September 14–16th at the Oregon Convention Center; 852 persons participated and everyone seemed pleased with the program and the exhibitors, as well as with the lovely–and Green–setting.

We were honored to have the U.S. Coast Guard co-host the conference and RADM Gary Blore, Commander of the 13th Coast Guard District, delivered the keynote address. Jessica Keys, Natural Resource Advisor to Oregon Governor Kulongoski, welcomed the conference delegates to Oregon.

The conference also featured the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force's 2009 Legacy Awards and a reading of the 1999-2008 Legacy Award Honor Roll, activity updates from state, provincial and federal agencies (U.S. & Canada), two pre-conference workshops, three "Super Sessions", six poster sessions and fifteen regular sessions. An Opening Night Reception honored the 20th Anniversary of the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force and the U.S. Coast Guard held an Open House for their Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSCs). We are most grateful to the Conference Sponsors, to the fine exhibitors and to everyone who attended for making this such a success!

The 3rd biennial Clean Pacific Conference will be in Long Beach, California September in 2012. Please check our website for more information."

Our regular one-day Annual Meeting will be hosted by the Hawaii Department of Health in Honolulu on October 6, 2010; program details will be posted on our website.

RADM Gary Blore, Commander U.S. Coast Guard District 13 was the Keynote Speaker

Jessica Keys of the Oregon Governor's Office and Dick Pedersen, Oregon's Task Force Member

OUR 2008 LEGACY AWARDS

Legacy Awards are given to industry, non-profit or public agency organizations and individuals, or for team efforts. The Task Force gives Legacy Awards for projects, accomplishments, or leadership that demonstrates innovation, management commitment and improvements in oil spill prevention, preparedness, or response resulting in enhanced environmental protection. Efforts to promote partnerships and involve the public are favored. Organizations, individuals, or projects nominated for the Legacy Award must be located or primarily operating in the Task Force jurisdictions of Alaska, British Columbia, Washington, Oregon, California and Hawaii. Organizations or individuals representing a regulated industry must demonstrate a satisfactory history of compliance with state, provincial and federal oil spill regulations.

The Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force awarded its 2009 Legacy Awards for excellence in Oil Spill Prevention, Preparedness and Response at the Clean Pacific Conference on September 15, 2009 to the following recipients:

- Richard Wright, retired Pacific NW Regional Vice President of the Marine Spill Response Corporation;
- Joseph Mullin, Manager of the Minerals Management Service's National Oil Spill Response Research Program;
- Alan Allen, an oil spill consultant working as "Spilltec";
- Scott Knutson, U.S. Coast Guard District 13 Response Advisory Team Supervisor

More details on the 2009 Legacy Award winners and their outstanding efforts is available on our website at: http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/awards_2009.htm. Information on all Legacy Award winners from 1999 to 2008 is available at: http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/legacy.htm

ONGOING STAKEHOLDER OUTREACH

Stakeholders monitor Task Force activities through our web site and can also participate in Task Force sponsored events or project workgroups. We host several public events, including our Annual Meetings which alternate with the Clean Pacific Conferences, plus topic-specific roundtables.

From left to right: Scott Knutson, Richard Wright, Alan Allen and Joseph Mullin

The Task Force Web Site

The Task Force website (www.oilspilltaskforce.org) offers the following features:

- The OVERVIEW provides background on the Task Force as well as bios and photos of all Task Force Members;
- CURRENT INTERESTS is where we post event and award announcements, our Events Calendar, and reports from recent Task Force meetings or projects;
- WHAT WE DO includes our current Strategic Plan and Annual Work Plan, our Memoranda of Cooperation, and Resolutions and Agreements signed by the Task Force Members since 1993;
- The LEGACY AWARD HONOR ROLL lists all the Task Force Legacy Award Winners since 1999;
- NOTES & REPORTS features our Annual Reports (which contain the spill data reports) as well as Task Force comments on federal rulemaking, noteworthy correspondence, meeting notes and project reports;
- CONTACT INFORMATION provides contact details for the Task Force's Coordinating Committee and Executive Coordinator;
- LINKS provides links to the Task Force member agencies, other state and provincial agencies on the West, Gulf and East Coasts, plus key US and Canadian federal agencies;
- The SPILLS AREN'T SLICK page provides information on POSPET and its activities;

- A new page covers West Coast HARBOR SAFETY COMMITTEES AND BEST MARITIME PRACTICES; and
- A SEARCH engine allows you to search the site if you don't find what you want in one of the categories above.

The website has received a total of 2,154,347 "requests" since it was initiated in the 3rd quarter of 2003 (a "request" is any visit to the site or to any page on the site). Here's a breakdown by year: 2003: 22,269; 2004: 246,597; 2005: 471,158; 2006: 521,506; 2007: 380, 495; 2008: 262,430; and 2009: 249,892.



MAINTAINING OUR PARTNERSHIP WITH THE U.S. COAST GUARD PACIFIC AREA

The Pacific Area Coast Guard and its member Districts have a track record of collaboration with the Oil Spill Task Force on projects of regional interest over the past 15 years. Such projects include the Integrated Vessel Response Guidelines (1997), the Oil Spill Field Operations Guide Update (2000), the Best Industry Practices for Vessels and Tank Barges (2003), the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project (2002) and its Five-year Review (2007), Places of Refuge Guidelines (2005), the Clean Pacific Conference (2007) and the Pacific Oil Spill Prevention Education Team (ongoing).

In May of 2008 Vice Admiral Charles D. Wurster, Commander, Coast Guard Pacific Area and Jean Cameron, Executive Coordinator of the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, signed a Memorandum of Understanding, which recognizes this 15-year cooperative partnership and the shared goals of both the U.S. Coast Guard and the Oil Spill Task Force in preparing for and preventing spills, in seeking cooperative methods to foster greater environmental awareness and compliance and by ensuring that appropriate cleanups are conducted.

The Task Force Coordinating Committee met with representatives of U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area and Districts 11, 13, 14 and 17 on January 21st, 2009 to form a Steering Committee to implement this MOU.

The second of these annual Steering Committee meetings was held in Bellevue, WA on April 14, 2010. In addition to sharing updates on activities and initiatives, the Coordinating Committee and the USCG representatives discussed the following topics:

- The 2010 Spill of National Significance Exercise and Lessons Learned
- Agency budget cuts and implications for spill prevention & response
- The status of the USCG's CAIP inspections of TAPS tankers
- USCG tracking vessel transits offshore: volume and observation of recommended distances offshore
- Implementation of emergency towing packages on the West Coast
- EPA & USCG addendums to FEMA's generic FOG
- Night/Low-visibility response operations
- Loss of Power incidents associated with low-sulfur fuel requirements

EPA Regions 9 and 10 were also invited to provide updates on their activities. Summary notes from these meetings are available on our website.

ONGOING OUTREACH TO OTHER COASTAL STATES AND PROVINCES

We currently interface with Points of Contact in the oil spill agencies of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Maine, New Brunswick, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Virginia, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, the Yukon and South Carolina as follows:

- They receive the our news clippings;
- They are invited to join the information sharing at the Coordinating Committee meetings in person or by speaker phone;
- We advise them of federal rulemakings of interest and when the Task Force submits comments, we give them an opportunity to sign on;
- Their agency links are added to our web site;
- They can contact our Coordinating Committee members anytime on any topic and vice versa; and

- As Points of Contact (POCs) for this information sharing, they are also our POCs for mutual aid requests.

OTHER TASK FORCE COMMUNICATIONS AND OUTREACH ACTIVITIES

- Pursuant to our focus on submitting Task Force consensus comments on federal initiatives, the Executive Coordinator tracks rulemaking activities and notifies member agencies of opportunities for comment on relevant proposals. During the past work-year we submitted comments on the U.S. Coast Guard's proposed rule titled "Non-tank Vessel Oil Spill Response Plans and Other Vessel Response Plan Requirements." Copies of our comments are available at: http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/comments/NTV_NPRM_Comments.pdf. In addition, we submitted comments to the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research which are also available on our website.
- The Coordinating Committee of the Task Force held its fall and spring quarterly meetings in Portland, Oregon and Bellevue, Washington this year; they conducted their winter and summer 2010 meetings by conference call. These meetings provide opportunities for information exchange as well as decisions on administration and implementation of projects outlined in our Annual Work Plan. The Task Force Coordinating Committee met with representatives of the U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area and Districts 11, 13, 14 and 17 during their April 2010 meeting. Summary notes for the Coordinating Committee meetings are available on our website.
- In addition to travel associated with the activities described above, Jean Cameron, the Executive Coordinator:
  - Made a presentation at OSPR's Harbor Safety Committee Summit in November;
  - Attended API's Spills Advisory Group in November and gave a briefing on the Task Force;
  - Attended the Clean Gulf Conference in November;
  - Presented a PowerPoint for the Aleutian Risk Assessment webinar in November;
  - Attended California's Statewide Area Committee Coordination meeting January 12th and gave a presentation on the Clean Pacific conferences, the tug Pathfinder spill in Prince William Sound and resources available on the Task Force website;
  - Attended the U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area Change of Command in May;
  - Presented comments to the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research in May;
  - Attended meetings of the AWO/USCG Regional Quality Steering Committee in Seattle in February and July; and
  - Presented comments on the Deepwater Horizon Spill of National Significance to the Region 9 Response Team on June 30th.

- Ms. Cameron responds to information requests as needed. Requests this past year covered such topics as a diesel spill in Desolation Sound, British Columbia; oil spill volunteer opportunities in New England; a request by an Australian PhD candidate looking for a copy of our original 1989 Memorandum of Cooperation; advice and information provided to the staff of the Islands Trust Council in British Columbia regarding vessel traffic risks; and several requests for information – or suggestions for remedies – for the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
- With regard to "internal communications" among member agencies, the Executive Coordinator provides a summary of news clippings on events and issues of interest to the Task Force. She also maintains a Contact List of Task Force and Coordinating Committee members and produces a Mid-Term Report to the Task Force Members. In addition, all member agencies regularly exchange information on their initiatives and activities.
- The Executive Coordinator and Coordinating Committee are developing an Annual Work Plan for 2010-2011 which will be adopted by the Task Force Members in October 2010 and posted on our website.

In addition to their dedication of staff and resources to Oil Spill Task Force projects, our member agencies have been involved in a wide range of initiatives in their own jurisdictions, as outlined below:

Alaska

ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION (ADEC), DIVISION OF SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

The mission of the Division of Spill Prevention and Response (SPAR) is to prevent, respond and ensure the cleanup of unauthorized discharges of oil and hazardous substances. The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation's SPAR division is responsible for protecting Alaska's land, waters and air from oil and hazardous substance spills. Alaskans have made a concerted effort to prevent and clean up spills. Significant progress has been made in the safe handling, storage and transportation of oil and chemicals and the cleanup of historic contamination. While we will never totally eliminate the risk of spills we are constantly learning how to better manage that risk.

In the past 20 years there has been a significant and continuing advancement in Alaska's spill prevention and response capability. The State established new regulations and substantially upgraded the requirements for contingency plans and the review process for the state's oil producers, added non-tank vessel compliance programs and established response depots throughout Alaska, including in some of the most remote regions of the state. In partnership with federal agencies and the City of Unalaska the State established emergency towing packages in the Aleutian Islands area and in Kodiak, has developed Geographic Response Strategies (GRS) for sensitive portions of the state's coastlines as well as Potential Places of Refuge (PPOR) guidelines around the State. Both GRS and PPOR work is continuing as are other projects including an Aleutian Island Risk Assessment study, a Cook Inlet Vessel Traffic Risk Assessment study, the Alaska Risk Assessment of Oil & Gas Infrastructure, a Clean Harbors Program and updates of the various contingency plans.

In the future, the State may face significant challenges resulting from an increase in vessel traffic and potential offshore development in the Arctic areas of Alaska. The possibility of a new gas pipeline from Prudhoe Bay to Canada will also add to the State's spill response workload. New exploration and drilling technologies may permit close-in offshore as well as onshore oil development in areas that are not now accessible for various reasons. Increases in oil and gas exploration will obviously add to the State's workload in both the response and prevention areas.

SPILL RESPONSE

ADEC received reports of 1,621 oil spills, 51 brine spills and 364 hazardous substance spills in 2009. ADEC conducted 224 field responses to oil spills, 16 field responses to brine spills and 43 field responses to hazardous substance spills. ADEC estimates that 82,585 gallons of oil, 80,529 gallons of brine and 69,583 gallons of hazardous substances were spilled in 2009. Of the 194 oil spills exceeding the Task Force data threshold of one barrel to land or water; 132 were from facilities, 16 from vessels, 12 from vehicles and 34 were from other sources.

In 2009, ADEC initiated emergency responses to twenty-eight (2)8 significant or potentially significant discharges of oil and hazardous substance statewide; ADEC continues to monitor ongoing cleanup and recovery activities. The releases involved commercial and fishing vessel groundings, tank truck rollovers, overfills, ammonia releases from vessels and fixed facilities and process water spills due to corrosion of piping. ADEC responders actively worked 2,036 spill cleanups throughout the state and removed the risk by cleaning up contaminants at sites and then closing or issuing "no further action" letters for 1,843 spills. Ten (10) cases were transferred to ADEC's Contaminated Sites Program for long-term cleanup and monitoring and 7 cases to the Department of Law for enforcement action. The state's response containers (located in Bethel, Dillingham and Iliamna) were accessed to support several spill responses.

MAJOR RESPONSES IN 2009

The M/V Monarch Sinking

On January 15th, the 166-foot offshore supply vessel ***Monarch*** was making an approach to deliver cargo to the Granite Point Platform in central Cook Inlet. Heavy sea ice hampered the approach and the vessel allided with the platform causing the vessel to begin taking on water. The crew of seven was able to safely evacuate the vessel to the platform. The vessel sank with 34,000 gallons of diesel fuels and other petroleum products on board. Over-flights were conducted during the first few hours of the event and DEC staff coordinated response efforts with the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (ADNR), the Alaska Department of Fish and Game and other interested parties. A command center was established and Central Area Response Team (CART) played a central role in the efforts to prevent any environmental impact from this event.

Drift River Oil Terminal

On January 23rd, after months of increased seismic activity, the Alaska Volcano Observatory raised the alert level for Mount Redoubt from Yellow to Orange. When it became clear that this activity posed an increased threat to the Cook Inlet Pipeline Company (CIPL)'s Drift River Oil Terminal (DROT), located 20 miles to the northeast, CART began an assessment of the potential impacts by working with CIPL and other state and federal agencies. At that time, the facility held over six million gallons of crude oil in two of the six 270,000-barrel storage tanks.

Beginning March 22nd, Mount Redoubt Volcano produced a series of five explosive eruptions. CART and Coast Guard personnel conducted an over-flight the following day and found that the resultant volcanic mudflows caused extensive flooding at DROT. However, no oil releases occurred from either of the two operational storage tanks and there was no damage to the protective tertiary dike system or the individual tank secondary containment systems. A second major eruption occurred on March 28th. On March 31st, an Incident Management Team was activated. A Unified Command consisting of the Federal On-scene Coordinator, the State On-scene Coordinator and the CIPL Incident Commander provided unified response objectives.

Drift River Oil Terminal

On April 6th, the T/V ***Seabulk Arctic*** completed the transfer of approximately 60 percent of the crude oil from the two tanks in service at the DROT facility. Both operational tanks were ballasted with seawater as a precaution to maintain tank stability if significant flooding occurred at the facility inside the secondary containment. On April 6th, all CIPL crew were safely evacuated from the oil terminal and the Christy Lee loading platform. The Command Post was deactivated on April 7th and response personnel were placed on standby. On April 21st, the T/V ***Mississippi Voyager*** arrived from California to remove as much of the remaining crude oil as possible from the terminal. Measurements and confirmation by a third party determined that approximately 841,680 gallons of crude oil remained in the tanks at DROT after completion of product transfer to the tanker. This amount is about 13 percent of the original 6.2 million gallons.

Yukon and Kuskokwim River Spring Flood

Beginning in early May 2009, Yukon River and Kuskokwim River communities suffered extensive flooding and ice damage. Residential and commercial structures, vehicles, equipment and the local service (utility infrastructures) were displaced, flooded, or completely destroyed by the swollen river laden with ice. High waters and heavy ice flows destroyed and buried approximately three miles of riverfront development in Eagle. ADEC staff from the Prevention and Emergency Response Program (PERP), Drinking Water Program, Wastewater Program and Solid Waste Program responded to the flooding in Eagle, Fort Yukon, Stevens Village, Circle, Tanana, Beaver, Chalkytsik, Akiak, Kwethluk, Bethel and Red Devil. ADEC provided health, safety and environmental assessment of the damaged home heating oil or bulk storage tanks, mitigated hazardous substance

sources, located and stabilized orphaned drums, provided technical assistance for drinking water and waste water systems and met with community leadership. ADEC shipped response resources to the EPA/Indian Environmental General Assistance Program representatives and the water plant operators received drinking water sample containers to assess drinking water quality.

Flood damage - Eagle, Alaska

ADEC hired a response contractor for the communities of Eagle, Stevens Village and Tanana to remove and transfer heating oil from displaced tanks, construct temporary containment sites, characterize, label and recycle or dispose of the fluids from orphan drum or tanks recovered in the flotsam zones in several communities. Approximately 50 fuel oil tanks, 125 drums and 25 vehicles were collected in Eagle; six 500-gallon heating oil tanks, 87 drums and over forty 5-gallon containers were collected in Tanana; approximately 50 drums were collected in Stevens Village. Lead acid batteries and other household hazardous substances were also collected during the debris removal operations.

Tug Pathfinder Grounding

On December 23rd, the tug ***Pathfinder*** was returning to the Port of Valdez from ice scouting duty in Prince William Sound. The 136-foot vessel was under contract with Alyeska Pipeline Services Company to provide emergency assist services to tank vessels transiting to and from the Valdez Marine Terminal. The tug struck Bligh Reef and the grounding caused significant damage to the underside of the vessel, including puncturing three fuel tanks containing an estimated 33,000 gallons of diesel fuel. After the grounding, the tug anchored on the southeast side of Busby Island, approximately five miles northeast of Bligh Reef.

Approximately 139,000 gallons of diesel fuel and water was lightered from the tug ***Pathfinder***. Crowley Maritime Corporation reported an estimated 6,410 gallons of fuel was released to Prince William Sound during this incident. The Coast Guard investigation into the cause of the grounding is ongoing.

Lisburne Common Line

On November 29th, a BP Exploration Alaska operator making a routine check discovered a spill at the Lisburne Production Facility. The spill was from an 18-inch three-phase common line carrying a mixture of crude oil, produced water and natural

View of ruptured 18-inch pipeline

Tug Pathfinder with containment boom and response vessels nearby

gas. A rupture to the pipe released approximately 1,100 barrels (46,000 gallons) of oily material to a snow-covered, gravel pipeline access road and tundra. BP estimated the oily material spread over approximately 31,226 square feet.

Lightly-oiled snow was removed with snow scoops and transported by snow machine to containment bins. Response crews removed the liquid product using a flush and vacuum recovery process performed in a containment cell, along with mechanical equipment designed to remove embedded oil.

DISASTER ASSISTANCE

ADEC Disaster Response Plan Update

The ADEC PERP Preparedness Section maintains and publishes the ADEC Disaster Response Plan for natural disasters and terrorism. This plan establishes the policies and procedures used in assisting the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management in responding to natural disaster emergencies. The Preparedness Section has a position designated as the "Disaster Response Coordinator," who is responsible for the overall coordination of all ADEC programs involved in a disaster response.

ADEC Disaster Response Assistance

During 2009, ADEC responded to seven natural disasters for which ADEC provided assistance. These included:

- January 2009: Redoubt Volcano Unrest
- March 2009: Redoubt Volcano Eruption
- March 2009: Kotzebue Snow Damage and Removal
- April 2009: Yukon and Kuskokwim River Flooding
- August 2009: Pelican Water System Damage and Ammonia Release Threat
- October 2009: Kodiak Borough Flooding
- December 2009: Seward Storm Event

SPILL PREVENTION INITIATIVES

Inspections

ADEC Industry Preparedness staff conducted 142 inspections of oil terminal/tank farms, exploration, production and refinery facilities, crude oil transmission pipelines (TAPS), tankers, non-tank vessels and tank barges.

Industry Contingency Plans

Industry Preparedness staff reviewed and approved 48 new, renewal, or amended oil discharge prevention and contingency plans for facilities and vessels other than non-tank vessels. Staff also reviewed and approved, as necessary, 205 non-tank vessel contingency plans.

Statewide HAZMAT Workgroup

The Statewide Hazmat Workgroup met four times during 2009. The ***Safe Handling and Emergency Response to Anhydrous Ammonia*** training course was conducted in Juneau in March 2009. Several other training courses were also held throughout the course of the year, including a Hazmat Technician Course and Ammonia training course in Kodiak. An Extremely Hazardous Substance Release Summary for 2009 was produced and posted on the Statewide Hazmat Response Work Group website.

Alaska Risk Assessment

In May 2007, the Alaska Legislature approved funding for the comprehensive Alaska Risk Assessment of Oil & Gas Infrastructure. The funding level is $5 millions - $2.5 million each from the General and Response Fund accounts. The goal of the Alaska Risk Assessment is to reduce the number and severity of future spills. The North Slope Spill Analysis Methodology will work toward this goal by analyzing the relationship between crude oil pipeline characteristics and North Slope oil and hazardous substance spills and providing recommendations to the State of Alaska to mitigate the risk of future spills.

During 2009, ADEC, as the lead agency for this project refined the project scope and developed a Revised Methodology to emphasize a compilation and analysis of causal information associated with the North Slope crude oil production pipeline infrastructure spills. ADEC is also working with industry owners/operators to obtain information needed to complete the study.

SPILL PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVES

Clean Harbors Initiative

The Clean Harbors initiative in Alaska is being sponsored jointly by ADEC and the Cook Inlet Regional Citizens Advisory Council (CIRCAC) and is partially financed by a grant from the ConocoPhillips Earth Energy Partners Program. Homer Harbor is serving as a "pilot project" for launching the Clean Harbors initiative in Alaska. This program is based on Clean Marina programs on the west coast and nationwide.

Working with a contractor, Nuka Research, the workgroup has drafted an Alaska Clean Harbors Guidebook that includes best management practices for harbors in Alaska. This guidebook is currently being distributed around the state.

Also being developed is a Clean Harbor Certification Program, complete with educational reference materials, outreach materials and "Clean Harbor" incentives such as a flag that Alaskan harbors will display once they have joined this voluntary program and instituted relevant best management practices.

Memoradum of Agreement / Understanding

PERP staff updated the Coast Guard/ADEC Memorandum of Agreement and the document was formally signed in June 2009. Efforts are underway to update the existing EPA/ADEC Memorandum of Understanding currently dated July 1997. Both documents are available in Annex K of the updated Unified Plan.

Drills & Exercises

ADEC staff participated and evaluated 69 oil spill exercises conducted throughout the state involving oil terminals and tank farms, exploration, production and refinery facilities, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, crude and non-crude tankers, tank barges, non-tank vessels and the Alaska Railroad. The major drills were the PWS Polar Tanker drill, TAPS Lowe River Response Exercise, Valdez Marine Terminal IMT Exercise, TAPS Klutina River Response Exercise and TAPS Kanuti River Response Exercise.

SPILL RESPONSE INITIATIVES

Emergency Towing System Workgroup

The emergency towing capability for disabled vessels utilizing locally available tugboats and an Emergency Towing System will decrease response time and enhance the ability to rescue a disabled vessel before grounding. Two systems were purchased for Unalaska in 2008, one by the city and a larger system was purchased by ADEC. ADEC also purchased a second system that is located at the Coast Guard Air Station, Kodiak, AK. ADEC is planning on purchasing two additional systems to be placed in Anchorage and Sitka.

Aleutian Island Risk Assessment Scoping Project

ADEC and the Coast Guard are funding a multi-stage risk assessment of maritime transportation in the Bering Sea and the Aleutian Archipelago. The first phase of this longterm risk assessment and mitigation strategy was to fund a project titled, "Risk of Oil Spills in the Aleutian Islands - A Study to Design a Comprehensive Risk Assessment." A Committee was established within the Transportation Research Board of the National Academies which completed the project in July 2008. Based on this scoping project, ADEC and the Coast Guard established a Management Team to conduct the actual risk assessment itself. The current Aleutian Island Risk Assessment Project Team consists of the Management Team, an Advisory Panel and the Risk Analysis Team. The Project Team held a series of meetings in Dutch Harbor, September 1st through 3rd. Participants and invited speakers discussed pertinent perspectives concerning infrastructure, capabilities, weather, waterways, natural resources, risk and vulnerabilities.

Cook Inlet Vessel Traffice Risk Assessment Project

This project was initiated to conduct a detailed vessel risk assessment for the Cook Inlet area of operations focused on vessel traffic and the potential for major accidents or incidents, with the added potential of a major oil or hazardous substance release. On July 16, 2009, a meeting was held with the Cook Inlet Regional Citizens Advisory Council (CIRCAC) to outline the process for development of the Cook Inlet Vessel Traffic Risk Assessment. It is envisioned that the $250,000 Capital Improvement Project funds for a vessel traffic risk assessment would be conveyed to CIRCAC via a Memorandum

of Agreement with the Kenai Peninsula Borough. ADEC, the Coast Guard and CIRCAC would form a steering committee to direct the project. CIRCAC would retain a project manager to prepare the design methodology using the Aleutian Risk Assessment as a model. Funding is being sought by CIRCAC to implement the risk assessment once the methodology is completed.

SPILL PLANNING

Unified/Subarea Plans

Change 1 to the Aleutians Subarea Contingency Plan was published in April 2009. Major changes included the addition of GRS and PPOR guidance documents, information on the Emergency Towing System package, plus numerous spill response updates resulting from the M/V *Selendang Ayu* incident. Change 1 to the Kodiak Subarea Contingency Plan underwent public review in 2009 and will be published in June 2010. Efforts are now underway to apply Change 1 to the Northwest Arctic, Bristol Bay and Western Alaska subarea contingency plans. The proposed Change 3 to the Unified Plan was formally approved by the Alaska Regional Response Team at the January 2010 meeting.

Geographic Response Strategies (GRS)

The GRS provide site-specific spill response plans to protect priority sensitive areas in specific geographic areas. Nearly 400 GRS have been developed as a proactive planning measure to protect sensitive resources along Alaskan coastal areas in the event of a petroleum product spill. GRS for portions of the Aleutians Subarea were completed in 2009 and additional GRS were developed for the Prince William Sound subarea. Future GRS projects are planned for the North Slope, the Northwest Arctic, Western Alaska and Bristol Bay. Additional work is also planned to develop GRS for inland waterways in Alaska.

Potential Places of Refuse

PERP continued to address Potential Places of Refuge (PPOR) issues during 2009. The pre-identified PPOR and supporting documents are designed to identify possible locations to move a vessel needing assistance where actions can be taken to stabilize and/or repair the vessel, in order to protect human life, reduce hazards to navigation and/or protect natural resources and other uses of an area. The documents contain maps, aerial photos and information on site considerations, operational characteristics and local knowledge. Phase 2 of the PPOR project for the Southeast Alaska subarea continued throughout 2009, with expected completion of the project by June 2010. A follow-on meeting was held in Ketchikan in November 2009, and numerous sites were selected by workgroup members. Additional PPORs are scheduled for development for the North Slope, the Northwest Arctic, Western Alaska and Bristol Bay subareas.

ADJUDICATION HIGHLIGHTS

BP'S Prince William Sound Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plan Adjudicatory Hearing Request

On December 18, 2009 a private citizen filed a request for an adjudicatory hearing concerning the 2009 approval of BP's (independent) spot charter tanker oil discharge prevention and contingency plan. His request was still under review at the end of the year.

PROGRAM INFORMATION

- ADEC Disaster Response Plan: http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/plans/adec_disaster.pdf
- Statewide Hazmat Response Work Group: http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/hazmat.htm
- Emergency Towing System: http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/aiets/home.htm
- Alaska Geographic Response Strategies: http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/grs/home.htm
- Potential Places of Refuge: http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/ppor/home.htm

British Columbia

ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, THE BRITISH COLUMBIA MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT

PROGRAM MISSION

The Ministry of Environment works to protect people, property and the environment from spill hazards through its Environmental Emergency Program. The program's mission statement is: Exemplary Environmental Emergency Management through Leadership, Organization, Teamwork and Shared Responsibility.

On average, 2,500 to 3,000 spills are reported to the ministry annually - most are accidental oil and hazardous material releases. Highly trained Environmental Emergency Response Officers located in regional offices throughout the Province are available to respond to these spills. For large and complex spill incidents, the Ministry can also activate its Incident Management Team. The team is tasked with the Provincial delivery of the BC Marine Oil Spill Response Plan, the BC Inland Spill Response Plan and the BC Hazardous Material Response Plan. The team functions according to the international and provincial adopted Incident Command System which includes the application of Unified Command with the Responsible Party (spiller) and other responding jurisdictions.

The Environmental Management Branch in Victoria (Headquarters) undertakes environmental emergency planning for both the regional Environmental Emergency Response Officers and the Provincial Incident Management Team.

ACHIEVEMENTS AND OPPORTUNITIES - 20/20

British Columbia has made steady progress over the last 20 years since it joined with the State of Washington to form the partnership that has become the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force. Although there have been ebbs and flows in the resources available to the Environmental Emergencies Program over the years, the dedicated program personnel have continued to develop and make steady improvements. The creation of a Provincial Incident Management Team and the establishment of a roster of Technical Specialists have positioned the Province well to manage large incidents. The program has developed Provincial plans and guidance for marine and inland oil spills, hazardous materials incidents and a variety of others aspects of spill response.

With growing transportation along the coast and resource development activities - including the continued expansion of the Port of Prince Rupert, a proposal for an oil and condensate pipeline on the north coast and expansion of oil exports from the Port of Vancouver - the Province must ensure that the program continues to develop the tools and acquire the resources needed to mitigate the risks. Work also continues on building stronger relationships with our wide array of partners and stakeholders. Extensive work has been done with federal agencies, particularly the Canadian Coast Guard, with whom we are working to better define our role and responsibilities and ensure a coordinated response. Work also continues with First Nations and other stakeholders to promote shared stewardship and ensure that an effective and integrated response occurs.

PROGRAM RESTRUCTURING

The Environmental Emergencies Program has recently been re-structured to realize efficiencies, improve consistency in program delivery and enable the program to devote more effort to prevention, preparedness and recovery activities. The new centralized structure converts a number of staff to full-time positions within the program, while also maintaining a number of backup response officers in order to retain solid geographic coverage around the province.

Along with the Program Manager in Victoria there are 11 full-time Environmental Emergency Response Officers and 5 part-time Response Officers who are located in 10 different communities around the Province. The core program staffs are supported by approximately 45 Incident Management Team members with specialized skills in various aspects of hazardous material and oil spill response, and are further supplemented by additional technical specialists that can be drawn upon from across the Ministry of Environment and the Provincial government as a whole.

SIGNIFICANT SPILLS

The Province did not experience any significant marine spills in 2009, although a number of small spills did occur, along with several potential incidents related to a grounding and an allision involving freighter ships.

Salvage operations were successfully carried out in May 2009 to recover a diesel tanker truck and a metal cube containing hydrocarbons which fell off a listing barge in the Robson Bight Ecological Reserve in 2007. The provincial government in partnership with the Canadian Coast Guard co-funded the recovery operations after the Responsible Party declared bankruptcy. The recovery operations ensures that the recovered hydrocarbons can have no further impact on the world renowned killer whale rubbing beaches within the reserve.

Robson Bight Salvage Operations

The Ministry also dealt with a number of significant hazardous materials releases around the Province. One incident resulted in the release of crude oil from a large storage tank associated with an inter-provincial pipeline terminus. The Province also was faced with the need to declare an "Environmental Emergency" in order to address the potential for a significant release of chlorine dioxide from a pulp mill in northern British Columbia.

NEW LEGISLATION

The Environmental Emergencies Program completed a review of existing environmental emergency legislation and developed a list of recommended changes for government to consider in 2008/09. The list of potential changes would address current gaps identified by ministry staff, ensure that transporters and users of hazardous materials are appropriately prepared to respond to spills and improve environmental protection and public safety overall. The recommendations are still under review and those that are selected to move forward will go before Government during the 2011 legislative session.

VANCOUVER 2010 OLYMPICS

The Ministry of Environment participated in a variety of exercises leading up the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics. The final preparatory exercise dubbed "exercise Gold" became the largest emergency management exercise ever conducted in Canada. The exercise included all levels of government and a wide array of stakeholders to test the coordination and response to a number of potential hazards that could occur during the Olympic time period. The Ministry's participation focused on a simulated hazardous material spill as well as a terrorist-triggered hazmat release.

During the Olympics and Paralympics, Environmental Emergency Program staff maintained an enhanced response level to ensure that a prompt and coordinated response would be available as required. Fortunately, no significant spills occurred during this time period. The multi-agency planning and exercises that occurred in the lead up to the games leave a legacy of enhanced preparedness and improved coordination among agencies.

OILED WILDLIFE

Work continues with industry, non-governmental organizations and federal wildlife regulators to develop a consistent approach to handling oiled wildlife. A working group that includes members of Transport Canada's Regional Citizens Advisory Committee, the Western Canada Marine Response Corporation, other marine sector associations and representatives, the Canadian Coast Guard, the Canadian Wildlife Service, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the Oiled Wildlife Trust, the Province and others has been working closely for the last year on this issue. A draft Oiled Wildlife Field Operations Guide has now been prepared and is currently being reviewed by all the parties. The draft guide lays out the decision-making process that

would be used in launching an oiled wildlife response, lays out roles and responsibilities and delineates integration into the Incident Command System structure. It is hoped that once a final agreement is reached on the requirements for oiled wildlife response, the working group's attention can then be turned to developing and funding an increased capacity and capability to respond to oiled wildlife situations.

ANNUAL TRAINING

Incident Management Team

The Ministry of Environment has merged its two Incident Management Teams (IMT) into a single team to facilitate training, exercising and organization of the team overall. The team's role is to ensure that the Provincial government is strategically and operationally situated to work with industry, federal agencies, local governments and First Nations for the duration of a significant spill incident affecting the province.

The team restructuring includes the establishment of standing sub-teams for the most commonly required technical specialists during spill incidents including oily waste, environmental impact and sensitivities, shoreline cleanup and assessment, oiled wildlife and hazardous materials. In addition to these standing sub-teams the IMT also includes various individual technical specialists such as GIS, spill modeling, archaeological, monitoring, legal, etc.

The 2009 Annual IMT Training was held in Victoria, BC on January 26th and 27th. Training was based on the Incident Command System and ICS refresher training and presentations on recent incidents and team reorganization. For 2010 IMT training we intend to offer both a general IMT training session and meeting along with individual sub-team training sessions.

Incident Management Team members and our response officers also participated in a number of individual training activities and exercises over the course of the year. Nine members of the Incident Management Team participated in the CANUSDIX 2009 exercise that took place in Prince Rupert. The exercise involved well over a 100 participants from various agencies and organizations from Canada and the United States, who took part in on-water activities, planning meetings and a multi-day table-top exercise. CANUSDIX exercises involve planning and exercising the federal Joint Contingency Plan annex specific to the trans-boundary waters between British Columbia and Alaska.

Canusdix 2009 Environmental Unit

EERO Refresher Training, 2009

The Skeena Region successfully hosted the 2009 Environmental Emergency Response Officer Annual Refresher training in the communities of Smithers, Terrace, Kitimat and Prince Rupert. This training helps ensure that our 16 response officers maintain their skills and have an opportunity to share their experiences and lessons learned. It also provides familiarity with the various regions of the province and enables program staff to build partnerships and improve interagency response through working with other local, regional, provincial and federal emergency responders.

Two consecutive 4-day training sessions were conducted during the weeks of June 1st and June 8th. The training is split over two weeks in order to ensure that half of the response officers remained available to meet operational requirements during each week. The training sessions included practice in the donning and doffing of level-A hazmat suits and self-contained breathing apparatus and a variety of training sessions related to the various skills and knowledge required. During the first week a table-top and field response exercise were done with the Port of Prince Rupert, Prince Rupert Fire Department, Burrard Clean Operations and other local emergency responders. The second week's exercise was held at Rio Tinto Alcan's facility in Kitimat.

Annual Environmental Emergency Response Officer training

PROGRAM INFORMATION

Further Information on the province's Environmental Emergency Program can be found at our internet site at the following address: http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/eemp/

California

THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME'S OFFICE OF SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE (OSPR)

MISSION STATEMENT

The mission of the Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) is to provide best achievable protection of California's natural resources by preventing, preparing for and responding to spills of oil and other deleterious materials and through restoring and enhancing affected resources.

OSPR, a division of the California Department of Fish and Game (DFG), is the lead state agency for spill response in California. OSPR was established by the Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990 (Act). The Act provides the OSPR Administrator with authority to direct spill response, cleanup and natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) and restoration.

OSPR'S SHARED VISION

We have an organization that:

- Is the Premier Agency for all aspects of spill prevention, response, and restoration;
- Operates with integrity;
- Is transparent and open;
- Values one another;
- Communicates and creates connections;
- Anticipates needs and is proactive;
- Inspires confidence and creativity; and
- Provides great service.

OSPR training group

OSPR EXECUTIVE

In June 2009, OSPR Administrator Stephen L. Edinger testified on Capitol Hill. The House Committee on Science and Technology's Subcommittee on Energy and Environment held a hearing to examine federal research and development efforts to prevent, detect, or mitigate damage from oil spills. Witnesses and Members discussed legislation introduced on June 3, 2009 by Rep. Lynn Woolsey (D-CA), H.R. 2693. The committee explored ways to fund and coordinate federal research and development of oil spill technologies.

SPILL DATA (2009 - MAY 2010)

Spill Notification Analysts reviewed 8,663 reported pollution incidents for 2009. There were 1,013 (49.2%) inland petroleum incidents and 1,044 (50.8%) marine petroleum incidents, for a total of 2,057 California petroleum incidents for the year. OSPR responded to 1,044 (100%) of the marine incidents and 459 (45.3%) of the inland incidents. Of the 2,057 total petroleum incidents, 40 marine and 582 inland for a total of 622 incidents met Pacific States/British Columbia Task Force reporting threshold of 42 gallons (one barrel).

As of May 24, 2010, OSPR received and analyzed 3,078 reported pollution incidents impacting the state of California for 2010. Of these, 162 (13 marine spills/149 inland spills) were petroleum-based spills which impacted waters of the state and met Pacific States/British Columbia Task Force reporting threshold of 42 gallons (one barrel).

2009/2010 SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS

TV Dubai Star Bunker Spill, San Francisco Bay (10-30-09)

While taking on bunkers at anchorage in San Francisco Bay on October 30, 2009, the tank vessel Dubai Star's port side bunker tank overflowed, spilling approximately 420 gallons of IFO 380 into San Francisco Bay. A unified command was formed and cleaned up the spill. A NRDA is being conducted and the case is under investigation.

Angus Petroleum Corporation, Huntington Beach Channel Incident (1-21-10)

On January 21, 2010 crude oil was discovered in the Huntington Beach Channel, a steel lined tidally influenced flood control channel. OSPR responded with the County of Orange, City of Huntington Beach, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The oil was contained with boom before entering the Talbert Marsh, a sensitive wetlands area. Approximately 1 ½ miles of channel was oiled and cleanup lasted over a month. Oil was traced from the channel through a storm drain to the Angus Petroleum (Angus) production facility. A search warrant was issued for the Angus facility and the investigation is ongoing.

OTHER SIGNIFICANT POLLUTION MATTERS

Transocean Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Gulf of Mexico (4-22-10)

OSPR is supporting the response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill by sending experienced response personnel to assist in the cleanup. To date (May 25, 2010), OSPR has deployed six staff to assist in SCAT (shoreline cleanup assessment team), GIS and applied response technologies. In addition, the USCG has recalled four OSPR staff as reservists to assist with this incident.

OSPR scientist Mr. Judd Muskat and Dr. Jan Svejkovsky with Ocean Imaging, in cooperation with the Minerals Management Service, have developed an oil thickness sensor system which provides aerial imagery and data for oil on the ocean surface. This system is being used extensively, along with satellite images and high altitude radar, during the Gulf of Mexico response to provide detailed spatial information on the thickness variations of the oil (sheen vs. thick oil) and condition of the oil (fresh oil vs. weathered or emulsified) for specific targeted

areas of the spill and to provide a generalize outline of the extent of the oil. This information is used by the dispersant operations, skimming operations, SCAT, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) modelers, British Petroleum's "topkill team," and the Situation Unit within the Unified Command.

SS Montebello

OSPR is continuing to work on the assessment of the *SS Montebello*. The *Montebello* was a 487 foot tanker that was sunk by a Japanese submarine on December 22, 1941. OSPR believes 73,571 barrels of crude oil and 2,477 barrels of bunker fuel remains onboard.

OSPR has partnered with NOAA, the USCG, the Monterey Bay Research Institute (MBARI), the California Department of Transportation and the National Marine Sanctuaries to create the Montebello Assessment Task Force ("Task Force"). The Task Force intends to contract for two dives on the Montebello this year. One dive will employ multi-beam sonar and the other will involve either a manned submersible or a remote operated vehicle that will take video of the vessel to compare with previous dives. OSPR hopes to complete the assessment report by 2010.

NEW LEGISLATION

(Enacted January 1, 2010)

Assembly Bill 1442
(Huffman, Chapter 294, Statutes of 2009)

This was a large omnibus bill that included many changes to the Fish and Game and Government Codes. It specifically relates to OSPR as it clarifies provisions relating to submission of the wildlife rehabilitation plan after an oil spill and corrects an inaccuracy in the definition of "non-persistent oil."

Assembly Bill 305
(Nava, Chapter 4259, Statutes of 2009)

This bill establishes a five (5) year statute of limitation for failure to report hazardous material spills or for intentionally giving a misleading report of such a spill. It also adds county jail time (up to one year) as a possible punishment for failure to report an oil spill or knowingly making a false or misleading report of an oil spill in non-marine waters, potentially making these actions misdemeanors.

Assembly Bill 248
(Lowenthal, Chapter 317, Statutes of 2009)

The Marine Invasive Species Act requires vessels to meet reporting requirements relating to ballast water and hull fowling and to submit this information to the State Lands Commission (SLC). Additional information is required to be reported to the SLC related to the ballast water treatment system used by the vessel.

PENDING LEGISLATION

(Introduced 2009; has not passed as of mid-June 2010)

AB 234 (Huffman, amended December 16, 2009)

This bill would require transfer units (i.e., a vessel or a facility transferring oil) to pre-boom each oil transfer operation prior to the beginning the operation, for the duration of the entire transfer operation. It would also require the transfer unit to have, among other things, equipment compatible with a vessel traffic advisory control system and a person on board communicating in both English and the language of the vessel master.

AB 2739 (Blakeslee, amended April 27, 2010)

This bill would require the OSPR Administrator to prepare a sunken vessel imminent threat assessment that identifies any sunken vessel off the California coast that meets certain criteria, such as being located within eight miles of the coast and containing more than 1 million gallons of oil. It outlines strategic plan elements to identify studies to be performed to determine whether or not there is an imminent threat of an oil release from the vessel. The bill also requires a report to the Legislature by June 1, 2011.

NEW RULEMAKING

Independent Drill Monitor for Out-of-State Drills

Regulations have been approved and will go into effect on July 1, 2010, to implement SB 1739 (Simitian, Chapter 566, Statutes of 2008), which authorizes the Administrator to require an independent drill monitor when a plan holder requests credit for an out-of-state drill, under specified circumstances. Additional clarifying changes were also made for the drills and exercises program. Specifically, the approved language:

- Clarifies prior notice requirements for in-state drills/exercises;
- Expands the required drill documentation, and now includes authority for verification by the Administrator;
- Provides three options for obtaining credit for out-of-state exercises:
    1. Evaluation by the USCG or other qualified agency to receive credit for National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (NPREP) objectives; or
    2. Submission of all documentation required for an in-state drill, to receive credit for NPREP objectives; or
    3. Use of an independent drill monitor to receive credit for NPREP objectives and California-specific objectives if a California-based scenario is used.

RULEMAKING ISSUES UNDER REVIEW

Best Achievable Technology Focus Groups

The mission of the Best Achievable Technology Focus Groups' is to update a 1996 report to the legislature, outlining how State and Federal agencies, industry and others are working toward the Best Achievable Protection of coastal resources and marine waters, utilizing the Best Achievable Technology. Each group has been assigned the following broad subject areas to review; 1) Remote Sensing, Sampling and Analysis; 2) Applied Response Technologies; 3) Mechanical Response; 4) Prevention/Spill Mitigation.

The report will summarize current technology along with a review of emerging and experimental technology. The Focus Groups' goal is to have a working draft of the updated report by late fall. The groups are made up of representatives of OSPR and other state agencies, federal agencies, industry and non-profit associations.

SPILL PREVENTION

In July 2009, the California Air Resources Board's Low Sulfur Distillate Fuel (LSDF) regulations for main propulsion engines went into effect. As a result there was an increased occurrence of total loss of propulsion for commercial vessels maneuvering in California waters. As crews began to gain experience in fuel switching, the frequency of reported LOP occurrences decreased. However, an unintended consequence is that vessel engines are not operating reliably at low speeds.

Rooted to this consequence is a change in maneuvering tactics employed by the pilots and crews. Vessels are making approaches to the docks and anchorages at higher speeds and utilizing assist and escort tugs to slow them down, rather than totally relying on the ship's engines. Also, rooted to the loss of confidence in engine reliability is the

practice of having assist tugs meeting the ships further out and escorting them to their berths.

The economic cost of operating on the LSDF has also resulted in more unintended consequences. To minimize the time spent running on LSDF, vessels are staying offshore more than 24 miles and approaching harbor entrances directly from the west. This has changed the offshore traffic patterns and was especially noteworthy in the LA/LB approaches, where the number of vessels transiting the Pacific Missile Test Range increased dramatically. In addition, vessels are choosing to minimize their time in port in order to minimize their time running on LSDF; rather than enter California marine waters and head to anchorage to await their berths opening up, vessels are remaining at sea until their berths are clear.

OSPR asked the California Harbor Safety Committees to address the problems associated with LSDF usage. The San Francisco Bay and Delta Harbor Safety Committee has been exceptionally proactive in this regard. Because of their actions and the care of the maritime industry, no oil pollution has occurred due to LSDF related LOP casualties.

In 2009, OSPR's Marine Safety Branch personnel actively boarded vessels that were targeted as "at risk" by our Risk Data Analysis Model. Twenty-seven vessels targeted as at risk were boarded. The vessel crews received training in California regulations and concerns. The vessel's material condition was noted and the database information for that vessel updated. No oil pollution has resulted from a vessel that was targeted as "at risk" and boarded by OSPR.

SPILL READINESS

In 2009/2010, a total of eight unannounced Oil Spill Response Organization (OSRO) rating drills were conducted in various marine locations along the California coast. These drill exercises demonstrated with success the OSRO's ability to meet requirements of oil spill response in a skillful and timely manner. In particular, one unannounced six-hour OSRO drill exercise conducted in the San Francisco Bay Area (ACP 2) incorporated the new California Code of Regulations, Title 14, Division 1, requirement of "Oil Spill Risk Areas" (OPRA), a designated geographic location within a High Volume Port where an oil spill could occur which are identified by latitude and longitude. In addition, three sensitive sites were included in latter stages of the drill that ranged from environmentally sensitive (bird sanctuary) to culturally and economically sensitive (Pier 39).

OSPR maintains a reliable and thorough unannounced OSRO drill exercise program, the results of which are practiced on a daily basis by the rated OSRO's required to protect California's marine waters.

Response Equipment Grants

OSPR has developed a program to provide grants to local governments adjacent to marine waters for the purchase of oil spill response equipment, which includes an eight-hour hands-on training program. This grant has enhanced the availability of pre-staged oil spill response equipment around the State and has also provided local governments with an opportunity to protect their coastal communities and priority resources.

In order to be considered, local governments must be at risk of an oil spill occurring in their jurisdiction. Response equipment grants include:

- up to 1,000 ft. of containment boom;
- a mobile storage trailer; and
- anchors, a tool box and personnel protective equipment.

As of May 2010, OSPR has issued twenty-eight (28) response equipment grants to local governments throughout the State and will continue to offer grants based on available funds.

Volunteer Program

Although volunteers have made significant contributions to oiled wildlife care during several California oil spills it was apparent during the most recent spills in the San Francisco Bay area that additional volunteer opportunities needed to be developed outside of oiled wildlife. The Non Wildlife Volunteer Plan (Plan) was developed through the San Francisco Bay and Delta (SFBD) Area Committee Volunteer Sub-Committee (VSC). The Plan has been exercised twice in Marin County (September 2009) and with the City and County of San Francisco (January 2010) with great success. The Lessons Learned from these exercises have been addressed and incorporated into the Plan as necessary.

In June 2009, the Plan was submitted to the Region IX Regional Response Team (RRT) for consideration and adoption into the Regional Contingency Plan, but no decision has been made by the RRT to date.

In March of 2010, the VSC submitted the Final Draft Plan for consideration and adoption into the SFBD Area Contingency Plan. It is the vision of the VSC that the Plan will continue to be tested during industry and government led exercises and be revised as necessary.

Contingency Plan Drills and Exercises

The Drills and Exercises Program (D&E) is now firmly established as a player in the oil transportation community. D&E past year accomplishments include:

- Completion of the "Evaluation Guideline Manual" to assist OSPR staff in formulating consistent, in-depth drill evaluations, which will be made available on OSPR's website for use by plan holders and the general public;
- Continued revision and maintenance of the Drills and Exercises Database;
- Continued training for staff in safety, ICS, exercise design and evaluation;
- Continued planning and designing of major plan holder drills include the following major exercises:
  - The April 1, 2010 joint drill with the California Maritime Academy and USCG;
  - The October 7, 2009 drill with ExxonMobil; and
  - An October 27, 2009 Richmond Inner Harbor exercise (covering six separate facilities holders);
- Drafted regulations required by Senate Bill 1739 covering a new program of independent drill monitors (IDM), which will go into effect July 1, 2010; and
- Drafted additional regulatory changes to assist in improving drill attendance and final report submissions, which will also go into effect July 1.

OSPR's drill participation at required exercises has increased to 93% for the spill management team/tabletop exercises and 76% for the equipment deployment drills. (These drills exclude drills at unregulated facilities and drills not meeting the 30-day notification requirement.) This is a significant increase over last year's numbers. We have already exceeded the program goals set for 2010.

NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (2009 - MAY 2010)

COSCO Busan Incident, San Francisco Bay

State and federal trustee agencies are continuing to assess the ecological injuries and impacts to human activities caused by the November 7, 2007 Cosco Busan oil spill. The container ship Cosco Busan, operated by Regal Stone, Ltd., struck a support tower of the Bay Bridge, puncturing the vessel and spilling 58,000 gallons of intermediate fuel oil into the central San Francisco Bay and vicinity. The spill affected wildlife (primarily birds and fish), habitat (primarily rocky intertidal, salt marsh, flats, sandy beach and eelgrass beds) and human recreational activities. The natural resources Trustee agencies conducted a Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) to quantify the injuries and seek compensation in the form of restoration projects. In this case, the Trustees for the injured natural resources are the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), the National Park Service (NPS), the Bureau of Land Management, NOAA, OSPR, and SLC.

T/V Dubai Star Incident, San Francisco Bay

On October 30, 2009, during a refueling incident, the T/V Dubai Star spilled approximately 420 gallons of Intermediate Fuel Oil (IFO 380) into San Francisco Bay at Anchorage 9 just south of the Bay Bridge. The spill affected more than 10 miles of shoreline, from just north of the east approach of the Bay Bridge to San Leandro Bay along the Alameda coastline. The spill resulted in shoreline oiling, bird mortalities, as well as beach and fisheries closures in the vicinity of Alameda Island.

The Trustees (OSPR, USFWS and NOAA)- in cooperation with the RP Harmony Shipping - are conducting a NRDA. Resources affected by the spill include birds, shoreline habitats and human recreational use. The Trustees and RP are currently assessing injury and potential restoration project alternatives.

Kinder Morgan Incident, Suisun Marsh

In mid-2010, state and federal agencies will issue the Final Damage Assessment and Restoration Plan (DARP) for the Suisun Marsh Pipeline Spill, where a pipeline owned by Kinder Morgan Energy Partners on ruptured on April 27, 2004 and discharged

thousands of gallons of diesel fuel. The release resulted in death and injury to a variety birds, reptiles, fish, invertebrates and small mammals, including the salt marsh harvest mouse, an endangered species.

Completion of the plan paves the way for the trustee agencies (USFWS and OSPR) to contribute $950,000 to two projects designed to compensate for environmental injuries caused by the spill. The Hill Slough Management Area Restoration Project near Suisun Bay is expected to restore tidal wetlands and moist grassland habitat to approximately 950 acres of diked seasonal and perennial wetlands. The second project involves invasive weed control at the Grizzly Island Wildlife Area at Suisun Bay. The goal of this project is to provide funds for ongoing control measures of perennial pepper weed in managed marsh land within the wildlife area.

Castro Cove Incident, Richmond

Chevron Products Company (Chevron) owns and operates a petroleum refinery in Richmond, California which, prior to 1987, discharged wastewater directly into Castro Cove, a small embayment within San Pablo Bay. Although the wastewater discharge was relocated outside of Castro Cove in 1987, some of the sediments inside the Cove retained elevated levels of contaminants, including mercury and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons.

Beginning in 2010, more than 200 acres of San Pablo Bay wetlands will be restored to highly productive tidal habitat with $2,850,000 awarded in a federal court settlement with the entry of the consent decree. The awarded settlement will be to state and federal agencies for the past releases of contaminants into Castro Cove from the Chevron Refinery in Richmond, California. The consent decree that details the settlement was entered with the court on March 18, 2010, and the final DARP will be published in the near future. The federal and state agencies which are designated as Trustees for natural resources injured by the releases of contamination into Castro Cove are NOAA (the U.S. Department of Commerce), USFWS (the United States Department of Interior) and OSPR.

Luckenbach Oil Incident, Northern California

The freighter S.S. ***Jacob Luckenbach*** sank in 1953 in the Gulf of the Farallones. In 2002, state and federal officials identified it as the source of many mystery oil spills that occurred periodically during winter storms. These spills resulted in the oiling of thousands of seabirds along northern California beaches from Bodega Bay to Monterey Bay. In the summer of 2002, the USCG provided oversight for a $19 million effort to remove oil from the wreck and to seal it to prevent further oil releases.

At the same time, in conjunction with other trustee agencies (USFWS, NOAA, NPS), OSPR NRDA prepared a restoration claim that was submitted to the National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC). In 2008, the NPFC approved $3 million for five (5) projects. In January 2010, the NPFC approved another $17 million for seven (7) more projects. A third smaller portion of the claim remains outstanding. The projects are intended to benefit a wide variety of seabirds and well as sea otters. While most of the projects are in California, some are on remote breeding grounds in Canada, Alaska, Mexico and New Zealand.

East Walker River Incident, Mono County, CA and Lyon County, NV

On December 30, 2000, a tanker truck operated by Advanced Fuel Filtration Systems, Inc. overturned on California State Route 182 north of Bridgeport, California resulting in the release of approximately 3,600 gallons of No. 6 fuel oil; the majority entered into East Walker River. The spill impacted about fifteen (15) miles of stream habitat in Mono County, California and in Lyon County, Nevada. An out-of-court settlement agreement for $418,000 was reached. After assessment costs, $350,000 is available for activities to restore the natural resources injured and the interim loss of recreational use. In 2009, the Restoration Plan/Environmental Assessment (the "plan") was finalized and the Trustees from both California and Nevada are proceeding with plan implementation. Projects include outdoor recreation improvements on the U.S. Forest Service Rosaschi Ranch which is used for recreational fishing on the East Walker River, a

riparian enhancement project along the East Walker River, a vehicle control project to protect riparian habitat in DFG's East Walker River Wildlife Area and a restroom for the Wildlife Area. A Lahontan cutthroat trout enhancement project is also planned for Slinkard Creek, Mono County.

PROGRAM INFORMATION

For more information about OSPR's activities, please visit: www.dfg.ca.gov/ospr/

NRDA Spill updates: www.dfg.ca.gov/ospr/Science.

Dr. Michael Ziccardi of the California-based Oiled Wildlife Care Network, is currently helping to lead the effort to care for oil-affected marine mammals and sea turtles in Louisiana.

Hawaii

HAZARD EVALUATION & EMERGENCY RESPONSE OFFICE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION IN THE HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (HEER)

PROGRAM MISSION

The Hazardous Evaluation and Emergency Response (HEER) Office serves the people of the State of Hawaii by addressing all aspects of releases of hazardous substances - including oil - into the environment. Our work includes preventing, planning for and responding to hazardous substance releases or risks of releases. The HEER Office accomplishes this mission by addressing contaminated sites with the highest risk to human health and the environment first, preventing contamination rather than cleaning up after the fact and basing decisions on sound scientific principles and common sense.

The office is comprised of three operating sections, each addressing an important aspect of its mission. The implementing sections are organized as follows: 1) Emergency Preparedness and Response; 2) Site Discovery, Assessment and Remediation; and 3) Hazard Evaluation.

The HEER Office Emergency Preparedness and Response Section (EP&R), along with the four State On-Scene Coordinators (SOSCs) are responsible for planning and preparing for, and responding to releases of a hazardous substance and/or oil that may cause immediate and substantial threat to human health or the environment. The SOSCs have been trained to enter hazardous atmospheres in self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and various types of personal protective equipment. As back-up personnel to first responder County HAZMAT teams, SOSCs are on 24-hour call.

SIGNIFICANT EVENT SUMMARIES

During FY 2009, the HEER Office received 315 notifications which were directly concerned with the release of hazardous chemicals or oil spills. Of the 315 notifications reported, 187 were oil-related and required a site response by a State On-Scene-Coordinator (SOSC) and/or a major off-scene coordination and response effort. Notable among the spill responses during FY 2009 are the following:

Keehi Lagoon Diesel Fuel Release

On 5 September the HEER office received a call indicating a fishing vessel was sinking in Keehi Lagoon slip #836. A total of 150 gallons of diesel fuel was onboard. The vessel was dewatered, all holes plugged and only a minor diesel sheen was observed. It was cleaned up with absorbent pads.

F/V Lady Anna Diesel Spill

On 30 October the Harbor Master at Barbers Point harbor reported that an oil sheen was coming from the dry dock at Barbers Point Harbor marine way. The fishing vessel Lady Anna was being removed and 3000 gallons of diesel fuel was release from a cracked bottom fuel tank. PENCO responded and conducted a cleanup of the harbor.

F/V Lady Anna

C/S Voge Trader Grounding

The 734 foot bulk coal carrier Voge Trader (LI) ran aground in the entrance channel to Kalaloa Barbers Point Harbor on Oahu on February 5th. A pilot was aboard. The reef adjacent to the channel on the Starboard side was damaged and the vessel reported a crack to a double bottom fuel tank. The vessel was refloated by tugs after shifting ballast to the port side. The vessel was towed to anchorage and made temporary repairs. There was no release of oil.

C/S Voge Trader

OIL SPILL PREPAREDNESS

DOH and Clean Islands Council (CIC) sponsored a full scale field exercise on the Airborne Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) and Helicopter Bucket Dispersant Delivery System, including communications and monitoring operations.

In Partnership with CIC, DOH has developed a semi-mobile oiled wildlife facility. Stabilization, food preparation and emergency power trailers have been developed that can easily be moved to the location of any spill incident.

LEGISLATIVE

A legislative bill increasing the 5 cent per barrel tax on petroleum to $1.05 was vetoed by Governor Lingle but the veto was overridden. The $1.05 tax will be split 5 cent to oil response (same as now), 10 cents to the Energy Security Special Fund, 10 cents to the Energy Systems Development Special Fund, 30 cents to the Agricultural Development and Food Security Special Fund and all remaining to the General Fund. Aviation fuel is exempted from the barrel tax.

PROGRAM INFORMATION

Additional information about the environmental program and available documents can be obtained at: http://hawaii.gov/health/environmental/hazard/index.html.

Oregon

EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM, OREGON DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

PROGRAM MISSION

The Emergency Response Program at the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) supports the agency's strategic direction to protect human health and the environment from toxics by preventing, preparing for, and minimizing the danger posed by catastrophic releases of dangerous chemicals.

The oil spill planning and preparedness responsibilities are carried out by staff located at DEQ's office in Portland and are augmented by response personnel located in three regional offices throughout Oregon. This program is responsible for facility and vessel oil spill contingency and prevention plan review, drills and exercises, geographic response planning and general coordination of emergency response planning activities. DEQ provides leadership to the Northwest Area Committee and the Region 10 Response Team and associated committees, work groups and task forces.

Response activities are carried out by response personnel and State On-Scene Coordinators located at our offices in Portland, Bend and Eugene. This program is enhanced by personnel from several other programs that provide after hours coordination and can fill various Incident Command System (ICS) positions.

The Oregon Oil Spill Prevention Act was passed by the Legislature during the 1991 regular session. This act directed DEQ to develop rules to provide for the prevention, preparedness and response to oil spills from large facilities, vessels and petroleum transportation industries.

After the rules were developed and approved by the Oregon Environmental Quality Commission, the first facility and vessel plans were submitted to DEQ in July, 1993. Geographic response plans (GRPs) and the statewide Oil and Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Plan were developed during this time. Additionally, several studies were conducted including the "West Coast Oil Transfer Locations" to identify high risk operations and areas that are vulnerable to oil spills. DEQ worked with the marine transportation and petroleum handling industries to develop a coordinated approach to oil spill prevention, preparedness and response. Eventually the GRPs and the Oil and Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Plan were incorporated into the Northwest Area Contingency Plan.

SPILL STATISTICS

DEQ received 2,494 notifications from the Oregon Emergency Response System in 2009. Further investigation of these notifications resulted in approximately 525 active spill projects. This represents an increase in projects from 329 in 2008. These projects included 177 incidents involving spilled petroleum products. The petroleum spills included 49 releases to freshwater.

There were 90 petroleum spills during 2009 that were over 42 gallons. Sources for these spills included 67 spills from commercial trucks and three from trains. Further analysis indicates that there were 18 spills of petroleum over 200 gallons and seven spills over 1,000 gallons.

PREPAREDNESS

DEQ is responsible for preparedness activities as promulgated in Oregon Revised Statutes 468B.300 through 468B.500. These regulations require ensuring that all regulated vessels and facilities have prepared oil spill contingency plans and that those plans meet the requirements specific to protect the navigable waterways of Oregon. These regulations also require verification that all equipment listed in the oil spill contingency plans is available and adequately maintained, that personnel listed in the plans are trained, and that drills and exercises are conducted. Activities conducted under DEQ's preparedness program include:

- Contingency Plan Reviews
- Drills and exercises
- Geographic Response Plan (GRP) development
- Northwest Area Committee (NWAC) participation.



DEQ approved plans for Paramount Petroleum, Tidewater Barge Lines/Terminal Services, SeaRiver Maritime and Maritime Fire and Safety Association) and has made significant progress on other plans, including Chevron, Shell, Harley Marine and BP West Coast.

DEQ also participated extensively in several exercises with industry and agency counterparts during 2009 in order to train and prepare for spills. These exercises provided an opportunity to exercise Unified Command with the Washington Department of Ecology and the U.S. Coast Guard Sector Portland. These events used the Northwest Area Contingency Plan and protocols extensively. DEQ staffed positions in the Unified Command, the Joint Information Center, Liaison, the Planning Section, the Environmental Unit and the Documentation Unit. Drills and exercises that DEQ participated in during the year included:

- Olympic Pipeline (Worst-Case Discharge);
- Harley Marine Services (Worst-Case Discharge);
- Conoco Phillips (Worst-Case Discharge);
- Tidewater Barge Lines and Tidewater Terminal Services; and
- Clean Rivers Mutual Aid Exercise (Equipment Deployment and Geographic Response Plan verification)

REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAM AND NORTHWEST AREA COMMITTEE

DEQ fully participates in the Region 10 Regional Response Team and Northwest Area Committee. The Northwest Area Committee is responsible for the continual development of the Northwest Area Contingency Plan. DEQ serves as a co-vice chair of the committee (as does a representative of each state) and provides leadership through the steering committee. DEQ also co-chairs the Geographic Response Plan Workgroup and participates in the Science and Technology Workgroup, the Logistics Workgroup and the Public Affairs Workgroup. Significant activities for the Northwest Area Committee during the year included:

- Volunteer coordination;
- Improve understanding and direction for liaison position; and
- Participation in National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration-sponsored Shoreline Cleanup Assessment Technique training.

GEOGRAPHIC RESPONSE PLAN DEVELOPMENT

DEQ develops and maintains emergency response plans to cover the first 12 to 24 hours following a significant release to the coastal shoreline and bays and major river systems. These plans identify resources to be protected and describe strategies to protect the resources and recover released oils. Response contractors use these plans to provide a coordinated initial response until a Unified Command can be implemented. DEQ periodically updates the plans as information changes or new resource information becomes available. In 2009, DEQ conducted the following activities to update Geographic Response Plans:

- Verified Geographic Response Plan strategy locations and boom length required (for example, along the Columbia River in the Bachelor Island and Ridgefield Wildlife areas);
- Identified resources that require protection and updated shoreline types;
- Incorporated new data collected by other agencies/response partnerships such as the Oregon Estuary Project;
- Converted existing and revised booming strategies into GIS format; and
- Incorporated logistical information into the GIS system.

RESPONSE

In February of 2010 DEQ responded to a citizen complaint of oil and toxic metals contamination in the Multnomah Channel of the Columbia River caused by a ship-breaking operation. Follow-up investigations found that this unlicensed, unpermitted facility was scrapping old Navy and Coast Guard vessels. This operation violated numerous regulations including those covering invasive species, asbestos abatement, oil pollution, wetlands protection, erosion control, storm water, zoning and business licensing. Ship-breaking is illegal in Oregon if not conducted in a licensed drydock. Workers at this site failed to report several discharges of oil and additionally sank one vessel while attempting to haul it out for final disposal. The operation has closed and enforcement is pending.

Illegal shipbreaking operation on the Multnomah Channel

LEGISLATION

Also in February, 2010 an overfill to an above ground storage tank near Adrian, Oregon caused an approximate 6,200 gallon release of diesel to the ground and a canal that provides irrigation water to this farming community. The release also threatened the Owyhee River. Underflow dams were constructed to protect the Owyhee River and over 5,000 tons of contaminated soils were removed.

In April, DEQ responded to a diesel spill when a 150-gallon saddle tank fell off a truck pulling a semitrailer on the I-5 Bridge spanning the north Portland Harbor. The bulk of the spill flowed directly off the bridge into the Columbia River below. When DEQ arrived they discovered that a

left: Owyhee Irrigation right: Canal Underflow Dam

number of geese swam through the oil that dotted Jantzen Beach Moorage, a small houseboat community. Working with the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, several oiled geese, goslings, ducks and ducklings were collected. DEQ activated the Clean Rivers Cooperative wildlife resources and contacted the Audubon Society for assistance in treating the oiled wildlife.

OREGON EMERGENCY RESPONSE WEBSITE

For more information on the emergency response programs at DEQ, please go to: http://www.deq.state.or.us/lq/cu/emergency/index.htm

Contaminated Soil Stockpile

Ducklings at Jantzen Beach Marina

Washington

THE SPILL PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PROGRAM OF THE WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY

PROGRAM OVERVIEW

The Washington State Department of Ecology's Spill Prevention, Preparedness and Response Program activities include responding to oil and hazardous materials spills, performing vessel and facility inspections, evaluating readiness drills, drug lab cleanups, contingency plan reviews and much more. The program delivers services 24/7 from 4 regional offices and 2 smaller field offices.

Although many factors have shaped our program, lessons learned from our work activities have been critically important. Lessons learned from "preventable" spills help sharpen focus, drive our strategic planning and direct our future work. While some of the challenges facing the program are somewhat predictable, many others are in constant flux – requiring us to be vigilant, in a constant state of readiness, flexible and forward-thinking.

Investment in the Spills Program has dramatically reduced the number and volume of major spills in the state. In the five year period centered on 1990, Washington State averaged three major spills (over 10,000 gallons) annually to surface water. Today the average is about one spill of between 10,000 and 20,000 gallons per year.

The title of the Spills Program's 2009-2015 Strategic Plan states our foremost duty: "Our waters, our citizens, ours to protect." Accordingly, we will focus on five major Strategic Initiatives in the coming year(s):

- Obtain additional program funding necessary for the program to meet legislative and public expectations.
- Fulfill the promise of a strong collaborative partnership with the U.S. Coast Guard.
- Improve maritime safety to continue progress toward the legislature's zero spill goal.
- Conduct twenty-four-hour oil spill recovery operations.
- Ensure the response to significant spills and incidents is rapid, aggressive and well coordinated (see also RESPONSE section).

As we submit this summary, the international response to the catastrophic Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico is still ongoing. Since the onset, our program has actively monitored the personnel, equipment and other resources that our state has (re)directed to the response on a daily basis - to ensure that our State's readiness is not significantly compromised. Over the coming year, we will be evaluating this unique 'Spill of National Significance' for Lessons Learned and opportunities to improve our prevention, preparedness and response efforts.

The following report provides a brief sampling of some of the many activities and accomplishments of the Spill Prevention, Preparedness and Response Program.

SPILL INCIDENTS

New Dawn Grounding

In July 2009, a barge being pushed by a Tidewater Barge Line tug grounded while navigating in the Columbia River channel on an uncharted sand bar at mile 169, below the Hood River Bridge. The tug had a barge carrying one million gallons of gasoline, a loaded container barge carrying containerized solid waste and two additional empty barges in tow. Tidewater response personnel and governmental authorities were mobilized to the site. Tidewater, state representatives and Coast Guard personnel inspected the double-hull of the barge. The initial assessment indicated no damage to the hull of the barge, no release of any cargo and no injuries as a result of the incident.

The Unified Command, consisting of Tidewater, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality and the Washington Department of Ecology (Ecology) - with assistance from other federal, local and tribal agencies - worked together to manage the operation to safely refloat the barge.

In order to free the vessel, Tidewater safely transferred approximately 500,000 gallons of gasoline from the stranded barge to another double-

hulled barge stationed along side. No gasoline was released during the transfer.

Another Pre-Booming Success Story

When the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN spilled jet fuel from an overflow pipe on the side of the ship last November, more than 50 ship and shipyard personnel responded immediately. Fortunately, the ship was already pre-boomed as a standard precaution and crews deployed 5,000 feet of additional boom around the ship as a preventative measure. Cleanup teams used sorbent pads and two skimmers to collect the oil inside the boom.

Navy officials estimate approximately 1500 gallons of oil and seawater mix spilled, 500 gallons of which was oil. Ecology and the U.S. Coast Guard were notified and also responded to the situation.

The Dalles Dam Transformer Leak

From late December 2009 to early March 2010, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Washington Department of Ecology emergency response teams worked to contain and clean up about 5,500 gallons of light mineral-type oil that leaked from a spare transformer at the Dalles Lock and Dam on the Columbia River.

Environmental cleanup crews worked to prevent oil that leaked into the dam's ice and trash sluiceway from reaching the Columbia River, but a small amount of oil did reach the river. Crews constructed a grout curtain, recovery wells and underflow dam in the sluiceway; these proved effective in collecting oil that was seeping from the adjacent spill area. The response ultimately removed 120 cubic yards of contaminated soil and oil-saturated sorbents from around the containment facility where the spare transformers were stored. The investigation is still underway as to why the secondary containment surrounding the transformer failed.

Old Steilacoom Marina Fire

A former Steilacoom marina caught fire in early October 2009, scattering charred debris along the nearby shoreline. Responders noted silver ribbons of petroleum trailing the debris field. It was determined that the petroleum was unrecoverable and the fire likely consumed much of what was in the tanks of the vessels that caught fire.

Fish and Wildlife biologists did not believe the sheen of petroleum outside the boomed area of the marina posed a significant risk to fish or wildlife. Ecology hired a cleanup contractor to place containment boom around the entire burned-out marina structure to keep debris from floating further out into the sound.

Leaking transformer at The Dalles Lock and Dam

Fire at Old Steilacoom marina

Kettle Falls Train Derailment

Two railroad engines and a box car derailed in a remote wooded area adjacent to the Columbia River in Stevens County, Washington. The derailment occurred where a landslide had undermined the track. Two railroad employees received minor injuries.

Responders from the Kettle Falls International Railway Company, the Stevens County Sheriff's Office, Ecology and the Lake Roosevelt National Recreation Area all came to the scene. While the engines had a total capacity of 4,000 gallons of diesel fuel, there was no significant release. The railway company hired a contractor to remove the fuel and right the engines.

Landslide derails railroad engines

PREVENTION

Oil Transfer Rules

Over 15 billion gallons of oil are transferred over Washington's waters each year. The state's Oil Transfer rules have been in place since October 2006, and continue to have a very positive preventive effect on oil handling operations in the state. State inspectors have consistently inspected approximately 10% of the nearly 15,000 oil transfers that occur each year with a focus on those transfers that represent higher risk of spills. It is noteworthy that the spill rate during transfer operations in Washington averages less than 1 gallon spilled per 100 million gallons transferred.

In addition, as of October 2007, the rules require that vessel and facilities transferring oils at high flow rates pre-boom their operations whenever it is safe and effective to do so. When conditions are too severe for safe and effective pre-booming, alternative measures must be in place to respond to any spill event. In 2009, the pre-booming rates continued to improve. Statewide the pre-booming rate jumped to 89%, with over 94% of all bunker operations in Puget Sound being pre-boomed. These values are quite significant since the recovery rate for contained spilled oil is easily 6 to 8 times higher than uncontained oil.

Vessel Inspections

Washington has actively inspected commercial vessels of 300 gross tons or more since 1994. Ecology's inspectors have conducted approximately 500 vessel safety and environmental protection inspections, including another 500 spill notification drills, each year for the last five years. These inspections seek to determine whether selected vessels pose a substantial risk to state waters. Vessels have traditionally been screened for inspection either because they are first-time callers at Washington ports, or based on their potential risk due to a number of weighted risk factors, such as country of registry, age, type of vessel, owner/operator, or recent change in ownership, etc.

Until this year, Ecology had no specific inspection performance measures to either ensure a focus on the highest risk vessels, or for the performance of compliance inspections. Through 2008, approximately 80% of the vessel inspections were focused on technical assistance as opposed to compliance exams.

While vessels were screened for relative risk, the inspections were to some degree based upon ease of access (e.g., boarding vessels at dock rather than ones at anchor, during normal business hours, etc.).

The establishment of a full complement of oil transfer inspectors has allowed our vessel inspectors to devote increased attention to "non-oil transfer" related inspections. Thus, in 2009, Ecology re-dedicated its efforts and outreach to the highest priority vessels (first-time callers and those vessels that screened highest for relative risk),

acknowledging that those vessels would offer the greatest prevention benefit. To maximize the value of inspections, we emphasized the completion of compliance inspections. As a result, compliance inspections increased 200% for the highest risk vessels available for inspection.

PREPAREDNESS

Oiled Wildlife Rescue and Response Goes Mobile

The Washington Departments of Ecology and Fish & Wildlife got a first-hand demonstration about how refining, oil handling and vessel shipping companies in the state can effectively set up a mobile response operation to rescue and care for wildlife affected by oil spills.

The November 2009 event was the culmination of two years of hard work by the Marine Spill Response Corporation and Clean Rivers Cooperative Inc. These two private, non-profit spill response entities worked closely with representatives from state and federal agencies, wildlife response contractors and the oil industry to create a jointly-operated mobile oiled wildlife response unit.

Mobile Wildlife Care Facility Demonstration; photo courtesy of British Petroleum Cherry Point Refinery

The demonstration met Ecology's new planning standard to have sufficient strategies, personnel and mobile equipment in place that can be sent anywhere in the state to rehabilitate 100 oiled birds within 24 hours of an oil spill. Additionally, mobile response capability is under development by the National Response Corporation (NRC) and should be completed in June 2010. The NRC mobile response unit will also be 100-bird capable.

Emergency Response Tug at Neah Bay

Since 1999, the state funded emergency response tug stationed at Neah Bay has provided an important safety net to prevent disabled ships and barges from grounding in the western Strait of Juan de Fuca or off the outer coast. On March 24, 2009, Governor Christine Gregoire signed legislation to shift funding responsibility for the emergency response tug boat from the state to the maritime industry. Vessel owners and operators will update their contingency plans to describe their access to the tug, conditions for call out and a commitment to deploying the tug in deployment drills. Industry is scheduled to have the tug on station by July 1, 2010.

The regulated tank and non-tank vessel industry worked together to contract for the tug and develop a funding mechanism. Both the Ecology and the Coast Guard will continue to be able to contract the industry-funded tug directly for call-out in a vessel emergency. Additionally, Ecology has been directed to initiate discussions with the Canadian government to share the marine response assets as required by the legislation.

RESPONSE

Responses Rapid, Aggressive and Well Coordinated

In summer 2009, the Spills Program's strategic planning effort identified key initiatives that would further enhance our work in preventing, preparing and responding to incidents and spills. One of our strategic initiatives is to ensure a rapid, aggressive and well coordinated response to spills and incidents. Some particular points of emphasis are that we:

- Assertively protect state interests;
- Capture Lessons Learned, both successes and areas to improve;
- Adhere to policies, procedures and direction;
- Respond to spill potential; and
- Mobilize adequate and appropriate response resources.

PROGRAM INFORMATION

For more information on the Washington Department of Ecology, please visit:www.ecy.wa.gov.

Ecology's Spill Prevention, Preparedness and Response Program website is:http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/spills/spills.html

www.oilspilltaskforce.org